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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the current HIV testing protocols, especially 
provider-initiated counselling and testing, otherwise known as ‘routine testing,’ under 
implementation in sub-Saharan African countries and examine whether and how they 
transgress bioethical and philosophical principles and the human rights of women in the 
current context of the highly stigmatised HIV epidemic. The research method employed is 
mainly a literature review partly based on my 20 years of experience working on HIV 
testing programmes and programmatic evaluations in sub-Saharan African countries, from 
which earlier background papers and this thesis topic grew. Included in this primarily 
moral examination are the historical philosophical and present bioethical principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, justice, and non-maleficence, the philosophical right to self-
preservation, and relevant human rights principles and recent examples of human rights 
infringements related to the HV testing, in particular, the routine testing of women in sub-
Saharan African countries. A conclusion is reached that where HIV testing is practiced in 
sub-Saharan African countries, and anywhere for that matter, without alignment with the 
bioethical principles of respect for autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, 
and without protecting the human rights of individuals testing for HIV, including the 
provision of pre- and post-test counselling, implementing the informed consent process, 
maintaining the confidentiality of test results, and making referrals to other services 
available to all individuals who test negative or positive, as well as making antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) available to anyone who tests HIV-positive, such testing is unethical. Thus 
I posit that without the aforementioned conditions, the routine testing for HIV of all 
individuals presenting to a clinic for healthcare—and the routine testing of all pregnant 
women for HIV—amidst the highly stigmatised HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa is 
unethical.  
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis has benefited from the inputs and support from my two supervisors, Dr. 
Anthony Egan, S.J. and Professor Ames Dhai. I also would like to thank all the staff 
members at the Steve Biko Centre of Bioethics for their continuing support and to 
Professor Patrick Dessein, Professor Thaddeus Metz, Baroness Onora O’Neill, and 
Professor Thomas Pogge for their support ‘along the way.’  
 
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
          Page 
DECLARATION        ii 
DEDICATION        iii 
ABSTRACT         iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS       v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS       vi 
ACRONYMS         viii 
 
CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  1 
THE HIV TESTING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION       1 
1.0.1 Brief History of HIV Testing and the Impact of Stigma  3 
1.1 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH     4 
1.2 DEFINITIONS OF HIV TESTING PROTOCOLS   5 
1.2.1 Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT)    6 
1.2.2 Provider-Initiated Counselling and Testing (PICT)   7 
1.2.3 Diagnostic Testing       8 
1.2.4 Mandatory Testing       8 
1.2.5 Universal Testing       8 
1.3 HIV TESTING AND ETHCAL PRINCIPLES    9 
1.4 LITERATURE SURVEY      12 
1.4.1 Views on the Ethics and Bioethics of HIV Testing   12 
1.4.2 Autonomy and HIV Testing      14 
1.4.3 Autonomy as the Basis for Informed Consent    16 
1.4.4 Beneficence and HIV Testing      18 
1.4.5 Non-Maleficence and HIV Testing     22 
1.4.6 Justice and HIV Testing      25 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD LIMITATIONS    28 
 
CHAPTER 2: STIGMA AND ROUTINE TESTING   31 
2.0 INTRODUCTION TO STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION  
AND HIV         31 
2.1 AUTONOMY AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE IN HIV TESTING  32 
2.2 THE IMPACT OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV)  35 
2.3 EXAMPLES OF CRIMINALISATION OF HIV   38 
2.4 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO’s) HIV    40 
TESTING POLICY 
2.5 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  43 
(CDC’s) HIV TESTING POLICY 
2.6 INFORMED CONSENT AND HIV TESTING    45 
2.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNSELLING    48 
2.8 HIV TESTING AS THE GATEWAY TO CARE   50 
2.9 CONFIDENTIALITY AND HIV TESTING    52 
2.10 RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY AND HIV TESTING   55 
2.11 PRE-TEST COUNSELLING AS A CRUCIAL STEP   59 
2.12 IMPLEMENTATION OF POST-TEST COUNSELLING  60 
2.13 HIV TESTING AND LINKAGES TO PREVENTION   65 
AND CARE 
vii 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: HIV TESTING AND JUSTICE    71 
3.0 RECENT HISTORY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS  71 
3.1 AUTONOMY AND JUSTICE      72 
3.2 RAWLS ON JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS     74 
3.2.1 Justice and Self-Esteem ad HIV Testing     75 
3.2.2 Human Rights Jurisprudence and HIV Testing    76 
3.2.3 Rawls on Mill and Justice      77 
3.2.4 Rawls on Justice and Equality      78 
3.3 NELSON MANDELA, JUSTICE AND HIV    80 
3.4 JUSTICE AND HEALTH RIGHTS     85 
3.5 HEALTH RIGHTS AND HIV      88 
3.6 RECENT HIV AND RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA  95 
Table 1: HIV Prevalence in Females & Males Aged 15-24 in  96 
6 Southern African Countries 
3.7 JUSTICE, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS    104 
 
CHAPTER 4: HIV TESTING AND BENEFICENCE   118 
4.0 INTRODUCTION TO BENEFICENCE     118 
4.1 HISTORY OF BENEFICENE IN THE PROVISION OF   120 
MEDICAL CARE 
4.2 BENEFICENCE AND FEMINIST THEORY    129 
4.3 BENEFICENT PRACTICE TOWARD INDIVIDUALS   132 
4.4 BENEFICENCE AS A VIRTUE      138 
 
CHAPTER 5: HIV TESTING AND NON-MALEFICENCE  144 
5.0 THE EMERGENCE OF NON-MALEFICENCE    144 
5.0.1 Mill and the Harm Principle      145 
5.0.2 Non-Maleficence and Individual Freedom    148 
5.1 NON-MALEFICENCE AND SELF-PRESERVATION   151 
5.2 NON-MALEFICENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS    160 
5.3 NON-MALEFICENCE RELATED TO HIV    162 
5.4 NON-MALEFICENCE AS A HUMAN DUTY    165 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 192 
FOR THE FUTURE 
6.0 BIOETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE HIV TESTING OF    192 
WOMEN IN AFRICA 
6.1 BIOETHICAL CHALLENGES OF THE HIV TESTING OF  194 
ADOLESCENTS 
6.2 RECENT HIV RESERCH RESULTS RELATED TO    196 
CHALLENGES WOMEN FACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
6.3 CONCLUSION ON THE BIOETHICAL AND HUMAN   201 
RIGHTS CHALLENGES OF THE HIV TESTING OF WOMEN 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMMATIC AND POLICY 202 
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO HIV TESTING 
 
REFERENCES         205 
 
viii 
 
ACRONYMS 
ACHPR  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
ART   Antiretroviral therapy 
ARV   Antiretroviral 
BONELA  Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS 
CDC   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States 
CICT   Client-initiated counselling and testing 
DOH   Department of Health of South Africa 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
GBD   Global Burden of Disease Study 
GBV   Gender-based violence 
GTZ   Deutsch Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenabeit 
HIV   Human immunodeficiency virus 
hrHPV   High-risk human papillomavirus 
IPV   Interpersonal violence 
NDOH   National Department of Health, South Africa 
NNRTI  Non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor 
OAU   Organisation of African Unity 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights of the United 
Nations 
OI   Opportunistic infection 
OSI   Open Society Institute 
PEP   Post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV  
PICT   Provider-initiated counselling and testing 
PITC   Provider-initiated testing and counselling 
PLHIV  People living with HIV 
PMTCT  Prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
ix 
 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
STD   Sexually transmitted disease 
STI   Sexually transmitted infection 
TB   Tuberculosis 
UDHR   United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
UN   United Nations 
UNAIDS  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
US   United States of America 
VCT   Voluntary counselling and testing 
WHO   World Health Organization 
WMA    World Medical Association 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
HIV TESTING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the ethical implications and impacts on women and girls of various 
types of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing under implementation in or 
consideration for South Africa and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This research on 
the ethics of HIV testing supports the necessity of protecting and realising the rights of 
individuals amidst the HIV epidemic response, in particular individual women who are 
more vulnerable to HIV infection, and who may or already be living with “possibly the 
most stigmatised disease in history” (Cameron, 2010, p. 6).  Through the implementation 
of ethical HIV testing protocols in South Africa and other sub-Saharan African countries, 
the rights of individuals, including women and girls, will receive greater protection. 
Moreover, the research argues that by protecting the rights of individual women in regard 
to HIV testing and in the overall HIV response, there will be a better chance of reaching 
the public health goal of decreasing the rate of new HIV infections overall. That is, by 
respecting the health and human rights of individuals, especially individual women and 
girls, society itself will benefit—although the aim of the research will not be to try to prove 
the latter hypothesis (Mann, 1996, p. 924).  
 
To override the individual rights of women to achieve public health objectives in this 
highly stigmatized HIV epidemic does not seem like a just, moral, or caring objective, 
especially as women biologically are more vulnerable to HIV infection than men due to 
anatomical, physiological, and reproductive health reasons (Chersich and Rees, 2008, p. 
S29). Moreover, women have lower socioeconomic and sociocultural status than men, 
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putting them at greater risk of infection due to various factors that this thesis will describe 
(ibid., p. S35). Yet HIV testing protocols currently focus on testing more people for HIV 
infection rather than making undergoing an HIV test a truly voluntary act and well-
informed decision and do not necessarily provide access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) if 
an individual tests HIV-positive. Since women have a greater need to access health care 
than men due to their reproductive health issues, which also can make them biologically 
more vulnerable to HIV infection, they are more likely to be tested for HIV, whether or not 
such testing is voluntary and truly informed and results in ART provision, if needed.  
 
Women are tested for HIV more frequently than men for a variety of reasons, including 
testing during pregnancy and because more women than men voluntarily undergo HIV 
testing due to their health concerns (Young, Hlavka, Modiba, et al., 2010, p. 621). Some 
have described these factors as placing the burden of HIV testing on women (Knight, 
Shoveller, Greyson, et al., 2013, p. 7). Thus women are subject more than men to any 
unethical practices surrounding HIV testing simply because more women than men are 
tested for HIV. Also, the inferior social position of women in African society means that 
they have less individual agency and autonomy than men (Jewkes, Dunkle, Nduna, et al., 
2010, p. 48). Consequently, women in Africa have less power to object to any unethical 
practices they may undergo under the guise of ‘voluntary’ HIV testing. The unethical 
practices some women encounter range from the use of coercion to test for HIV, the lack 
of informed consent or any consent, the lack of information provision and counselling to 
explain the testing procedure, the meaning of the potential testing results, and any 
availability of health care they may need or wish to access, or the lack of confidentiality 
about the result of their HIV test (Angotti, Dionne and Gaydosh, 2010, pp. 1, 8; Orza, 
Welbourn, Bewley, et al., 2015, pp. 16-17).  
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1.0.1 Brief History of HIV Testing and Impact of Stigma 
The first HIV tests became available in 1985, a few years after HIV was discovered in 
1981 (Staveteig, Wang, Head, et al., 2013, p. 1). At that time before ART was available to 
treat HIV and AIDS effectively, the benefits of HIV testing were questioned and ethical 
concerns were raised by many around the world based on the substantial stigma toward 
and discrimination against people living with HIV (ibid.). Unfortunately, the stigmatisation 
and discrimination regarding people living with HIV has not abated in many places and is 
still widespread in sub-Saharan Africa (Logan, Plank, Bogart, et al., 2013, p. 1). The 
stigma toward and discrimination against people living with HIV is particularly directed 
toward women, who are the most vulnerable to HIV infection due to their greater 
biological vulnerability, which is exacerbated by the gender inequality and lower 
socioeconomic and socio-cultural status of women in African societies (UNDP, 2012, p. 
68; Gari, Malungo, Martin-Hilber, et al., 2013, p. 1; Horwood, Butler, Haskins, et al., 
2013, p. 1; UNAIDS, 2013, p. 79). Also, the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV) 
in many African countries increases women’s risk of HIV infection from HIV-positive 
partners (Jewkes, Dunkle, Nduna, et al., 2010, p. 48; Adimora, Ramirez, Auerbach, et al., 
2013, p. S169). Behavioural evidence has shown that men who practice GBV against their 
partners also tend to practice HIV-risk behaviours, such as having multiple sex partners, 
frequent alcohol use, and having a sexually transmitted infection (STI), which increase 
their partners’ risk of HIV infection (Garcia-Moreno, Pallitto, Devries, et al., 2013, p. 21). 
The possibility of suffering from GBV, abandonment, loss of economic support, family 
disruption, community marginalisation, and losing one’s place of residence are all barriers 
to HIV testing because of the fear of many women that their test result may be positive 
(Medley, Garcia-Moreno, McGill, et al., 2004, p. 300). 
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1.0.2 The HIV Epidemic in South Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan African countries have the largest HIV epidemics in the world, and South 
Africa has the world’s largest number of people living with HIV in any country in the 
world, estimated at 5.9 million people in 2013 (UNAIDS, 2014b, p. A27). Moreover, more 
women than men are living with HIV in Africa, with women making up nearly 60% of the 
people living with HIV on the continent (UNAIDS, 2012, p. 3). Not only is it important to 
protect the rights of people living with HIV, but it is especially important to protect the 
rights of women living with HIV because of their greater vulnerabilities, including 
vulnerability to unethical testing protocols and practices.  
 
1.1 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH  
The rationale for the research is that it is important to understand the potential bioethical 
and human rights ramifications of the approaches and content of various HIV testing 
protocols for the following reasons: 
• To be able to design HIV testing protocols that are ethically sound;  
• To not infringe on the individual rights of anyone testing for HIV;  
• To not infringe on the rights of any groups particularly vulnerable to HIV infection, 
such as women, based on their heightened biological, socio-economic, and socio-
cultural vulnerability to the virus; 
• To allow for the provision of the necessary level of care to anyone refusing to test 
for HIV, including pregnant women, due to their fear of the greater potential for 
intensified stigma and discrimination if testing HIV-positive, including by sex 
partners, family members and community members; 
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• To prevent stigmatization toward or discrimination against individuals who 
undergo testing after potential exposure to HIV, including rape survivors, and 
especially girls and female adolescents; 
• To not deter anyone who is ill from seeking health care due to the fear of ‘routine’ 
HIV testing, as an increasing fear of testing for HIV could have a deleterious 
impact on the spread of HIV amidst the global pandemic and the world’s largest 
HIV epidemic, in South Africa.  
By reviewing the various HIV testing methods and protocols and the ethics surrounding 
these approaches and protocols and how the testing protocols are implemented, this thesis 
will examine potential unethical testing approaches and protocols and possible human 
rights infringements relating in particular to the HIV testing of women and girls.  
 
1.2 DEFINITIONS OF HIV TESTING PROTOCOLS  
Each of the HIV testing protocols will be defined. These include: HIV voluntary 
counselling and testing (VCT); provider-initiated testing and counselling (PITC), also 
called ‘routine testing’; a request for HIV testing by a patient from a private health care 
practitioner or by a health care practitioner to a patient for diagnostic purposes; mandatory 
or compulsory testing; and the latest, universal testing or ‘test and treat’.  
 
In South Africa, “HCT” is the acronym used by the Department of Health (DOH) for any 
type of HIV counselling and testing, while “HTC” is the common short form acronym 
used in a number of other sub-Saharan African countries for any form of HIV testing 
(Republic of South Africa, Department of Health, 2014, p. 20). In 2015 South Africa’s 
DOH distinguished between only two forms of HCT, client-initiated counselling and 
testing (CICT) and provider-initiated counselling and testing (PICT), although the national 
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HIV guidelines state that “all forms of HCT should be voluntary” (ibid.). However, for the 
purposes of this paper, I have broken down HIV testing and counselling into more 
categories, as follows. 
 
1.2.1 Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) 
Voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) is when an individual either voluntarily goes to a 
health-care or community-based centre where VCT is provided and requests an HIV test, 
or when an individual requests an HIV test if home-based HIV testing is available in the 
community (WHO, UNAIDS, GTZ, et al., 2004; Doherty, Tabana, Jackson, et al., 2013, p. 
3). In this protocol, available in developing countries for some 20 years, pre-test 
information and counselling is provided on an individual, confidential basis and can 
include personal risk-reduction identification by a trained counsellor to help the person 
understand her risk of HIV infection and devise strategies to reduce her risk, including 
HIV prevention methods (WHO, UNAIDS, GTZ, et al., 2004, p. 34). The HIV test is 
performed by the provider with a rapid test kit, taking a pin prick of blood from the client’s 
finger. Some 20 minutes later after the test result is visible, the result is provided 
confidentially to the client, explained, and post-test counselling is provided, whether the 
person has tested negative or positive (ibid.). The provider describes the implications of 
the test result and discusses risk-reduction counselling to prevent future HIV infection if 
the person has tested negative or onward transmission of HIV if the person has tested 
positive (O’Grady, 2005, p. 27). For a person testing positive, the provider writes a referral 
to a health-care centre or laboratory for a CD4+ cell count (if this service is available) to 
test the person’s immune system level and whether she should start antiretroviral therapy 
(ART), if available, if she has reached the threshold for treatment in her country through 
the public-health system. In some countries, ART can be made available as soon as 
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possible after a person tests HIV-positive if funding is not an issue and the health system 
will support the immediate availability of and access to lifelong ART. In South Africa, for 
example, the 2015 HIV guidelines recommend ART initiation at a CD4 count of  ≤ 500 
cells/mm3, which is consistent with the latest WHO guidelines from 2013, but in fact in 
2015 the country is still struggling to meet WHO’s previous guidelines for ART initiation 
for individuals testing HIV-positive at ≤ 350  cells/mm3 with some 3 million people 
accessing ART in early 2015, or less than 50% of the 6.8 million South Africans estimated 
by UNAIDS to be living with HIV (RSA, DOH, 2014, p. 15; Bekker, Venter, Cohen, et al., 
2014, p. 105; UNAIDS, 2015, p. 1).   
 
1.2.2 Provider-Initiated Testing and Counselling (PITC)/Routing Testing 
Provider-initiated or routine HIV testing has been recommended in the United States of 
America (USA) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) since 2006 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) for countries with generalised HIV epidemics, 
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, since 2007 (Branson, Handsfield, Lampe, et al., 
2006; WHO, 2007). Routine testing is when an individual goes to a health-care practitioner 
or clinic for diagnosis, care, or treatment of any illness, for a health check-up, or a 
pregnant woman for antenatal care, and the health-care practitioner states the individual 
will be tested for HIV unless she declines the HIV test, known as ‘opting out’ (WHO, 
2007, p. 20). Test-related information is provided before the HIV test is performed rather 
than specific pre-test counselling; the information given varies in the level of detail by the 
facility and provider, although related guidelines were released in 2007 by the WHO (ibid., 
p. 36). If an individual ‘opts out’ of routine testing stating she does not want to be tested 
for HIV, the provider should not test her. Post-test counselling generally is provided only 
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to individuals who test HIV-positive through routine testing, although the WHO 
recommended in 2007 post-test counselling for anyone testing for HIV (ibid., p. 39).  
 
1.2.3 Diagnostic Testing 
Individuals seeking health care through a private provider or at some public health clinics 
in sub-Saharan African countries can request an HIV test, but counselling generally is not 
offered. The WHO calls testing based on specific signs and symptoms, the approach 
generally used for most medical tests, “diagnostic testing,” or diagnostic testing and 
counselling” if counselling is offered  (WHO, 2012, p. 18).   
 
1.2.4 Mandatory Testing  
Mandatory or compulsory HIV testing is when all adults or the whole population of a 
country are tested without an opportunity to decline the HIV test, as was done in the 
former Soviet Union in the late 1980s/early 1990s (UNESCO, 2005, p. 16). Mandatory 
HIV testing of individuals occurs in some countries in southern Africa to obtain insurance, 
to enter the military, before blood and organ donation, and for immigration purposes 
(Armstrong, 2008, p. 6). Mandatory HIV testing has not been linked to treatment for HIV, 
which complicates its ethical implications by potentially diagnosing an individual with a 
dreaded, deadly disease without providing any access to treatment for it. In 2013 
mandatory testing was suggested by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and several 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders as a viable strategy to curb 
the spread of HIV, showing that this testing approach may be seeing a resurgence of 
support by policy makers (Mbanje, 2013, p. 1).  
 
1.2.5 Universal Testing  
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Voluntary universal testing for HIV emerged conceptually in 2009. In theory, voluntary 
universal testing of HIV is linked to universal treatment for anyone testing HIV-positive 
(Granich, Gilks, Dye, et al., 2009, p. 48). However, this hypothetical approach is based on 
a controversial mathematical model supposedly verifying effectiveness, the validity and 
public health value of which many have questioned. Several published responses to this 
study questioned the ethics behind the mathematical model using data from South Africa’s 
generalised HIV epidemic (and admitted guesswork) in which adults 15 and older would 
be tested for HIV annually and started on ART immediately if testing HIV-positive 
(Jurgens, Cohen, Tarantola, et al., 2009, p. 1079; Cairns, 2009, p. 3). The model also had 
significant problems in its epidemiological assumptions and design, according to several 
respondents (Ruark, Shelton, Halperin, et al., 2009, p. 1078; Hsieh & de Arazoza, 2009, p. 
1079). Moreover, the cost that such an HIV testing approach would involve, including the 
necessary human resources and funding for massive testing and lifelong ART for many 
millions of people, was felt by some to be prohibitive (Bartlett, 2009, p. 1). Other 
modelling study results published in 2010 show that universal testing and immediate 
treatment with ART for individuals testing HIV-positive could promote greater 
proliferation of drug-resistant strains of HIV, which would defeat its public health 
objective (Smith, Okano, Kahn, et al., 2010, p. 1). Resistance of HIV to ART is causing 
clinical and public health problems in Europe and the USA, and resistant strains are 
growing in developing countries, where the deleterious impact could be much greater in 
resource-constrained settings with larger epidemics (ibid.).  
 
1.3 HIV TESTING AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
I will argue that it is essential for South Africa and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
to encompass the bioethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
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maleficence, and justice, and the related sub-issues of informed consent and privacy and 
confidentiality, in their HIV testing protocols and for HIV testing to be ethically beneficial 
on both the individual and population levels. And sometimes there will not be an easy 
union of individual and common good. Exploring and answering questions about the 
ethical content of HIV testing protocols, including voluntary counseling and testing, 
provider-initiated or ‘routine’ testing, mandatory testing and universal testing or the ‘test 
and treat’ approach, will shed light on whether these interventions are indeed ethical and 
respectful of human rights, especially the rights of individual women. (In South Africa and 
some other countries HIV counselling and testing (HCT), or HIV testing and counseling 
(HTC), is the ‘blanket’ term used to encompass the various types of testing-related 
interventions available.) 
 
Identifying the most ethical testing methods to use amidst the world’s largest HIV 
epidemic, here in South Africa, where a massive testing campaign was introduced by the 
government in April 2010, could also help identify the protocols potentially most 
beneficial for reaching public health objectives. Moreover, examining the essential ethical 
content of routine testing and other HIV testing interventions could help guide the 
evolution of an optimal testing intervention or the optimum range of testing interventions 
for South Africa and other countries in the region in the future as the HIV epidemic and 
the responses to it continue to unfold. It is important to recognize that in medicine and 
public health, “there is no universally accepted way to do ethics”, according to a prominent 
ethicist (Sokol, 2010, p. c3256). Thus identifying the full range of ethical issues evident in 
the various HIV testing protocols and describing where and how they impede the 
implementation of recognised bioethical principles and veer off into human rights 
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infringements or outright violations related to women and girls would advance the fields of 
both bioethics and human rights.  
 
Reducing HIV transmission is a primary rationale for HIV testing. Emphasising the need 
for voluntariness, good counselling both before and after HIV testing, and accessible ART 
provision supports HIV testing as an entry point to both prevention and care. Interrogating 
the ethical issues surrounding current HIV testing protocols and making recommendations 
for the future also could help countries provide not only more humane services, but lead to 
greater uptake of testing and the necessary referral services to prevention, treatment, care, 
and support services―resulting in beneficial impact for individuals and public health by 
decreasing the number of new HIV infections―especially in women and girls.   
The bioethical principles to be examined regarding HIV testing include respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. The following definitions by 
Beauchamp and Childress will be used for these principles: respect for autonomy, as a 
norm respecting the decision-making capacities of autonomous persons; non-maleficence 
as a norm of avoiding the causation of harm; beneficence as a group of norms for 
providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and costs; and, distributive justice 
as a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001, p. 12). However, the philosophical views of autonomy and that autonomy 
involves liberty of action will also be explicated; and, views of justice beyond distributive 
justice, including justice as fairness and social justice, will be reviewed. The two most 
important ethical issues challenged by some current HIV testing protocols are autonomy 
and justice. Autonomy is challenged when HIV testing is not voluntary, or is perceived not 
to be a matter of choice through the lack of including an informed consent process prior to 
testing, or if testing appears to be coercive and individual agency is overridden. In these 
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cases, autonomy is overridden because of the end, that is, testing more people for HIV, 
justifying the means of involuntary testing. Justice is challenged when HIV testing results 
are not kept confidential in the current social environment of stigma toward and 
discrimination against people living with HIV (PLHIV), or no counselling is accessible 
surrounding HIV testing, or testing is forced without access to HIV care and treatment if 
one tests positive. The occurrence of the events also show a lack of beneficence and indeed 
are maleficent. Other ethical issues to be interrogated with respect to HIV testing include 
human rights, specifically the right to self-preservation, related to the right to health care 
and argued by some to be a socioeconomic right and by others to be encompassed by the 
concept of social justice. Yet self-preservation can be perceived as a more basic right than 
either of those concepts encompass. Any of these rights are profoundly dense and complex 
matters. 
 
1.4 LITERATURE SURVEY 
The current debate about the efficacy of various HIV testing methods centres around a 
utilitarian justification of aiming to reach a public health objective of fewer new HIV 
infections through the use of a routine testing approach for HIV, which some believe 
infringes on human rights. This thesis will make a rights-based argument related to the 
ethics of various HIV testing protocols, which bioethical principles help expand beyond 
the common human rights framework normally discussed because they encompass explicit 
rights of patients and duties of health-care providers. The following literature review 
includes literature related to these two areas most prominently and more selectively to the 
key issues and the most important points related to the ethics of these testing protocols 
regarding the rights of women and girls, starting with routine HIV testing. 
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1.4.1 Views on the Ethics and Bioethics of Routine HIV Testing 
Several authors have raised ethical questions about routine HIV testing in medical journal 
articles since 2006. Yet they have not necessarily linked their questions to bioethical 
principles. While not identifying the principle of autonomy, Rennie and Behets reviewed 
informed consent for HIV testing in developing countries, where disempowerment is 
common and the ‘voluntariness’ of routine testing and choice can be questionable based on 
power differentials between patients and health-care practitioners, especially when the 
patients are women (Rennie and Behets, 2006, p. 54). However, power differentials 
between patients and health-care practitioners are not limited to developing countries. 
Rennie and Behets, Maman and King, and Bassett and Walensky focused on gender 
inequalities specifically in developing countries and the commonality of women who test 
HIV-positive facing stigma, violence, and abuse in these countries, emphasising that 
routine testing may expose women and girls to significant harm or maleficence (ibid., pp. 
54-55; Maman and King, 2008, p. 198; Bassett and Walensky, 2010, p. S81).  
 
A Kantian-based examination of routine testing was done by Metz, although he also used a 
utilitarian lens in reaching his conclusion. Metz determined that routine testing does not 
violate rights, can promote health, and is morally justified even where ART is unavailable 
or unaffordable (Metz, 2005, p. 397). He based his conclusion on assumptions promoted 
by public health advocates on the potential benefits of routine HIV testing to result in 
fewer HIV infections in the future (ibid.). He cited support for his statements that people 
who test HIV-positive subsequently engage in safe sex from an article published in 1991, 
when advocates hoped VCT would result in disclosure of positive status and the practice 
of safer sex (i.e., using a condom) by PLHIV and have an impact on the spread of HIV 
(ibid.). These assumptions from more than 20 years ago have not been proven by research 
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results supporting such outcomes, although to gain additional information intrusive 
measures might have to be used. Research has shown that disclosure of positive HIV status 
remains limited, mainly because of HIV-related stigma and discrimination, including in 
South Africa (Wong, Van Rooyen, Modiba, et al., 2009, p. 220). Metz supported routine 
testing as a “means” likely to justify achieving the public health goals of reducing HIV 
transmission and improving access to ART, stating that such testing is justified even if 
ART is not available (Metz, 2005, p. 405). Ironically, he justified routine testing mainly on 
utilitarian grounds rather than on the Kantian principle of autonomy, which does not 
support the end justifying the means.  
 
Knight and colleagues reviewed several ethical issues related to HIV testing approaches in 
peer-reviewed literature and how they pertained to public health and/or individual 
interests. Among the issues they reviewed were John Stuart Mill’s principle of preventing 
harm to others; the impact of stigma on HIV testing; and, mandatory testing (Knight, et al., 
2013, pp. 2, 4, 7). They determined that consequentialist arguments focusing on whether 
testing approaches were morally permissible or not had neither robust empirical or 
theoretical underpinnings related to the needs of individuals or public health. Knight and 
colleagues did not examine gender issues related to HIV testing, although they reviewed 
the issue of pregnant women and coercive or mandatory testing and the rights of the foetus 
versus the rights of these women (ibid., p. 7). Noting that forms of ethics emphasising 
equity, justice, and the structural distribution of health and illness had not been included in 
the testing literature they reviewed, Knight and colleagues recommended the need for 
continued articulation of both evidence- and theory-based ethics regarding HIV testing 
(ibid., p. 10). 
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1.4.2 Autonomy and HIV Testing 
Kant’s principle of respect for human dignity and that every human being is of “absolute 
and incomparable worth” is the basis for respecting the autonomy of each and every 
human being, i.e., respecting an individual’s right to make her own decisions about her 
actions and her life (Kant, 1996, pp. xvii, xxii). The bioethical principle of autonomy is 
based on the Kantian principle of autonomy: the ability to make a choice, to weigh the 
specific factors involved, to make a determination about a present or future action, and to 
take action based on one’s decision, all of which are dependent on rationality, the human 
ability to reason. Exercising autonomy recognises the right to liberty of action. 
Contemporary philosophical notions of individual autonomy also encompass conditions 
influencing decision-making other than the necessity of choosing what could be considered 
ethical for everyone, such as psychological and social factors enabling or delimiting 
autonomy (Oshana, 2006, pp. 87-88). Fundamental to autonomy is the opportunity for 
choice. 
 
For health-care practitioners, respect for autonomy obligates them to disclose information 
to the patient pertinent to a procedure or intervention they recommend, including the 
potential benefits and harms of the procedure; to probe for and ensure patient 
understanding and voluntary agreement to undergo the procedure; and, to foster adequate 
decision-making by the patient about whether she freely gives consent for the procedure 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 64). Some may see this as a controversial claim 
regarding HIV testing, pitting individual autonomy against collective autonomy, or the 
individual’s rights against a public health prerogative. Yet HIV testing is in invasive 
procedure.    
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In interrogating whether routine testing encompasses respect for autonomy, I will examine 
whether a health care practitioner stating to a patient she will be tested for HIV unless she 
declines indeed respects patient autonomy. If there are no signs and symptoms of HIV 
disease in a patient, yet the healthcare provider states she will test the patient for HIV 
simply because the person lives in a country with a generalised HIV epidemic, this 
approach may discriminate against individuals living in these countries even though 
WHO’s rationale for routine testing is to protect more people from HIV infection (see 
Chapter 2). If the patient has seconds to decide if she wants to be tested for HIV and has to 
immediately decline if she objects, this testing process does not seem to respect 
autonomous decision-making involving the time needed to make an individual choice. If 
the patient has no prior relationship with the healthcare practitioner who states she will be 
testing the person for HIV, the average patient may not feel she is in a position to decline 
the test the more powerful health care provider intends to conduct. For example, 68% of 
individuals who tested for HIV within 11 months of Botswana adopting HIV routine 
testing as its national policy reported they felt they could not refuse the test (Maman & 
King, 2008, p. 197). In Malawi in 2007, rural women who were interviewed did not 
perceive HIV testing as a choice, but as compulsory to be able to receive antenatal care 
(Angotti, Dionne and Gaydosh, 2010, p. 1). In 2010, personal reports from a few South 
African provinces showed that “people are being told that unless they agree to be tested, 
they will not be provided with healthcare” (IRIN Plus News, 2010, p. 2). Routine testing 
may infringe on freedom and equality, conditions for autonomy. 
  
1.4.3 Autonomy as the Basis for Informed Consent 
If an individual is given limited information about the HIV test before it is performed, does 
this show respect for autonomy by following an ‘informed consent’ process, the standard 
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manifestation of respect for patient autonomy in medical care? According to Manson and 
O’Neill, informed consent is voluntary consent for a course of action under which those 
requesting consent must provide an explicit statement of the nature and purposes of the 
proposed action, including its effects, risks and other features, to an individual whose 
consent is sought (Manson & O’Neill, 2007, p. 10). Consent may not be “informed” if it is 
based on limited information provision. If an ‘opt-out’ process is used, whereby a patient 
has to quickly orally object to the performance of the test, rather than the use of an ‘opt-in’ 
process, whereby the patient would have to say, “Yes, I do want to be tested for HIV” 
before the test is administered, consent may be questionable. The approach of the health 
care provider stating, “I am going to test you for HIV unless you say no,” could appear 
coercive or manipulative, especially where personal power differentials are great. The use 
of coercion voids autonomy in bioethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 94). Routine 
testing also could be seen as an example of a positive ‘framing effect,’ that is, framing a 
wish in such a way to guide the patient to make a specific decision as an apparent positive 
gain (Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, et al., 2005, p. 2). In bioethics, use of the framing effect is 
considered a barrier to informed consent (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 95).  The 
opt-out routine testing protocol does not seem to show sufficient respect for patient 
autonomy to be considered morally just, according to both the bioethical and Kantian 
principles of autonomy, an argument I will develop more fully in Chapter 2. 
 
Regarding mandatory testing, respect for autonomy is not even at issue, as the protocol 
overrides respect for autonomy based on its non-voluntariness. Yet whether this testing 
protocol would be advisable in some HIV epidemic circumstances and thus warranted in 
overriding respect for autonomy to protect public health, a utilitarian or consequentialist 
goal, will be examined. Mandatory testing is important to investigate ethically based on 
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several new legislative bills in African countries designed to establish and implement 
mandatory testing measures and other controversial HIV-related legal amendments. One of 
the bills was passed by Uganda’s Parliament in 2014 and signed into law by Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni on 31 July 2014 (Barton, 2014, p. 2). The new Ugandan law 
enacted in 2014 permits mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women and their sex partners, 
and survivors of GBV, and it enables the courts to release the HIV status of these 
individuals against their will and without their consent, potentially exposing them to 
physical violence from sex partners and other family or community members (Burnett, 
2014, p. 1). 
 
1.4.4 Beneficence and HIV Testing 
Beneficence requires the balancing of benefits and harms that may result from an action to 
determine whether or not, on balance, the action is beneficial (Kass and Gielen, 1998, p. 
92). With respect to beneficence and VCT, the patient already has decided getting tested 
for HIV is in her best interest, with such beneficence dependent on autonomous decision-
making. Thus VCT can be considered a beneficent HIV testing protocol on this basis. The 
same rationale can be used for beneficence in regard to a patient requesting an HIV test 
without counselling from a private health care practitioner.   
 
With respect to routine HIV testing, however, the rationale is that it is in the best interests 
of society, or in the interests of public health, that people be tested for HIV, rather than in 
the best interests of the individual. Where ART is accessible after an individual tests HIV-
positive, there is an individual benefit in testing: the ability to start treatment and prolong 
life if one tests positive. The public health benefit in these circumstances is that taking 
ART lowers an individual’s HIV infectiousness. The results of one study suggested that if 
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many people infected with HIV are taking ART, fewer people will become infected with 
HIV in the future (Das Douglas, Chu, Santos, et al., 2010, p. 1). However, the results of 
another study showed that while expanded HIV testing and treatment will increase the life-
expectancy of people living with HIV (PLHIV), it will have only a modest impact on HIV 
transmission and thus is unlikely to halt the epidemic (Walensky, Paltiel, Losina, et al., 
2010, p. 1). Consequently, there may be a public health benefit from routine testing if it 
results in more people accessing ART and thus fewer people living with HIV who will 
remain highly infectious. But whether routine testing for HIV definitely will have a 
positive impact on public health is unclear, especially in areas where there may not be 
many people living with HIV.   
 
Taking a test for an infectious disease, including HIV, does not in itself lower an 
individual’s infectiousness. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that individuals do not 
necessarily practice safe sex after they learn they are HIV-infected, and one may wonder 
why they are not. According to Simoni and Pantalone, some are afraid of rejection and 
abandonment, or violence and other forms of abuse from their partner (2004, p. 110). 
While the reasons behind this outcome vary, it is mainly because the rampant stigma 
toward and discrimination against PLHIV prompt many people not to disclose their HIV-
positive status to their sex partners, and some to no one at all (Sullivan, 2005, p. 33; 
Niccolai, King, d’Entremont, et al., 2006, p. 102; Wong, et al., 2009, p. 220).  
 
Routine testing may not be beneficent where counselling is not available to patients testing 
negative, thus providing no HIV prevention benefit to them. Its beneficence also is 
questionable where ART is not accessible to patients testing positive, providing no 
treatment benefit, or where a threshold has to be reached in an individual’s CD4+ cell 
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count before ART is provided through a public health system, especially where there are 
waiting lists of up to a year for patients who have reached the threshold for treatment 
(during the course of which some die), or in countries where ART is largely unavailable. 
Mandatory testing also is not in itself a beneficent HIV testing protocol. 
 
Whether routine testing on its own can be in the individual patient’s best interest is 
debatable. Before ART became available in 1996 in developed countries and in 2004 
through the South African public health system to patients who reach the necessary low 
CD4+ count threshold, the beneficence of VCT for individuals was debated. The theory at 
the time of initial availability of VCT and which remains in the era of routine testing is that 
if patients learn they are HIV-positive but do not have access to ART, at least they will 
know they have weakened immune systems. Then they promptly can seek treatment if they 
are infected with an opportunistic infection (OI), such as pneumonia or tuberculosis (TB). 
Yet this theory assumes OI treatment will be accessible to all PLHIV, that they will be able 
to afford to go wherever the treatment is available for their specific OI (of which there are 
many), be able to pay for treatment or access it through the public health arena, and 
perhaps be cured of whatever infection they have developed. Recent research results show, 
however, that these assumptions are not valid for many Africans (Irin PlusNews, 2010, 
p.1).  
 
I believe that whether HIV testing seems beneficent for an individual should be a decision 
made by the individual. When routine testing is not linked to counselling for individuals 
testing negative and not linked directly to treatment for individuals testing positive, this 
protocol appears to be deficient in beneficence and justice, unless the procedure is fully 
voluntary whereby the individual has decided in advance that knowing her HIV status will 
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be in her best interest—underscoring the autonomy of the decision—whether or not 
treatment will be available afterward. Unless a woman is pregnant, it is unlikely she would 
have decided to be tested for HIV and not already gone for HIV testing at a facility 
offering VCT unless other issues precluded it, such as lack of transport funds to reach a 
facility or the lack of necessary childcare assistance.  
 
Knowing one’s HIV-positive status despite lacking access to ART is presumed to be 
beneficial for mothers living with HIV who are approaching death and want to prepare 
themselves and their children for their deaths to try to lessen emotional pain and promote 
greater child stability. Yet it is hard to imagine how routinely testing a patient for HIV and 
telling her she has a fatal illness if ART is not available is in her best interest. Is routine 
testing really a public health protocol designed to control the HIV epidemic, as I believe, 
and beneficent to individuals and public health only if ART accompanies routine testing?  
 
Along with examining HIV testing issues from the individual woman’s viewpoint, I will 
examine whether the public health goal of routine testing—the utilitarian goal of 
substantially decreasing the number of new HIV infections—is an ethical rationale. 
Currently, there is no evidence to show that routine testing itself lowers the prevalence rate 
(percent of the population at risk who are infected) or the incidence rate (percent of new 
infections in the population at risk in one year) of HIV anywhere. The rationale for routine 
testing relies on the public health assumption that testing more people for HIV will result 
in lessening viral spread, a beneficent public health goal, but also a questionable outcome 
(WHO, 2012, p. 12).  
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A caveat regarding the efficacy of routine testing is when it is linked to the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV, which connects testing with treatment to 
help prevent transmission of the virus from the mother to the foetus or baby. The WHO 
guidelines on PMTCT recommend full ART provision to the mother, making the PMTCT 
protocol beneficent both for the baby and for the mother (WHO, 2009, p. 5). Previously, 
PMTCT focused on reducing the risk of transmission to the baby and physically benefitted 
only the foetus or baby. Yet it benefitted the mother emotionally by reducing her risk of 
passing her infection to her baby, which some pregnant women who knew they were 
infected with HIV were concerned about (Bello, Ogunbode, Adesina, et al., 2011, p. 33; 
Hamela, Tembo, Rosenberg, et al., 2013, p. 37). It is important to note that the latest 
PMTCT protocol includes treatment for both mother and baby, including lifelong ART for 
the mother in countries with generalised HIV epidemics, not only a routine test for HIV for 
the mother (WHO, 2013a, p. 100).  
  
1.4.5 Non-Maleficence and HIV Testing 
For 2,000 years, “primum non nocere,” or “first do no harm,” echoed in the ‘Hippocratic 
Oath,’ has been the fundamental guideline of Western medicine (Pappas, Kiriaze & 
Falagas, 2008, p. 347). Non-maleficence in bioethics means that no matter what you do to 
a patient, do not harm the person, or at least do not leave the person worse off than before 
you started to intervene (Jonsen, 1975, p. 27). Non-maleficence is important for health care 
practitioners to keep in mind regarding a patient’s emotional and psychological, as well as 
physical health. More than 35 years ago, six years before HIV was discovered, 
internationally renowned bioethicist Edmund D. Pellegrino asked, “Where is the delicate 
balance drawn between assuming moral authority on the justification of an emergency and 
overstepping the patient’s moral agency?” (Pellegrino, 1975, p. 215). This question 
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addresses both respect for patient autonomy as well as the need for non-maleficence by the 
health-care provider. Such a question is central to ethical decisions that have to be made by 
individual health-care providers, agencies, and nations about the necessary response to the 
HIV epidemic. It also shows there is overlap in bioethical principles relating to individual 
rights versus public health.  
 
Regarding the possibility of having to give a patient bad news about being infected with a 
fatal or at least long-term chronic disease, it is important to reflect on the difference for the 
patient between voluntarily requesting an HIV test and the potential result, versus a patient 
being told by a health-care practitioner she will be tested for HIV unless she refuses with a 
possible resulting diagnosis of HIV infection. Some have speculated that once it becomes 
common knowledge that HIV testing will be conducted when anyone goes to a clinic or 
practitioner for health care, fewer people will access health care because they will fear 
being tested for HIV. This worry has been expressed by a number of health care 
practitioners in journals and by some southern Africans themselves in recent surveys 
(Weiser, Heisler, Leiter, et al., 2006, p. 1017; Wynia, 2006, p. 5; Becker, Tsague, Sahabo, 
et al., 2009, p. 3).  
 
Imagine a young South African woman in her early 20s who goes to a public health clinic 
because her nose is blocked and has been blocked for ten days. She feels tired all the time, 
and her body aches. She doesn’t want to get out of bed each morning, and she’s worried 
because her infection is affecting her work productivity as a domestic. She wants ‘tablets’ 
to make it go away. When she finally sees a health care practitioner after standing in the 
long queue of patients at the clinic, she is told by the practitioner she will be tested for HIV 
unless she refuses. She is glad to see the practitioner and she is too scared to say no, 
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although she doesn’t really understand what the practitioner has said about the test. She is 
tested for HIV. Twenty minutes later she is told by the practitioner she is HIV-positive, 
and she must go to another clinic in a city to have her CD4+ count tested to see if she can 
be put on ART. She is asked if she has any questions. But she is too stunned to know what 
to ask. She sits in the chair in shock and tries to listen to what the health care practitioner is 
saying. All she can think of is that she may die soon, and then who will take care of her 
young daughter? 
 
This is how routine HIV testing works, using the opt-out approach, which is supposed to 
be implemented across South Africa, was recommended in the USA in 2006, and has been 
implemented in Botswana since 2004 (Branson, et al., 2006, p. 4; Kenyon, 2005, p. 21). In 
Botswana, though, the original routine testing protocol was ‘opt in’ by the patient, rather 
than ‘opt out’ (CDC, 2004, p. 1).  Consideration of all the impacts of routine testing on 
individuals is needed to make an ethical determination. For example, does routine testing 
for HIV of the young South African woman, telling her she is HIV-positive, and giving her 
a referral note for a clinic in the closest city to have her CD4+ cell count tested appear to 
be a largely beneficial intervention, without any detrimental impact to her emotionally or 
psychologically? According to bioethicist Albert Jonsen, “To benefit is to balance; to harm 
is to unbalance or fail to balance” (1975, p. 28). 
 
While patients may be no worse off physically after being tested for HIV, many patients 
are worse off emotionally and psychologically based on stigma toward and discrimination 
against PLHIV (Hensen, Baggaley, Wong, et al., 2012, p. 67; Loutfy, Sherr, Sonnenberg-
Schwan, et al., 2013, p. 5). They can be denied job opportunities, their relationships or 
marriages can deteriorate, and they can experience verbal abuse or physical violence if 
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others find out they are HIV-positive (Gaillard, Melis, Mwanyumba, et al., 2001, p. 938; 
April, 2010, p. 4). Stigma also includes the internal stigma many PLHIV feel on which 
Edwin Cameron has written so cogently (Cameron, 2005, p. 53). Many individuals feel 
they have no one to turn to for support. Indeed many may not, as recent study results on 
HIV disclosure in two locations in South Africa showed (Wong, et al., 2009, p. 216). Even 
if a person has a family member or friend to turn to after she learns she is HIV-positive, 
the psychosocial support system available in most sub-Saharan African countries through 
public health systems is minimal at best. The availability of support or lack thereof is 
relevant because of the commonality of depression in PLHIV, especially to individuals 
after learning they have tested HIV-positive. Another recent study in South Africa showed 
that 22.5% of HIV-infected patients had thought about suicide, and 69% of these patients 
had thought about it as a result of testing HIV-positive (Thom, 2009, p. 11). I believe 
routine testing interventions cannot be considered non-maleficent in and of themselves 
even if they are linked to the provision of ART to patients who test HIV-positive. The 
potential for negative psychological and emotional impact on a patient after testing HIV-
positive is one of the reasons why the voluntariness of HIV testing is crucial. 
  
1.4.6 Justice and HIV Testing 
I now turn to justice, including justice as fairness, distributive justice, and social justice. In 
regard to giving someone her due, is it just to tell her you are going to test her for a 
dreaded disease unless she refuses because she has come to a health clinic? Doesn’t this 
seem like it could be considered discriminatory practice toward individuals who are sick, 
or women who are pregnant, or anyone living in a country with a generalised HIV 
epidemic? I do not believe it is fair to tell a patient you plan to test her for a dreaded, 
stigmatised disease if you do not plan to offer her treatment for the disease if she is 
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diagnosed with it. Such a notion of fairness is aligned with that of Rawls, which is that all 
obligations to others arise from the principle of fairness, a theory of justice; that “each 
person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties,” 
and “that when justice as fairness is fully realized in a well-ordered society, the value of 
full autonomy is likewise realized” (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 226, 301; Rawls, 2000, pp. 341, 
344). Leaving someone on her own to suffer whatever negative consequences she may 
have to contend with after testing HIV-positive seems unjust.  
 
Perhaps routine testing could be considered a just protocol only if it is linked to access to 
ART and other health-care support for all individuals testing HIV-positive and available 
support for all individuals who test HIV-negative. If this is done, routine testing will 
comply with at least one of the factors ensuring a rights-based approach in the policy 
statement on HIV testing released in 2004 by UNAIDS/WHO before the routine 
testing/PITC guidelines were released (2004, p. 3). With regard to linking routine testing 
to treatment and care, justice equates with the right to health care, which many argue is a 
human right and with which I agree (Shue, 1996, p. 171; Rawls, 1999b, p. 50; Ashford, 
2007, p. 185; Gewirth, 2007, pp. 221, 225; Pogge, 2008, p. 74). 
 
Some bioethicists believe that in addition to justice, the bioethical principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence also underlie the societal obligation to provide “a decent 
minimum of health care” (Beauchamp and Faden, 1979, p. 128). Whether routine testing 
when not linked to health care can be shown to be morally unjust, and lacking in 
beneficence and non-maleficence, will be included in my interrogation. Others believe that 
health care should be subsumed under a principle of justice that guarantees the fair 
equality of opportunity, or distributive justice (Daniels, 1981, p. 95; Daniels, 2009, p. 37).  
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Linking routine testing to treatment also is a distributive justice issue regarding the 
resources needed for ART provision in developing countries. One has to question whether 
implementing routine testing in countries that cannot afford to make ART available to 
those who test HIV-positive is not only morally unjust, but lacking in pragmatism. Routine 
testing does not seem just even to the majority if the rationale is simply to test as many 
people for HIV as possible. Testing people for an infectious disease without any access to 
treatment or care if they have the infection has no real public health value, nor will it make 
the majority of people happier, or promote the greater well-being of all, other utilitarian 
goals. Awareness of the levels and impacts of HIV epidemics by public health 
professionals has been known for more than ten years. Testing more people for HIV to 
find out more about the epidemic, how to prevent more infections, and how to treat people 
for this illness is unnecessary even from a utilitarian point of view. Thus routine testing 
without access to ART does not seem efficacious as a valid utilitarian approach beyond 
whether it is morally just or unjust on the individual level.  
 
Another current issue related to justice is that some believe treatment for HIV in 
developing countries with the largest epidemics in the world should be supported primarily 
by resources emanating from developed countries. Their belief is premised on a duty of 
implementing social justice to individuals born in countries lacking or with huge 
disparities in socioeconomic equity (Pogge, 2008, p.79; Selgelid, 2008, p. 124).  
 
These are a few questions I will examine related to justice, distributive justice, and social 
justice. However, I believe developing countries have health care-related duties to their 
citizens and the issue is not only a cosmopolitan one related to the responsibilities of 
28 
 
countries—developed and developing. The duty not to impose unjust social institutions on 
other human beings, or an unjust social order as aligned with Pogge’s concept of 
cosmopolitanism, surely not only transcends borders but is relevant within one’s own 
national borders and is a responsibility of any government (Pogge, 2002, p. 86). 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD LIMITATIONS 
It is important to note that this thesis does not draw on new empirical research, but is based 
on the available literature and my work on HIV testing, which began in 1995. The research 
undertaken for the thesis is primarily theoretical, yet includes some important, relevant 
results from recent empirical studies. The study design involved a review of literature 
related to ethics, human rights, bioethical principles, autonomy, justice and social justice, 
welfare, the HIV epidemic, stigma and discrimination against PLHIV, the history of HIV 
counselling and testing, current and historical HIV testing guidelines, and related emerging 
and evolving issues surrounding current modes of testing, as well as potential HIV testing 
methods projected for use in the future.  
 
The research method that was used entailed the exploration of routine testing and other 
HIV testing methods as a moral problem. Concerning empirical inquiry, the method 
employed was theoretical. The range of approaches available for HIV testing and the 
ethical issues these approaches encompass is a current ethical and public health problem 
that may be better understood through examination and explication.  Ethical inquiry, 
including analysis of the means (reasonable and ethical actions by individuals and groups) 
and ends (a just and good goal for individuals and groups), was undertaken. The method 
involved clarification of the issues, concepts (ideas), logic (the relationships between the 
way decisions are made by individuals and determinations made for public health 
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purposes), and criticism of intent (how experience is conceptualised, described, and acted 
on). The relevant issues are identified in the thesis, and how they relate to human dignity 
and individual rights are described. Related developments in rights theory from the 1600s 
to the present day are reviewed and referenced. The facts surrounding ethical and public 
health issues related to routine HIV testing and other testing protocols are outlined. 
Examples from published research study results and other relevant journal articles are 
provided.   
 
The groups and individuals having a stake in HIV testing and the outcomes, and their 
special needs and obligations, especially those of women and girls, are characterised. The 
options for taking specific approaches to HIV testing related to ethics and public health are 
summarised. The ethical reasons for and against taking specific approaches, including 
voluntary counselling and testing, routine testing, mandatory HIV testing, ‘universal’ 
testing, and potentially other new approaches to HIV testing, are examined.  
 
The main focus is on the options regarding HIV testing that will produce the least harm to 
an individual, especially an individual woman or girl in sub-Saharan Africa, without 
compromising public health. Common individual and gender-based circumstances related 
to HIV testing in the present epidemic environment, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are 
an important focus. A conclusion regarding the ethical basis for and ethically appropriate 
methods of HIV testing of women is reached, including relevant recommendations for the 
future. Several health-care and legal professionals have identified a few human rights 
concerns regarding HIV testing over the last five or more years. Yet to my knowledge, an 
extensive examination of the relevant bioethical principles and human rights and the 
ethical implications of HIV testing protocols, with recommendations on revisions 
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specifically to routine testing to make it a more ethical intervention, especially for women 
and girls, has not been undertaken previously. 
 
Books, journal articles (both electronic and hard copy), and other related philosophical and 
health publications have been used for the research and writing. A ‘snowball’ approach has 
been used, i.e., reviewing references in the most important related publications, both 
books―classics through contemporary―and journal articles to expand the information 
sources and the ethical underpinnings, and relevant research study results published prior 
to and during the research period. All information search engines available through the 
Wits Library’s electronic catalogue and books from the Wits libraries, as well as other 
lending libraries available through other universities, were accessed. Google Scholar and 
other search engines such as ProQuest, Science Digest, etc., were used to include other 
relevant source materials.  
 
Historical and contemporary ethics, medical ethics, human rights, and bioethics theories 
and practices have been assessed related to HIV testing, particularly of women in sub-
Saharan Africa. Where relevant, data from the results of published empirical studies was 
examined regarding specific ethical issues related to epidemic status and trends, HIV 
testing, vulnerability to HIV infection, secondary and tertiary socioeconomic vulnerability 
and status, and other emerging issues within the research itself. Key data has been used to 
defend or refute ethical arguments, where relevant, along with the most important ethical 
and human rights theories, policies, and potentially existing or planned programming. Data 
include those relevant to the ethical issues surrounding HIV testing methods and policies 
under discussion for the future in sub-Saharan Africa and their potential implications for 
and impact on women and girls in the region.    
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CHAPTER 2: STIGMA AND ROUTINE TESTING 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION TO STIGMA AND DICRIMINATION AND HIV 
Stigma and discrimination related to HIV infection and HIV testing have been issues of 
serious concern for individuals and vulnerable groups since the HIV epidemic began 
(April, 2010, p. 4). They remain issues causing anxiety to many today. A recent study in 
Zambia showed that discrimination against people living with HIV by health-care workers 
and stigmatising attitudes toward them by community members continue to be common 
barriers for individuals in deciding whether to be tested for HIV (Gari, et al., 2013, p. 1).  
The study investigators also hypothesised that because of the level of tolerance of GBV in 
Zambia, to which women living with HIV are highly vulnerable, women’s fear of potential 
abuse can govern their decisions about HIV testing (ibid.). Moreover, the study noted that 
other studies in Zambia have shown that women who are living with HIV and who have 
suffered from GBV are more likely not to receive treatment for their disease because of 
their fear of further violence and abandonment by their families (ibid.). Such findings are 
not limited to women in Africa. A recent literature review of articles published in Africa, 
Canada, Europe, and the USA from 1980 to 2012 found that the emotional well-being of 
women is affected by stigma, discrimination, violence, lack of self-resilience, and post-
traumatic stress, resulting in an impaired quality of life and lack of adherence to HIV 
medication, negatively affecting clinical outcomes (Loutfy, et al., 2013, p. 11).  
 
This chapter will explore autonomy as an ethical issue and its relationship to HIV testing, 
the impact of GBV on women related to HIV and testing, the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission, the HIV testing policies of the WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), informed consent and HIV testing, pre- and post-test 
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counselling as integral parts of HIV testing, and HIV testing as a gateway to care, with 
linkages to HIV prevention and care interventions.  
 
2.1 AUTONOMY AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE IN HIV TESTING 
Autonomy is derived from two Greek words, autos, which means ‘self,’ and nomos, which 
means ‘laws’ or ‘rule,’ and the word originally referred to the self-governing city-states in 
ancient Greece (Elander & Hermeren, 2013, p. 153). The contemporary use of the word 
autonomy related to individuals connotes different meanings to different philosophers. A 
number of differing frameworks for autonomy have been advanced by philosophers, as 
well as various types of autonomy, such as moral autonomy, personal autonomy, ethical 
autonomy, legal autonomy, political autonomy and social autonomy, among others 
(Christman & Anderson, 2005, pp. 2, 15). Only a few descriptions of autonomy will be 
examined briefly here, those that seem most relevant to the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy and its importance in HIV testing.   
 
To many philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and his followers, autonomy is used to 
denote self-government, related to an individual who is self-governing, thus referring back 
to the original meaning of the word (Gregor, 1996, p. xxiv). To be self-governing to some 
philosophers means the ability to make choices for oneself and the action of making such 
choices without interference by others. However, autonomy is used by other philosophers, 
such as contemporary philosopher Marilyn Friedman, to connote self-direction, giving the 
sense of a more long-term planning process by an individual for her life, which would 
involve making choices, some important and long-lasting and others more immediate and 
mundane, but with an idea in mind of the path her life should take (Friedman, 2005, p. 
156). Both of these senses of autonomy are important, even though none of us is truly self-
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governing and no one can be solely self-directing. All human beings live in some country 
that governs its citizens; and, all human beings are dependent on others and individual life 
circumstances, as well as the surrounding social, political, and environmental conditions, 
which are crucial factors in the range of self-directing choices and actions that are 
available to anyone.    
 
Contemporary versions of autonomy generally entail reference in some way to philosopher 
Immanuel Kant’s ‘principle of autonomy’ (Kant, 1996, p. xxii). The ability to make a 
choice, to weigh the specific factors involved, to make a determination about a present or 
future action, and to take action based on one’s decision is dependent on rationality, the 
ability to reason. In his writings, Kant explored the unique human capacity for “practical 
reason” and that such rationality influencing the will is what separates humans as 
“intelligible beings” from other “non-rational beings” (ibid., p. 544; Kant, 1991, pp. 90-
91). Moreover, Kant wrote that the rational nature of human beings is what makes persons 
“ends in themselves,” not just the “means” for achieving ends―and that all actions must 
harmonise with this principle of humanity (ibid., pp. 92-93). Kant’s respect for human 
dignity and that every human being is of “absolute and incomparable worth” is the basis 
for respecting the autonomy of each and every human being, that is, respecting an 
individual’s right to make her own decisions about her actions and her own life (Kant, 
1996, pp. xvii, xxii).  
 
What is important to understand about Kant is that his principle of autonomy centres 
morality within rationality, and that human reason is the source of moral legislation (ibid.). 
But Kant did not mean that every person makes her own morality. Rather, in identifying 
“the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law,” Kant 
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meant that the moral principle(s) an individual follows in determining actions of the will 
should be the same moral principle(s) that any individual would follow in the same 
circumstances of determining right action (Kant, 1991, pp. 90-91). Thus, the ability to 
universalise a right action, or the capacity to make a rational determination and attribute 
one’s chosen action morally to what anyone would choose, is a key concept in Kant’s 
moral philosophy. The universality of right action is what unites his notion of autonomy to 
rationality (reason) and the dignity inherent in each human being, since the “moral law,” or 
“universal law of right,” resides within each person (Kant, 1996, pp. 269, 388).  
 
Kant’s idea of autonomy is considered by many to be idealistic and not a practical way to 
make decisions concerning individual circumstances involving the weighing of a variety of 
pluses and minuses before making a determination and taking action. Indeed, Kant was 
more focused on a “distinctive conception of autonomy” (O’Neill, 2002, p. 74). Kant’s 
conception might be called moral autonomy as it conceptualises an overall moral basis, or 
perhaps more rightly a moral method for living, whereas individual autonomy can involve 
choices, decisions, and actions that are not fundamentally based on moral principles, or 
methods of decision-making that would fall into the moral realm, as well as others that 
would be morally based. Indeed, more contemporary notions of individual autonomy 
encompass conditions influencing decision-making other than the necessity of choosing 
what could be considered ethically universal for everyone, such as psychological and 
social factors enabling or delimiting autonomy (Oshana, 2008, pp. 87-88). Yet it is the 
Kantian concept of autonomy that lies behind the contemporary bioethical principle of 
respect for autonomy that is used in medicine today, as one of four bioethical principles 
central to medical ethics and which shall be examined later in this chapter and in 
subsequent chapters of this paper, where relevant (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 63). 
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2.2 THE IMPACT OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV) 
The lower socioeconomic status of women than men also limits their personal autonomy 
and ability to access the care they need if they have to make time during the day while 
caring for their family and home and/or somehow find transportation funds to travel to a 
clinic, both of which can be factors impeding HIV testing (April, 2010, p. 4). These 
inhibiting factors are of central importance in the case of rape when access to antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) to prevent HIV infection is essential within 72 hours (WHO, 2013d, p. 4). 
The fear of HIV testing because of potential GBV after one tests HIV-positive means that 
many women do not possess the personal autonomy and self-efficacy needed to access 
HIV testing and the treatment and care needed afterwards if they test positive. According 
to Gari, et al., the lack of being able to freely decide to test for HIV due to the fear of 
violence or social exclusion is a human rights violation (2003, p. 8). Moreover, the fear of 
violence as the impetus for HIV testing violates Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” 
(UN, 1948, p. 1).  
 
According to the WHO, the lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence (physical 
and/or sexual) or non-partner sexual violence against women aged 15 and over in Africa is 
45.6%, a strikingly high percentage and the highest of any region (2013b, p. 20). That 57% 
of the people living with HIV (PLHIV) in Africa, the epicentre of the global HIV 
epidemic, are women emphasises the heightened vulnerability of women in Africa to both 
GBV and HIV infection (UNAIDS, 2014b, p. 78). Gender-based violence increases the 
risk of HIV infection to women physiologically through traumatic injury to genitalia, with 
an even greater physiological susceptibility to infection by children and adolescents who 
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undergo sexual violence (ibid., p. 81). Women who have suffered sexual violence as 
children or adolescents are susceptible to HIV infection later in life as they have enhanced 
social and psychological vulnerability to infection due to their potential for increased 
sexual risk-taking based on the experience of violence in their youth (ibid.1). Indeed, 
recent studies of women in Uganda and young women in South Africa found that women 
who had experienced intimate partner violence were 50% more likely to be HIV-infected 
than women who had not experienced violence (ibid., p. 80). A study by the WHO in 2005 
found that men who were violent toward their female sex partners were also more likely to 
have multiple sex partners and be infected with HIV (UNDP, 2012, p. 64). Of additional 
concern is that another study in Uganda found that 29% of the surveyed women living with 
HIV reported they had undergone intimate-partner sexual violence in the last year, and 
those on ART were twice as likely to report such violence (UNAIDS, 2013, p. 81). These 
recent statistics underscore that while there are some reports of decreasing stigma and 
discrimination against PLHIV in some places, a high degree of stigma and discrimination 
exists in Africa to which many women living with HIV attest. It is not surprising that 
African women who previously have suffered GBV or who feel they are at risk of it would 
hesitate to be tested for HIV. 
 
It seems to be a moral dilemma in the context of substantial stigma toward and 
discrimination against women living with HIV in Africa and the growing awareness of 
their heightened risk of GBV that pregnant women are routinely tested for HIV in many 
clinics, at a time when they are extremely vulnerable in a variety of ways. Yet only half of 
countries collect data on the linkages between HIV and GBV, so while awareness of the 
links is growing it does not seem to be widespread (ibid., p. 82). Recently, the Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law found that:  
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“Coercive and discriminatory practices in health care settings  
are rife, including forced HIV testing, breaches of confidentiality  
and the denial of health care services, as well as forced  
sterilisations and abortions (UNDP, 2012, p. 65). 
These apparently unethical practices focus specifically on women. Reports on forced 
sterilisation and abortion among women living with HIV have emerged from Kenya, 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, among other countries and, 
according to the Commission, some of the women claimed they were denied access to 
HIV-related health services unless they agreed to abortion or sterilisation (ibid., p. 66). In 
late 2013 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) condemned 
coerced sterilisation as a blatant violation of the fundamental rights of women living with 
HIV, rights that are guaranteed under the Africa Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 2013, p. 1). The African Commission based their 
pronouncement on coerced sterilisation of women in Kenya and Namibia who were 
challenging the practice in court. These reports belie HIV testing as voluntary, and all the 
practices identified by the women and the commissions are human rights violations. These 
practices reinforce why women can fear HIV testing, especially where HIV exposure and 
transmission are criminalised and mothers living with HIV can be prosecuted for passing 
on the virus to their children, such as in West and Central Africa (UNDP, 2012, p. 23). The 
transmission of HIV from an infected mother to her child can occur during pregnancy, 
labour, delivery, or breastfeeding (WHO, 2013d, p. 4). If a pregnant woman does not know 
she is infected with HIV and passes on the virus to her child, it is unjust to criminalise her 
for such transmission. Yet the laws in some countries do not take this circumstance into 
account. Indeed, the plural legal systems of constitutional law and codified 
customary/religious law concerning private and family life in some countries in Africa can 
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perpetuate gender inequality and discriminatory practices and have “negative implications 
for women’s sexual health” (UNDP, 2012, p. 63).  
 
2.3 EXAMPLES OF CRIMINALISATION OF HIV  
Despite interventions by several civil society organizations, in April 2013 Botswana’s 
Parliament passed a bill that allows medical practitioners to test for HIV without patients’ 
consent, to force patients to be tested for HIV, to test patients for HIV before deciding 
whether to carry out non-urgent procedures, and to allow doctors to disclose patients’ HIV 
status to their sex partners (Bernard & Cameron, 2013, p. 25). Botswana’s Public Health 
Bill was signed into an Act of Parliament in September 2013 (News Botswana, 2013, p. 1). 
The intent of the law in Botswana was to isolate people infected with HIV who knowingly 
infect others with the virus, which in theory has some merit, but as it also allows doctors to 
force individuals to be tested for HIV through a court order, and it enables the situation of 
mandatory HIV testing of an individual against her will (Botswana Network on Ethics, 
Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA), 2013, p. 1). Kenya criminalises HIV transmission in its 
Sexual Offences Act, which one Kenyan woman lawyer said will lead to most pregnant 
women wanting to deliver at home, risking a dangerous delivery, to avoid antenatal care 
and HIV testing and reprisal from health-care providers (ibid., p. 66). Uganda drafted its 
HIV Prevention and Control Bill 2010 to include mandatory HIV testing of pregnant 
women, their partners, and survivors of sexual offences, discretion by medical personnel to 
disclose one’s HIV status to one’s sex partner, and criminalisation of intentional and 
attempted transmission of HIV/AIDS, among other clauses. The controversial law was 
passed unanimously by Parliament in mid-May 2014, and was assented to by President 
Yoweri Museveni at the end of July 2014, despite 43 civil-society organisations attempting 
to have it reworded to delete mandatory testing (Agaba, 2013, p. 1; Fallon, 2014, p. 1). 
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These examples of laws criminalising HIV transmission are only a few of those that have 
been under discussion by legislators in African countries in the last five years. There is a 
movement to criminalise HIV transmission arising in some countries even though since 
2010 there have been successes in restricting the use of criminal law to cases of intentional 
transmission of HIV in Congo, Guinea, Senegal, and Togo (Bernard and Cameron, 2013, 
p. 25).  
 
It is understandable that pregnant women would not only fear the potential of being 
imprisoned if they pass on the virus to their child, but also the possibility of having to go to 
court to defend themselves when they may not have known they were infected with the 
virus or were unable to prevent HIV transmission. While the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission may seem to some to be a very good reason why pregnant women should get 
tested for HIV, the existing interventions to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
(PMTCT) of HIV are not available everywhere in Africa. Nor is HIV testing itself 
available in every clinic where women deliver babies, especially in rural areas. For 
example, only 41% of 96 public health facilities surveyed in an evaluation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013 provided HIV testing for PMTCT (O’Grady, 
Sadaphal, Mandjo, et al., 2013, p. xiii). Of those 39 clinics offering HIV tests, only 59% of 
them, or 23, which is about 25% of all the clinics surveyed, provided antiretrovirals 
(ARVs) for PMTCT (ibid.). Thus if ARVs to prevent HIV transmission are unavailable, it 
is impossible for women in some areas to prevent the transmission of their HIV infection 
to their baby even if they know they are infected with the virus. In countries where home 
deliveries remain common, preventing the transmission of HIV to the baby at birth can be 
impossible if the mother is infected with the virus and gives birth at home―whether she 
knows she is infected or not. Thus in some areas HIV testing may be a futile prevention 
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intervention where antiretrovirals remain unavailable. Moreover, mandatory testing does 
not prevent HIV infection. 
 
2.4 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)’S HIV TESTING POLICY  
Since 2007 the WHO has recommended routine HIV testing in countries with generalised 
HIV epidemics, including routine testing of pregnant women (WHO, 2007). The view of 
the WHO was that routine testing should be standard clinical practice where patients 
present with symptoms of HIV and where ART is available or the country’s national plan 
states it would be made available eventually (Baggaley, Hensen, Ajose, et al., 2012, p. 1). 
However, what “eventually” meant went unexplained by the WHO in 2007, and some 
countries did not make ART available to anyone testing HIV-positive, including 
individuals meeting the WHO guidelines for ART of having a CD4+ call count below 200. 
In 2007 only 31% of individuals estimated to be in need of ART according to the WHO 
guidelines received it of the estimated 33 million people living with HIV (WHO, 2008 
p.1). In 2013 the WHO revised its clinical guidelines for HIV to include initiating ART for 
all HIV-positive pregnant women and HIV-positive women who are breastfeeding and 
other HIV-positive adults and adolescents with a CD4+ cell count of 500 or below (the 
CD4+ cell count of an individual is an indicator of the progress of an HIV infection) 
(WHO, 2013a, p. 92). Obviously, the WHO’s revised guidelines assume that ART will be 
available in clinics, a false assumption for many areas in Africa. Thus the WHO made a 
recommendation in 2013 that many countries did not have the resources to act on. More 
progressively, in 2013 the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) made a “moderate 
recommendation” for HIV-positive individuals to start ART even if their CD4 cell count is 
over 500, meaning that individuals can start treatment as soon as they are diagnosed HIV-
positive and can continue it lifelong (NIH, 2013, p. E1). The new guidelines by the WHO 
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and NIH for HIV treatment are excellent in that they support provision of ART to PLHIV 
and pregnant and breastfeeding women who are HIV-positive.   
 
Despite the recent progressive guidelines issued by the WHO and the NIH, in some areas 
in Africa treatment may not be available if women test HIV-positive, and PMTCT may not 
be available for pregnant women who test positive (UNAIDS, 2014b, pp. A63, A67-A68). 
A study published in 2011 found that less than half of HIV-infected women in sub-Saharan 
Africa receive PMTCT interventions (Turan, Bukusi, Onono, et al., 2011, p. 7). In areas 
where ART is not available and stigma toward and discrimination against PLHIV is rife, 
telling a pregnant woman she will be tested for HIV unless she refuses it, giving her 
perhaps 10 seconds to make up her mind, and afterward potentially telling her she is 
infected with a virus she may believe is a ‘death sentence’ does not seem like an ethical act 
by a health-care provider. Yet this is the unenviable position the WHO has recommended 
that has put many nurses in clinics in Africa where resources, including ART, are scarce. 
After a testing situation that may be experienced by a woman as coerced if access to 
treatment is not available if she tests HIV-positive, this might be considered a human 
rights violation. As explored earlier in Chapter 1, many nurses in such situations claimed 
they were following orders, focusing on reaching testing targets, and dealing with long 
waiting-room queues as rationales for carrying out routine testing on pregnant women 
where the women may have felt the decision was coerced (Maman & King, 2008, p. 197; 
Angotti, et al., 2010, p. 1). Yet it is important to explore the reasons why and the rationale 
behind the current practice of coercive HIV testing.  
 
Health-care providers generally describe routine testing as an “offer” to test a person for 
HIV (Turan, et al., 2011, 7). However, the ‘opt-out’ protocol used for routine testing at 
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clinics consists of telling a woman she will be tested for HIV unless she explicitly refuses 
(Topp, Chipukuma, Chiko, et al., 2011, p. 1). Thus routine testing using the ‘opt-out’ 
approach is not an “offer” to test a person for HIV. Rather, it consists of telling a patient in 
a vulnerable position in relation to a health-care provider in the more powerful position 
that s/he will take a blood sample for an HIV test through a finger-prick, an invasive 
action, unless she refuses (Hardon, Vernooij, Bongololo-Mbera, et al., 2012, p. 9). Anyone 
seeking health care is in a vulnerable position in comparison to the health-care provider. 
According to a nurse in Kenya, “The patients are so innocent, they trust that whatever you 
are doing is for his own good” (Evans and Ndirangu, 2011, p. 8). Indeed, trust is one of the 
most important concepts in health care. According to the World Medical Association 
(WMA), “Trust is an essential part of the physician-patient relationship” (2005, p. 52). Yet 
health care providers are in the position of being able to betray a patient’s trust by 
disregarding it for what they perceive to be as one or more expedient reasons, for example, 
they work in a busy clinic with a long queue of patients, too few health care providers, and 
they see 50 or more patients per day. Thus their focus can be on quantity rather than 
quality of care. Moreover, they may even realise that patient trust can be an important 
factor in the healing process and that a lack of trust can hinder the effective delivery of 
health interventions designed to achieve public health goals over the long term (ibid., pp. 
39, 52).  Pregnant women are especially vulnerable patients due to their pregnancy, a 
condition that can cause multiple health risks for the mother or the baby (CDC, 2013, p. 1). 
Moreover, pregnant women in countries where HIV is more common than elsewhere are 
even more vulnerable to the emotional impact of being told they will be tested for HIV 
unless they decline because there is a greater likelihood they may test positive in an 
environment they know is rife with stigma and discrimination surrounding the virus.     
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What also is notable about WHO’s 2013 HIV guidelines is that there are new and more 
specific guidelines regarding HIV counselling and testing. The guidelines support the need 
for voluntary HIV testing: “Mandatory or coerced testing is never appropriate, whether 
that coercion comes from a health care provider or from a partner or family member” 
(WHO, 2013a, p. 69). Clearly, the new guidelines exhibit cognisance that  HIV testing can 
be coercive by health care providers. The WHO guidelines state that informed consent 
must be given by people receiving counselling and testing, that individuals must be 
informed about the process of counselling and testing in advance and their right to decline 
HIV testing, and that the services are confidential (ibid.). These counselling and testing 
prerequisites are not new, but they are not necessarily followed across all clinics providing 
routine testing. What WHO’s guidelines also state is that high-quality pre-test information 
must be given and post-test counselling provided to everyone (ibid.). However, post-test 
counselling is provided in many facilities in Africa only if a person tests HIV-positive, a 
common flaw noted by many since routine testing commenced (Hardon, et al., 2012, p. 5). 
For example, South Africa’s HIV counselling and testing guidelines published in 2009 
suggest an offer of post-test counselling to individuals who test negative, but state that 
post-test counselling is vital for individuals who test HIV-positive (National Department of 
Health, 2009, p. 46).  
 
2.5 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC’s) HIV 
TESTING POLICY 
The U.S. CDC’s routine testing recommendations published in 2006 state that providing 
counselling related to HIV testing in clinical settings is not necessary at all, although the 
CDC still recommends counselling provision at non-clinical testing sites  (Branson, et al., 
2006, p. 2; CDC, 2011, p. 9). Of interest is that ethics seemed to play little role in CDC’s 
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issuance of revised guidelines for HIV testing in 2006. The rationale given by the CDC for 
routine testing at clinics was that the cost of testing often is not reimbursed to providers, 
providers might perceive counselling requirements as a barrier to providing testing, and 
HIV prevalence information is not available to guide where testing should be provided 
(Branson, et al., 2006, p. 9). Since the CDC already had overridden providing pretest 
counselling to pregnant women and the need for their written informed consent for testing 
in 2001, one might think that the CDC was already on a slippery slope regarding the 
positioning of ethics as a high priority in its decision-making for HIV testing 
recommendations (ibid., p. 4). However, the difference between the CDC in issuing its 
routine testing guidance in 2006 and the WHO’s issuance of its routine testing guidance in 
2007 is in stating as the objective for the revised guidelines to be able to link HIV-infected 
persons to treatment and prevent more new infections. There was a much greater chance of 
PLHIV in the USA to access ART based on the CDC’s testing recommendations than 
there still is at the present time for PLHIV in Africa based on the WHO’s counselling and 
testing recommendations the following year. Thus there was a stronger rationale for the 
CDC to issue its routine testing guidance in 2006 given the greater access to ART for 
patients in the USA than there was in 2007 and indeed still is for patients in Africa as the 
treatment-focused rationale for the WHO releasing its routine testing guidance in 2007. 
 
Another new item in WHO’s guidelines issued in 2013 is the inclusion of community-
based HIV counselling and testing, which the WHO recently recognised is especially 
important in Africa, where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) often provide the bulk 
of HIV counselling and testing services. The WHO guidelines also note the need for a 
referral after counselling and testing to “appropriate follow-up services as indicated” for 
clinics and for community-based organisations, which includes referral to prevention as 
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well as treatment services (WHO, 2007, p. 69). Where no treatment for HIV is available, 
there will be no referral made for ART. Yet clinics may not make referrals for prevention 
services or condoms either, where these commodities and services are not available or 
where making referrals is not a standard operating procedure. It is not difficult to 
understand that in many clinics in Africa the WHO guidelines for HIV counselling and 
testing are more aspirational than strictly followed. This situation is ironic as 42 countries 
in Africa had adopted a policy on the routine testing of pregnant women at antenatal 
clinics or via PMTCT services by 2010 (Baggaley, et al., 2012, p. 3).  Yet this policy also 
seems to have been more aspirational than enforced in various countries. 
  
2.6 INFORMED CONSENT AND HIV TESTING 
The routine testing of pregnant women in South Africa, which adopted opt-out routine 
testing as a national policy in 2009 (previously South Africa implemented an opt-in routine 
testing policy for pregnant women), is illustrative of what can happen in regard to securing 
informed consent when opt-out routine testing is implemented in clinics (National 
Department of Health, 2009, p. 42). A study in an antenatal clinic in Durban, published in 
2011, found that only 50% of the pregnant study participants described having a clear 
choice in making the decision to test for HIV. Others were less clear about whether they 
had been given a choice to test or not; and, the rest felt that had been given no choice in 
testing for HIV (Groves, Maman, Msomi, et al., 2011, p. 3). A number of these women felt 
pressured by the nurses to test for HIV, a few felt they were forced to test, and most who 
did not feel they had a choice to test had not thought about testing for HIV before coming 
to the clinic, illustrating that having time to consider one’s testing decision is important 
(ibid., p. 5). These findings show that informed consent for HIV testing of the study 
participants was either not sought at all in some cases; or some women were not told they 
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could decline the test; or the testing procedure happened so quickly, some women did not 
feel they were given the choice to test or not. And, similar to other study findings, some 
women felt they could not decline the test and still receive adequate care at the clinic 
(ibid.). Some of the pregnant women who had come for antenatal care did not know they 
would be asked to test for HIV at the clinic and said they were totally unprepared to decide 
to test or not, including most of the women who did not feel they had a choice about 
testing (ibid., pp. 4, 5). These study findings are not unique, as similar findings were 
presented in Chapter 1 in this paper. Other researchers have found similar results about the 
ability of pregnant women in Botswana to decline an HIV test at routine testing sites 
(Weiser, et al., 2006, p. 1013). De Zulueta and Boulton went as far as to suggest in 2007 
that if informed consent is to be eroded in routine testing to protect third 
parties―foetuses―from preventable disease, “such a policy should be made transparent, 
debated in the public domain and negotiated with women seeking antenatal care” (p. 329).  
They did not focus on the erosion of informed consent due to the desire to save time and 
test more people for HIV, as some have done including the CDC, or the lack of 
professional competence or responsibility, which also are potential factors inhibiting the 
proper implementation of the informed consent process. A recent study of informed 
consent, counseling and confidentiality conducted in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi and 
Uganda found that some pregnant women said the testing process was coercive, and 79% 
of the women testing positive reported they kept their HIV-positive status secret because 
of their fear of stigma and discrimination (Hardon, et al., 2012, p. 13). 
 
Others have focused on the importance of proper implementation of the informed consent 
process for HIV testing during labour, when women may be constrained physically or 
mentally to process the range of issues needed to provide fully informed consent (Gruskin, 
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Ahmed and Ferguson, 2008, p. 28). For a woman to be told during labour that she will be 
tested for HIV unless she declines, especially if she has not thought about HIV testing 
previously, could be an upsetting situation—in addition to the physical and emotional 
stress she already is undergoing due to her labour. Health-care providers should be 
especially sensitive to ensuring that not only is the informed consent process carried out 
for women in labour, but that these women understand why HIV testing is recommended 
at this time, what the testing process consists of, what the results mean, and the type of 
care they will receive if they test positive and the related referrals available, as well as the 
related referrals available if they test negative. It is overly optimistic to imagine that HIV 
testing, informed consent, and the information communication and counselling process is 
implemented comprehensively for all women in labour in routine testing environments in 
Africa. In fact, the study by Hardon, et al. showed that counselling and testing processes 
are not implemented comprehensively even in antenatal care in some clinics, with some 
health care workers telling pregnant women in Kenya and Uganda that mandatory testing 
of pregnant women is the government policy (2012, p. 9). While “There are substantial 
complexities…associated with HIV counselling and testing in labour”…and “this 
obviously is not the preferred time to be counselling a woman about HIV and obtaining 
consent for HIV testing,” such counselling and obtaining her informed consent is her 
human right, whether or not she is in a sub-optimal condition to give it (Forsyth, Barringer, 
Walls, et al., 2004, p. 154). Of course, efforts taken earlier in antenatal care, when and 
where possible, to offer an HIV test—where ART to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV is available—via ‘opting in’ rather than ‘opting out’ have a greater likelihood of 
receiving a pregnant woman’s fully informed consent, whether she decides to test for HIV 
or not, than during labour (ibid.). 
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Nonetheless, the results from a few recent studies in African countries have shown it is 
possible to provide comprehensive HIV testing and counselling services to women in 
labour, at least when they are in the early stages of it (Hamela, Tembo, Rosenberg, et al., 
2013, p. 38).  As labour progresses and women experience more pain, some mothers 
participating in a study in Malawi felt that women would not be able to engage in 
meaningful communication with a counselling and testing provider, understand the 
information they were told, or give truly informed consent (van Lettow, Kapito-Tembo, 
Kaunda-Khangamwa, et al., 2012, p. 9). A study at a hospital in Nigeria found that 86% of 
the women in the study accepted HIV counselling and testing during labour, but the 
investigators noted that women may feel obliged to accept it while in labour because of 
their fear of victimisation by health-care providers or withdrawal of the emergency care 
they had sought for delivery (Bello, Ogunbode, Adesina, et al., 2011, p. 30). The study 
conducted in Nigeria did not investigate stigma and discrimination surrounding HIV as a 
possible reason why some women in labour declined to be tested, but fear of stigma and 
discrimination was a prominent reason for refusing HIV testing during labour by women in 
Malawi (van Lettow, et al., 2012, p. 9).  
 
In addition to their fear of stigma by health-care providers if testing HIV-positive, some 
women in Malawi expressed fear of their partner learning their positive status, or that they 
had been tested for HIV without receiving their partner’s approval (ibid., p. 11). In the 
four-country study conducted by Hardon, et al. only one in three of the pregnant women 
who tested positive disclosed their HIV status to their partner (2012, p. 10). In fact, the 
study showed that some of the women who had disclosed their HIV status to their partners 
were abandoned or divorced by their partners (ibid., p. 11). These findings support the 
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continuing impact stigma and discrimination have on testing decisions, especially for 
women, in their inferior position to men due to gender inequality.  
 
2.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNSELLING 
Findings from interviews with women in Malawi in another study highlighted how 
important the counselling aspect of HIV counselling and testing is to women in labour. 
What was found to be most significant to both the study participants and the study 
investigators was the pre-test counselling that was provided, which outlined the advantages 
and disadvantages of testing for the women in labour and helped to enable them to accept 
the HIV test (Hamela, et al., 2012, pp. 36, 38). The pre-test counselling also included 
discussion of the possible results of the HIV test to prepare the women for the potential of 
receiving a positive result (ibid., p. 37). Preparing clients for the possibility of receiving a 
positive test result is one of the most important aspects of HIV counselling and testing and 
why I believe pre-test counselling is a crucial element of counselling and service. It also is 
important to note that the studies cited here addressed the ethical importance of securing 
informed consent for routine testing from women in labour, the issues of their particular 
vulnerability and its potential impact on the validity of their consent, and their fear of the 
loss of health-care provision if they declined the test.  
 
While women who are in labour may seem like a special case regarding the informed 
consent needed for routine testing based on their heightened vulnerability, individuals who 
present for health care also are in a heightened state of vulnerability to the more powerful 
health-care providers from whom they seek care. Individuals seeking health care also are 
targeted for routine testing by the WHO, the CDC, and some countries in Africa, including 
South Africa (National Department of Health, 2009, p. 42). As documented herein 
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previously, the rationale given for routine testing by these institutions is to provide 
individuals who test HIV-positive with appropriate care and treatment and to decrease HIV 
infections, as well as help to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. However, ART 
is not immediately available to everyone who tests HIV-positive in any country as a recent 
study of ART eligibility in 70 countries showed, whether the country’s HIV policy is 
consistent with the WHO recommendations or not (Gupta, Granich, Suthar, et al., 2013, p. 
e87). For example, ART is not available to individuals who do not meet South Africa’s 
eligibility criteria for treatment. The country’s new eligibility criteria for ART in 2015 
includes: a CD4 count of 500 per cubic millimeter or under; lifelong ART for pregnant 
women, breastfeeding women and women within one year post-partum; ART initiation for 
HIV/TB co-infected patients;  (Department of Health, South Africa, 2014, pp. 14-15). 
However, it is important to point out that in early 2015 South Africa is still trying to 
provide ART initiation to individuals testing HIV-positive with CD4 counts of 350 or 
under to meet the country’s 2010 guidelines. Less than half of the people estimated to be 
living with HIV in South Africa in 2015 have access to ART. A study conducted in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Thailand, and Uganda in 2008 found that on average it takes six years from HIV 
seroconversion for an individual to reach ART eligibility in countries with an eligibility 
threshold of 200 CD4 count per cubic millimeters or less, and it takes on average only two 
years from reaching that eligibility criterion to death (Wandel, Egger, Rangsin, et al., 2008, 
p. i31).  
 
2.8 HIV TESTING AS THE GATEWAY TO CARE 
While HIV testing potentially is a ‘gateway to care,’ as many have described it for more 
than a decade, the queue before that gateway opens to ART provision can be long indeed 
(Hardon et al., 2012, p. 2; Hensen, et al., 2011, p. 59; Branson, Viall and Marum, 2013, p. 
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S117). That ART is not available at all clinics in many African countries, especially in 
rural areas, is important regarding positioning routine testing as a gateway to care in 
international or national policy (Rosen and Fox, 2011, p. 10). The rationale for routine 
testing by the WHO to be able to provide treatment to people testing positive in 
generalised epidemics seems to be secondary at best in countries where treatment is not 
provided to individuals testing positive unless they meet the ART eligibility criteria. The 
primary focus in many countries appears to be testing as many people as possible for HIV, 
with some opining that reaching testing targets can be the real priority, which can help a 
country to secure more donor funding for the national epidemic response (Evans and 
Ndirangu, 2011, p. 6; Buse, Eba, Sigurdson, et al., 2013, p. 103). Testing someone for HIV 
does not make them less infectious, but treating someone with ART soon after infection 
when the individual’s CD4 cell count is 350 to 500 per cubic millimeter can make the 
person 96% less infectious, according to the results of a key international study published 
in 2011 (Cohen, Chen, McCauley, et al., 2011, p. 503).  
 
It is sad and tragic that ART is so efficacious for treating HIV and prolonging life, yet 
there is still too little focus on the importance of linking people who test HIV-positive to 
treatment and care soon after they receive their test results. Rosen and Fox found in a 
review of 24 studies in Africa that only about 18% of patients who tested HIV-positive, yet 
did not meet the eligibility criteria for ART in their country, were retained continuously in 
care (2011, p. 1). They also noted that little care is offered to patients who test positive but 
are not eligible for ART, and it may be too expensive for them to come back to the clinic 
to have their CD4 count monitored, or they cannot take time off from work and jeopardise 
their jobs to do so, or they do not want to be seen visiting an HIV clinic due to the stigma 
and discrimination by community members (ibid., pp. 9-10). Rosen and Fox also noted 
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that some patients die before they can access ART even if they meet the eligibility criteria 
(ibid., p. 10). All of these reasons emphasise that testing for HIV is only step one in the 
cascade of care needed by people who test positive. It should not be the objective itself. It 
does not on its own lead to decreasing new HIV infections.  
 
As already noted, testing HIV-positive can lead to substantial stigma and discrimination, 
including internal stigma, and it can lead to a painful and often lonely death without 
accessible treatment, care and support (WHO, 2006, p.1). Hardon, et al.’s four-country 
study results found that one in five women respondents said they felt worthless after 
testing HIV-positive, with an equal proportion saying they felt guilty (2012, p. 9). These 
women were worried about stigma by others, but they also were self-stigmatising 
themselves (ibid., p. 9). Some health professionals have written that “treatment availability 
should be a pre-condition for opt-out testing” even if they support routine testing as an 
approach (April, 2010, p. 2). This stance is based on the lack of survival gains if 
individuals testing positive do not have access to ART, which could be outweighed by the 
negative social consequences suffered by these individuals, especially African women who 
are more likely to be living with HIV and undergo testing (ibid., pp. 2, 4). Hensen, et al., 
straightforwardly wrote after their review of ten surveys of routine testing conducted in 
sub-Saharan Africa, “The benefits of testing, in the absence of effective linkages to 
PMTCT, treatment and care services, are limited” (2012, p. 68). Moreover, April has 
pointed out that while routine testing is expected to “yield a net benefit to populations, it is 
impossible to know whether the consequences of testing will bring more harm than benefit 
for each individual” (April, 2010, p. 5). This insightful understanding of the possible 
negative impact of routine testing on individuals, particularly women, emphasises the 
absolute necessity of a comprehensive informed consent process as an essential part of 
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routine testing so that testing is not coerced and clients understand what they agree to 
undergo.  
 
2.9 CONFIDENTIALITY AND HIV TESTING 
Anonymous surveys conducted in Cape Town, South Africa, found significant examples of 
stigma and discrimination toward PLHIV: one in five people infected with the virus had 
lost a job or a place to stay because of their HIV status, and more than one in three felt 
“dirty, ashamed or guilty” based on their status (Simbayi, Kalichman, Strebel, et al., 2007, 
p. 1823). These results also point to the need for confidentiality of HIV test results and the 
importance of limited self-disclosure by individuals testing positive. These findings also 
highlight the intense impact of testing HIV-positive on individual self-esteem, whether or 
not the individuals share the knowledge of their status with anyone else. They also 
underscore the issue of privacy and how important this can be to individuals regarding 
HIV test results, whether or not individual privacy has been a long-standing practice in an 
individual’s culture. Privacy is indeed a protected right in many countries. For example, 
South Africa’s Constitution protects individual privacy: “Everyone has the right to 
privacy” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, Constitution: 14). 
 
Confidentiality is a general ethical obligation in medical practice, and the need for 
confidentiality of HIV test results has been a continuing concern of individuals and 
ethicists for many years as a general principle and because of HIV/AIDS-related stigma 
and discrimination (Piot, Kazatchkine, Dybul, et al., 2009, p. 1676; WHO, 2013a, p. 69). 
According to the WHO, test results and any discussions surrounding the results should not 
be disclosed to anyone else without the expressed consent of the person who was tested 
(ibid.). Thus the WHO counselling and testing guidelines also support the need for consent 
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related to test results for any disclosure to others by a health-care provider in addition to 
the need for informed consent given by the client before testing should occur. Despite the 
awareness of health-care providers in Africa of the need for confidentiality of HIV test 
results, some recent studies have shown that breaches of confidentiality by some providers 
still are occurring (Evans and Ndirangu, 2011, p. 8). These breaches have provoked stigma 
and discrimination by some health-care providers and by community members towards 
individuals. Some individuals have been denied care otherwise accessible after testing 
HIV-positive, and some counsellors have shared supposedly confidential test results with 
community members (Hardon, et al., 2012, pp. 9-10). In such environments, it is not 
surprising that 79% of the individuals who tested positive in Hardon et al.’s four-country 
study kept their HIV status secret (2012, p. 9).  
 
Despite some breaches of the confidentiality of test results by counsellors, counselling 
before and after an HIV test is felt to be a crucial by some health-care providers in addition 
to individuals knowing their HIV status amidst major HIV epidemics, supporting the need 
for counselors to provide good counselling (Hardon, et al., pp. 9-10). Kelly noted the risk 
associated with “rapid-fire testing and insufficient counselling” by South Africa’s national 
HIV testing campaign in 2010, which he said could result in much greater levels of 
anxiety, depression, and other mental health issues of people found to be HIV-positive, 
(Conway-Smith, 2010, p. 2). Kelly also noted that finding out one’s HIV status is not a 
complete intervention: “we should not imagine that simply knowing your status is going to 
lead to HIV prevention or better access to care or a decrease in the degree of stigma, 
discrimination or denial” (ibid., p. 2).   
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One of the most tragic examples of HIV discrimination was the stoning and stabbing to 
death of HIV-positive Gugu Dlamini by community members in South Africa in 1998, a 
few weeks after she publicly announced her positive status (Cameron, 2005, pp. 53-54; 
April, 2010, p. 4). The death of Gugu Dlamini was international news at the time and is 
still remembered by many (Associated Press, 1998, p. 1). Based on the ongoing fear of 
stigma and discrimination surrounding positive HIV status, where confidentiality of test 
results cannot be assured, I believe routine testing should not be delivered as the standard 
protocol for every person coming to clinics for health care. This testing protocol is 
potentially dangerous for individuals, especially women, when the confidentiality of 
positive test results is breached. Also, not protecting the confidentiality of test results is 
unethical. 
 
2.10 RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY AND HIV TESTING 
Heywood has described routine testing as “implicitly less voluntary, less confidential, and 
with consent as opposed to informed consent” (2005, p. 14). Heywood wrote in 2005 
before routine testing was recommended by the WHO in countries with generalised HIV 
epidemics, but was being considered: 
“From a human rights perspective, routine testing also carries  
the risks of becoming a war on “vulnerable groups”―and later  
on, people with HIV―who must be identified so that the state  
can “help them” (allegedly).  This is paternalistic and coercive;  
and if the objective is improved HIV  prevention and treatment,  
then routine testing most certainly will fail” (p. 18). 
Challenging the point of view of some health-care providers who have described informed 
consent as a barrier to HIV testing, Heywood emphasised informed consent as a 
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“guarantor of respect for dignity” within the HIV testing process and obtaining it as an 
ethical duty of health-care providers (ibid., p. 16).  Heywood recognised that health-care 
providers not enabling individuals to understand the testing process, the possible results, 
and given the choice to proceed with it assaults their autonomy and the Kantian principle 
of human dignity (Kant, 1996, pp. xvii, xxii). Philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote in 1785 
that every human being has dignity and is of absolute and incomparable value, defining his 
principle of autonomy (1996, p. xvii). According to Kant, all human beings are equal to 
each other, and each rational human being is an end in itself and cannot be used as the 
means to an end (ibid., pp. xviii, 245). Kant also wrote that autonomy of the human will is 
the sole principle of moral laws and of the duties attached to them (ibid, p. 166). Thus 
according to Kantian autonomy, testing human beings without their informed consent and 
choice to be tested in order to promote the public health goal of reducing HIV infections 
would be a means to an end. This action would sacrifice their individual autonomy to what 
some may perceive as collective autonomy, yet to Kant it would be against moral law. 
Since respecting the autonomy of another human being is a human duty according to Kant, 
respect for autonomy should be a duty of health-care providers caring for other human 
beings.  
 
That the informed consent process within routine testing should allow enough time for an 
individual to understand the process itself, the benefits and potential harms related to 
testing, the possible testing results and any related care opportunities available before 
making the decision to test or not is aligned with the whole notion of informed consent for 
a medical procedure and with Kantian autonomy. Nonetheless, that informed consent is a 
standard ethical responsibility of health-care providers does seem to be neglected or 
overlooked by some providers in relation to routine testing, despite the WHO stating that 
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HIV counselling and testing must be voluntary and involve informed consent (WHO, 
2013a, p. 69). In fact, informed consent was one of the WHO’s initial three C’s―”consent, 
confidentiality and access to counselling”―necessary for HIV routine testing in 2007, 
which grew to five C’s―”consent, confidentiality, counselling, correct test results, and 
connections to care” in the WHO routine testing guidance published in 2013 (WHO, 2011, 
p.17; WHO, 2013a, p. 69). It is important to note that the WHO’s guidelines on HIV 
counselling and testing continue to evolve, which in part is a justification of the 
importance of some of the issues covered in this thesis. For example, in 2007 the WHO’s 
routine testing implementation guidelines included the following,  
“Women may be more likely than men to experience  
discrimination, violence, abandonment or ostracism when  
their HIV status becomes known. Although a synthesis of  
studies on disclosure of HIV status among women in  
developing countries reported positive outcomes related to 
 disclosure in most cases, disclosure-related violence does  
occur and preventive measures must be taken” (p. 30).   
 
In its 2007 guidelines, the WHO recognised the possibility of ‘compulsory’ or coerced 
testing occurring and that it must be prevented along with unauthorised disclosure of test 
results, and that the possible negative outcomes of knowing one’s status must be explained 
to the client, including possible discriminatory attitudes of health-care providers if the 
client tested positive (ibid.). Thus the world’s largest health care policy-making body 
supports the necessity of informed consent for HIV counselling and testing at the same 
time it acknowledges possible infringements on the right of clients to maintain their 
autonomy through informed consent. Moreover, the WHO guidelines allude to the right to 
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the dignity of the person in the reference to possible discrimination by health-care 
providers. Thus, the erosion of the informed consent process taking place in some clinics 
in Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda documented by Hardon, et al. regarding pregnant women 
who are told that testing is mandatory, is a serious cause for concern because it goes 
against both international and national routine testing policy (2012, p. 9). Another recent 
study at a hospital in Uganda by Rujumba, et al. also found that most of the pregnant 
women participants understood the routine testing to be compulsory, as the possibility of 
opting out of it was seldom discussed with them by health workers (Rujumba, Neema, 
Tumwine, et al., 2013, p. 5). This alleged lack of providing informed consent infringes on 
the right of an individual to be autonomous in making an informed choice to test or not. It 
also is paternalistic because health-care workers decide HIV testing is in the woman’s best 
interest without adequately considering the possible negative impacts of testing positive, 
such as stigma and discrimination, including GBV. The risk of GBV toward women by 
their partners or other community members if knowledge of their HIV-positive status 
becomes known can result in not only a physical assault, but it is also an assault to their 
human dignity, which the lack of informed consent can initiate. 
 
The WHO’s 2007 guidelines on routine testing focused on the need for pre-test 
information provision, which includes the informed consent process, rather than pre-test 
counselling (p. 36). The WHO also set standards in 2007 for what the pre-test information 
should include: why the testing is recommended; the benefits and potential risks of HIV 
testing, including discrimination, abandonment and violence; the confidentiality of the test 
results; whether ART is available if the patient tests positive; the patient’s ability to 
decline the test otherwise s/he will be tested, but that declining the test will not affect the 
patient’s health service access; encouragement of disclosure to sex partners; and, time to 
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ask questions of the provider (ibid.). Numerous studies, though, have shown that this 
amount of information is not provided as standard operating procedure for routine testing 
in Africa, including the testing of pregnant women (Evans and Ndirangu, 2011, p. 10; 
Hardon, et al., 2012, p. 6, Hensen, et al., 2012, pp. 64-65; von Lettow, et al., 2012, p. 15). 
Consequently, the risks or harms after testing for HIV can come as a surprise to some 
individuals who undergo routine testing even if they do not decline it. This was the case 
for some women who participated in the study conducted by Hardon, et al., who were 
chased out of the house, abandoned, or divorced by their partners after they disclosed their 
positive status to them (2012, pp. 10-11). These very unfortunate results of their disclosure 
of positive HIV status by women to their partners may have been because clinical practice 
at the time of their testing did not include discussion of the potential risks of disclosure, 
including discrimination, abandonment and/or violence. Or, the women may have 
misjudged the support they would receive from their partners after their disclosure. No 
matter what the preceding circumstances were for these individual women, their changed 
living situations after disclosure underscore how important it is for clinicians to provide 
comprehensive pre-test information, including the potential risks surrounding disclosure of 
HIV-positive test results.     
 
2.11 PRE-TEST COUNSELLING AS A CRUCIAL STEP 
Even though the WHO has abandoned its earlier focus on pre-test counselling in its routine 
testing guidelines, I believe pre-test counselling is an essential part of the routine 
counselling and testing services that should be provided. The reason why pre-test 
counselling is crucially related to HIV testing is that it is in the patient’s best interest to 
receive in-depth counselling prior to the HIV test, rather than wait until the test result is 
known. I believe it is every human being’s right to have access to information to 
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potentially save his or her life. Further, the right to receive health care information when it 
best can be accessed, that is, when a patient is not emotionally upset and thus the 
information is more likely to be used to personal health advantage afterward seems like it 
should be an essential aspect of fulfilling the  right to health. While it is not possible to 
control when health-related information is received, regarding the right to health, the 
WHO states that:  
“The right to health includes access to timely, acceptable, and  
affordable health care of appropriate quality” and that the right  
to health “extends not only to timely and appropriate health care  
but also to the underlying determinants of health...and access to  
health-related education and information, including on sexual  
and reproductive health” (WHO, 2013e, pp. 1-2).  
The WHO clearly recognises that timely access to health-related education and 
information is important. To limit the provision of crucial information and individual 
counselling surrounding HIV testing to the stage when most patients are upset—either in 
shock or in celebration after receiving an HIV test result—goes against the notion that 
patients should receive potentially life-saving information in a timely way when they are in 
a state to be able to consider the full import of it. To already be in a position to be able to 
understand the usefulness of the information patients have been given in pre-test 
counselling after receiving their test results and be able to act on the information and 
counselling they already received immediately, if need be, or at the next relevant time in 
the future can be a life-saving approach regarding HIV prevention. This step should not be 
minimised for ‘public health’ reasons, i.e., test as many people as possible and don’t waste 
time in advance explaining all the testing-related details many people will not need to 
know. Yet the whole HIV testing process is crucial to its ethical implementation.  
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2.12 IMPLEMENTATION OF POST-TEST COUNSELLING 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the WHO has recommended post-test counselling for 
every individual who is tested for HIV, whether the person tests positive or negative 
(2007, p. 39). The importance of post-test counselling for anyone tested for HIV, including 
individuals who test negative, has been emphasised by many others, as noted previously 
(Rujumba, et al., 2013, p. 8). The need for post-test counselling of individuals who test 
negative is to ensure they understand: the meaning of the test results; the limitations of 
rapid HIV testing if very recent exposure to HIV has occurred and the patient may be in 
the ‘window period’ when antibody test results are negative, but infection still may occur; 
the importance of practicing prevention behaviours for individuals at risk of infection; and, 
any possible referrals to support groups or for prevention counselling and/or commodities 
(Fethers, Andrews, McCoy, et al., 2008, pp. 94-95). But perhaps the most basic reason 
post-test counselling of individuals who test negative is needed is to ensure they 
understand that a negative test result is good, rather than bad as some have inferred when 
no post-test counselling has been provided. For example in Hardon et al.’s study of routine 
testing in four African countries, only 55% of the respondents said the meaning of the test 
result had been explained to them in pre-test counselling, again supporting the need for 
comprehensive information provision to foster good understanding (2012, p. 6).  
 
Rujumba, et al.’s recent study in Uganda found that the post-test counselling given to HIV-
negative women was so short that some of them did not believe they really had tested 
negative, and others had questions left unanswered during the post-test counselling (2013, 
p. 8). Few of the women who tested negative mentioned the benefit of knowing they were 
negative to the study interviewers, who saw the very limited post-test counselling provided 
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to them as a missed opportunity to promote HIV prevention behaviours (ibid., pp. 8-9). 
Moreover, some of these women were told by counsellors that if they remained faithful to 
their husbands, they would not test positive in the future (ibid., p. 11). This information is 
erroneous if the husband was already HIV-positive and the wife not yet infected, or if the 
husband was not faithful to the wife and became infected in the future (ibid., p. 11). 
Importantly, Rujumba, et al. also found that some of the women who tested positive who 
had tested negative previously doubted their positive test results, which could have a 
significant impact on their interest in access to care in the future (ibid., p. 8). Despite the 
availability of PMTCT services at the hospital where Rujumba, et al.’s study took place, 
the study participants “feared a positive test result as it was associated with the fear of 
death, living with HIV, and being blamed for bringing HIV infection to the family” (ibid., 
p. 9). These study findings showed that the women’s fear of HIV testing was significant 
even though they believed the routine testing was compulsory, and their fear of stigma and 
discrimination by their partners and family members if they tested HIV-positive was very 
real. The findings also show that stigma and discrimination continue to be significant 
factors affecting HIV testing decisions by at least some African women. 
 
That many clinics are not providing post-test counselling after routine testing to 
individuals who test negative rather than just telling the person the result is negative is a 
cause for concern. It is important for each person to know that it is possible s/he may test 
positive in the future if the person is in the ‘window period’ or becomes HIV-infected at a 
later date. There also is a concern about individuals who test negative practicing sexual 
disinhibition in the future, whereby they decide they must be immune to HIV based on any 
past risk-taking behavior and not testing positive and then continuing to practice risky 
behaviours thereafter (Shelton, 2008, p. 274; Hensen, Baggaley, Wong, et al., 2012, p. 68). 
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Thus post-test counselling for individuals who test negative can and should serve as an 
opportunity to provide guidance and support for practicing prevention behaviours in the 
future. Moreover, since pregnant women have a higher risk of acquiring HIV infection 
than non-pregnant women, it is essential that they receive post-test counselling if they test 
negative to inform them of their potential risk of future infection during their pregnancy 
(Turan, et al., 2011, p. 1). Rujumba, et al.’s recent study of pregnant women in Uganda 
stating they were given inadequate attention during post-test counselling shows what a 
serious oversight these women felt they had experienced from the very limited post-test 
counselling they received, leaving them with unanswered questions and doubts by some 
about their negative test results (2013, p. 10). It also is essential for individuals testing 
negative to ensure they have good understanding of how they can remain negative by 
discussing individual risk-reduction strategies with them, especially if this topic was not 
covered in pre-test counselling or if individual pre-test counselling was not provided. 
These topics within post-test counselling show why it is essential for ethical and human 
rights reasons for clinics to provide patients with comprehensive information for the 
present and for their use in the future. Routine testing should not be seen by providers as 
an end in itself, even if there are structural constraints in regard to counselling provision 
surrounding HIV testing due to low staffing levels at some clinics (ibid., p. 9). The use of 
lay counsellors for HIV counselling and testing has been the strategy taken in many 
African countries for more than a decade.   
 
It is important to realise that post-test counselling can provide information that women 
need to know and can use as self-efficacy for the rest of their lives, whether they test 
negative or positive. Rujumba, et al.’s study showed that many women in Uganda were 
very concerned about the struggles of living with HIV, the future of their marriage, and 
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caring for themselves and their children “amidst poverty, stigma and marginalisation in the 
African setting” (ibid., p. 9). Further, the investigators of the four-country study of routine 
testing in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda noted that one of the advantages of 
routine testing for pregnant women where PMTCT is available to those who test positive is 
that women from lower socio-economic groups who may not have been able to access 
VCT previously can test for HIV and access PMTCT services, if needed (Obermeyer, 
Neuman, Hardon, et al., 2013, p. 1). It seems crucial not to minimise any opportunity to 
provide women with key information and supportive counselling around HIV and their 
health. Counselling surrounding HIV testing may be the only opportunity that many 
women, especially women from the lowest socio-economic groups, have to receive 
individual counselling in their whole lives.  
 
Heywood noted that the expansion of HIV testing through routine testing to the detriment 
of pre- and post-test counselling could have a negative impact on the ability of people to 
cope after receiving a positive result, which could lead to a lack of adherence to care and 
treatment where it is available and undermine their health and well-being in the future 
(2005, p. 17). Nurses generally are the health-care workers providing routine counselling 
and testing in many settings, especially in hospitals related to PMTCT provision. Evans 
and Ndirangu noticed based on statements by nurse participants in their study in Kenya 
how easily “counselling quality and the boundaries between voluntary informed consent 
and coercion can become rather blurred,”  and that nurses are “stressed by breaking bad 
news and handling ethical dilemmas” (2009, p. 723). Evans and Ndirangu were concerned 
by the quality of the implementation of the various components of routine testing the 
nurses were providing and recommended that the routine testing implementation process 
be strengthened (ibid.). Based on their study findings, Evans and Ndirangu recommended 
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the identification of best practices and key obstacles to routine testing implementation 
through research of nurse and patient experiences, greater nurse participation in policy 
development, and strengthening of nurse training and mentoring (ibid.). Their study 
findings and recommendations imply that having a routine testing policy on paper 
designed by the WHO or a national health service is one thing; and, implementing a policy 
adequately and ethically can be quite another.  
 
2.13 HIV TESTING AND LINKAGES TO PREVENTION AND CARE 
Importantly, a number of studies in the past few years have examined whether routine 
testing in sub-Saharan African clinical settings is actually resulting in linking more 
patients who test positive to care. This was the rationale used by the WHO to initiate 
routine testing, as was highlighted earlier in this chapter. However, a study by Dalal and 
colleagues in South Africa in 2011 found that while opt-out routine testing at a clinic 
versus VCT referrals increased HIV testing uptake, although not by much, after three 
months of routine testing only four of 106 patients (3.8%) who tested positive at the clinic 
had registered for the treatment available (Dalal, Lee, Farirai, et al., 2011 p. 1). The study 
investigators also noted the lack of motivation of the routine testing providers to test many 
patients, the need for strong leadership to train the providers in routine testing, and the 
need for additional interventions to link patients testing positive to HIV treatment centres 
(ibid.). Moreover, a recent study by Topp, et al. in seven clinics in Lusaka, Zambia, found 
that routine testing did not facilitate more timely HIV-positive diagnoses and referrals to 
care, but it acted as a “safety net” for individuals who had low CD4 counts who otherwise 
were unwilling or unable to test elsewhere (Topp, Li, Chipukuma, et al., 2012, p. 1). In 
fact, more eligible patients accessed treatment within a month after receiving VCT than 
individuals testing positive through routine testing in Topp, et al.’s study (ibid.). Neither 
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Dalal, et al.’s nor Topp, et al.’s study examined the ethics surrounding routine testing or 
the patient reactions to it. Nonetheless, the studies showed that routine testing in these 
settings was not meeting its mandate by linking many people who tested positive to 
treatment. Whether or not those who tested positive in the studies may have started 
practicing safe sex thereafter so that their infection was not passed on to others is 
unknown.   
 
In 2011 Walensky and Bassett focused on how low the HIV testing rates still were in 
Africa despite the continent’s huge HIV epidemics and emphasised that testing was seen as 
the gateway to care (p. 1). They remarked that “a poorly conceived and executed testing 
programme can backfire toward an infringement on human rights,” which Lesotho was 
accused of by Human Rights Watch in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, p. 1).  According to 
Human Rights Watch in reaction to site visits made by the organisation’s staff members in 
2007 to monitor Lesotho’s “Know Your Status” nationwide HIV testing campaign,  
“Human rights protections should be an integral part of any  
testing campaign, not an optional element that can be added  
or left out depending on availability of resources. These  
campaigns need careful planning, sufficient funding, good  
training, ample coordination, proper oversight, and the 
involvement of civil society which can play a critical role  
in ensuring accountability and reporting potential human  
rights abuses” (Lohman, 2008, p. 3). 
I believe these same requirements should be mandatory for implementing any HIV testing 
protocol, including routine testing, not only for national or local testing campaigns. 
Walensky and Bassett also focused their research and analysis on cost-effectiveness 
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studies of HIV testing that were conducted in resource-limited settings, including in Africa 
(2011, p. 2). They concluded that while HIV testing was deemed by the cost-effectiveness 
study investigators to be a worthy investment, a better investment would be to ensure at 
the later stage that the testing was linked to the cascade of care and treatment available 
(ibid., p. 2). Thus Walensky and Bassett noted that testing in and of itself is not the most 
efficacious or effective intervention unless it is linked to interventions promoting care and 
treatment of individuals testing positive (ibid., p. 2). 
 
Linking HIV testing to treatment and other medical services that otherwise would not be 
available without knowledge of HIV status is the basic rationale behind routine testing by 
the WHO, which has been documented herein (WHO, 2010b, p. 20). I believe that all HIV 
testing protocols should be linked to care and treatment for individuals testing positive and 
prevention support for individuals testing negative. Yet the WHO itself noted in 2012, five 
years after releasing its routine testing guidelines, that linkages after HIV counselling and 
testing to treatment and prevention are generally weak, regardless of the testing approach 
used, including all the facility-based routine testing and community-based testing (2012, p. 
48). Thus the organisation that recommended the routine testing policy for generalised 
HIV epidemics in Africa recognised the schism between the policy and its practice. 
Moreover, a year later study investigators in Uganda went so far as to write, “Delays and 
failures in initiation of ART among treatment eligible patients may compromise the 
effectiveness of HIV care in Africa,” emphasising how widespread the inadequate care 
situation was (Geng, Bwana, Muyindike, et al., 2013, p. 1). When routine testing is not 
linked to treatment or individual risk-reduction counselling, which it currently is not in 
many locations in Africa, I do not believe that routine testing can be considered an ethical 
protocol. Unless there are benefits available to individuals who know their HIV status that 
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can be discussed with them before testing, convincing them to test for HIV is coercive. I 
suspect that if Human Rights Watch examined some of the clinics where routine testing is 
being implemented in Africa in 2015, they would find similar violations of human rights as 
they found seven years ago in Lesotho: poor training of providers; insufficient counselling, 
including a specific informed consent process; lack of confidentiality in some cases; and, 
limited or no linkages to prevention and care services for the individuals tested (Lohman, 
2008, pp. 25-50).    
 
As Human Rights Watch pointed out in 2008, “there is little point in knowing your status 
if you cannot do anything with that knowledge” (Lohman, p. 32). When people test 
positive through routine testing if they are not linked to any care and treatment services, 
they likely will suffer from internal stigma even if they do not share their positive status 
with anyone else. One recent study in the USA and Puerto Rico found that more than 65% 
of 1,766 individuals suffered from depression after testing positive (Eller, Rivero-Mendez, 
Voss, et al., 2013, p. 1). As mentioned previously, if women share their positive test results 
with their partners or husbands, they may suffer GBV, abandonment, or divorce (Hardon, 
et al., 2012, pp. 10-11). If other members of their community learn they are living with 
HIV, it is likely that many PLHIV will suffer stigma and discrimination from community 
members (Simbayi, et al., 2007, p. 1823). Wilcher and Cates focused on both the human 
rights and public health perspectives of women’s sexual and reproductive health, 
especially women living with HIV. (2010, p. 833). They noted that infected women are 
more vulnerable to rights abuses than uninfected individuals, but that sexual and 
reproductive health and HIV linkages at the policy, programme, and service delivery levels 
are particularly important to ensure their sexual and reproductive needs are met (ibid., p. 
839). Also emphasizing gender bias, de Bruyn and Paxton wrote that “some women who 
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test positive experience significantly more discrimination from their partners, families and 
community members than HIV-positive men do” (2005, p. 1). Consequently, at the same 
time individuals testing HIV-positive realise they are living with a life-threatening illness, 
they can be castigated by their partners, family, and community members because of the 
social stigma and discrimination their illness provokes. As mentioned above, it is hard to 
identify a lasting benefit from routine testing if no care or treatment is provided afterwards 
to people testing positive.  
 
If PMTCT is not provided to pregnant women testing positive through routine testing or 
ART provided to these women after they give birth, they are faced with the knowledge that 
their baby may become infected with HIV. De Bruyn and Paxton and others also felt that it 
is unfair to test pregnant women solely or mainly to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV if there are no support services available to protect their rights and enable them to 
live as healthily as possible after giving birth (ibid., p. 1). Moreover, if no prevention 
services and commodities are provided to people testing negative through routine testing, 
they may or may not understand the reality that they may be negative today but they may 
become infected in the future, if they are unable to take prevention precautions. The 
inability of many African women to protect themselves from HIV infection by using 
condoms has been described by many as just one aspect of African women having less 
power than men in sexual relationships (Chersich and Rees, 2008, p. S34; UNDP, 2012, p. 
67).  
 
Many of the research study results cited in this chapter have shown the continuing intense 
stigma and discrimination surrounding the HIV epidemic, including the fear of HIV testing 
by many. Indeed, according to Adimora, Ramirez, Auerbach, et al. in 2013, “Societies 
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have made little headway in combating stigma, despite the longstanding recognition that 
stigma undermines HIV prevention efforts” (p. S171). Amidst intense stigma and 
discrimination surrounding HIV and their position of lesser power in intimate 
relationships, it is hard to attribute to many African women the agency they need to make 
an autonomous decision regarding informed consent for routine HIV testing if they 
suddenly are faced with it in a clinic. “Freedom from violence is perhaps the most 
fundamental expression of agency,” according to Klugman (2013, p. 3). Yet according to 
the WHO in 2013, the proportion of African women who have reported intimate partner 
violence or non-partner sexual violence is 45.6%, the highest proportion of any region in 
the world (WHO, 2013b, p. 20). Indeed, Gruskin, Ahmed and Ferguson wrote that routine 
testing “may inadvertently exacerbate a women’s risk of stigma from her partner, family 
and community” (2008, p. 31). Based on the risk of substantial negative impacts on 
women of routine testing, I continue to view it as an unethical HIV testing protocol if it is 
not implemented with the opportunity for a woman to give truly informed―and 
considered―consent, thus exercising her autonomy, with pre- and post-test counselling 
provided, and linked to prevention and/or treatment services after testing negative or 
positive. 
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CHAPTER 3: HIV TESTING AND JUSTICE 
 
3.0 RECENT HISTORY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In 1996 Jonathan Mann wrote, “The world of health and human rights has moved away 
from earlier simplistic assumptions about a necessary conflict between public health goals 
and human rights norms” (Mann, 1996, p. 1). This physician and international programme 
leader of the HIV/AIDS pandemic response initially at the World Health Organization, 
who died tragically in a plane crash two years later, had realised in his work on HIV in 
Africa and later internationally that underlying societal issues “determine to the largest 
extent, who lives and who dies, when, and of what” (ibid., p. 1). Dr. Mann was a visionary 
in the field of health and human rights. Many working in this field, especially individuals 
focusing on HIV/AIDS, found him inspirational in his thinking and writing about health 
and human rights and social justice. In a commemoration speech in 2008, ten years after 
Dr. Mann died, UNAIDS Executive Director Dr. Peter Piot said,  “If somebody else had 
been in charge of the [WHO] Global Programme on AIDS, they would have created it with 
other ideas, with old-fashioned public health ideas, such as quarantine and forced testing” 
(UNAIDS, 2008b, p. 2). Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia, who also 
spoke at the commemoration for Jonathan Mann in 2008, said that Dr. Mann told him the 
first time they met that “AIDS is a women’s issue…a women’s issue because of women’s 
disempowerment” (UNAIDS, 2008b, p. 3). I believe that Dr. Mann’s positioning of health 
and human rights based on his experience with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its impact on 
women and his understanding of the harm that forced HIV testing could inflict on society 
and especially on women is what made him inspirational to so many people, including me. 
Jonathan Mann’s views remain a bulwark for some of the views expressed in this thesis. 
He has had a long-lasting influence on my work on HIV/AIDS for more than 20 years and 
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indeed on my views on human rights related to HIV testing. Dr. Mann understood that we 
have to confront social inequality in our response to the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases (STD), including HIV, and that linking human rights and public health is “both a 
return to the historical concerns of public health and the beginning of a new chapter in the 
relationship between health and society” (Mann, 1996, p. 1). My belief remains that in 
order to have the level of public health impact we need in our response to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, we must take a human rights-based approach. Otherwise, we are ignoring the 
people, indeed the individuals, most at risk of HIV infection and who make up the largest 
proportion of those who are infected with the virus―women in Africa, who make up 57% 
of PLHIV on the continent (UNAIDS, 2013, p. 78). Promoting social justice as a human 
right of these women in regard to HIV testing is one of the purposes of writing this thesis. 
In this chapter I will explore justice as both an issue and a human right related to HIV 
testing. 
 
3.1 AUTONOMY AND JUSTICE 
Drawing on broadly Kantian categories, autonomy may be thought of as what we owe to 
ourselves, our ability to make the best choice for oneself, to be able to weigh the various 
factors involved and make a decision that respects our own individual autonomy and self-
legislation (Kant, 1996, p. xxiv). Immanuel Kant believed this is a God-given human right 
(ibid., p. 245). In fact, Kant viewed the duty to oneself also as a special ethical duty (ibid., 
p. 385). According to Slote, “it is considered irrational for people not to care about their 
own welfare,” and, “it does seem implausible to deny the irrationality of acting against 
self-interest or of lacking concern for one’s own well-being” (2007, p. 106). For this 
reason, the duty to oneself will be explored extensively in Chapter 5. The previous chapter 
in this thesis focused on the ethical aspects of autonomy related to HIV testing, including 
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the necessity of informed consent for testing and the potential benefits and harms that 
should be made known to individuals in advance regarding HIV testing, which they should 
take into account in their decision-making on whether to test for HIV or not. Justice, it 
seems to me, is what we owe to other people. Certainly, we should respect the autonomy 
of other individuals, which is a bioethical principle (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 
12). Yet respecting the dignity of another person is a fundamental right that also is tied to 
justice by giving another person her just due.  Kant also viewed the duty to oneself as 
corresponding to the duty to others (1996, p. 395). Of relevance is that Kant also believed 
that social inequalities between people are fundamentally unjust (ibid., p. xix). According 
to Kant, assessing the morality of one’s actions toward others is as important as assessing 
the legality of one’s actions toward others (ibid., p. 523). One might perceive that to Kant 
justice toward others functions on two levels: what we owe to others legally and what we 
owe to them morally. Aligned with these two levels of justice, one might think of HIV 
testing firstly as a policy that needs to be in accordance with overall justice in the legal 
realm, that is, nothing should be done to someone else, including HIV testing, which does 
not conform to law. At the same time, and aligned with Kantian thinking, is that nothing 
should be done to someone else that is immoral. The ‘golden rule’ comes to mind 
regarding this view of justice; to paraphrase the biblical version: ‘do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you’ (Matthew 7:12). Some modern philosophers, including 
Flew and Rawls, have considered the ‘golden rule,’ also sometimes called ‘the ethic of 
reciprocity’ to be the most fundamental principle of human rights as well as a concept 
found in many religions (Flew, 1979, p. 134; Rawls, 1999a, p. 424). This notion of treating 
others as how oneself would like to be treated is also fundamental to the concept of the 
equality of all human beings. The concepts of equality and justice are interwoven in an 
individual moral sense. While in the contemporary legal realm these concepts may not 
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play out as interwoven since the needs of society can overrule individual needs, these two 
concepts are fundamentally why laws exist.  
 
3.2 RAWLS ON JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 
Philosopher John Rawls explored justice from the point of view of the “original position of 
equality,” which he noted covers all rational persons (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 222-223). Yet 
Rawls also famously explored his own notion of “justice as fairness…to handle the 
contingencies of particular situations” (ibid., p. 243). Rawls equated the duty of respect to 
another human being not only because the person is a moral being, but is a “being with a 
sense of justice” (ibid., p. 297). Rawls directly linked autonomy with justice; however, in 
that example he did so more as respecting someone who has a sense of justice rather than 
oneself having a duty to act justly toward another person. The main idea of justice as 
fairness to Rawls was that the principles of justice would be agreed to by everyone in the 
position of equality, that is, all persons would agree on what justice entails (ibid., p. 384). 
Rawls also equated justice as fairness as relating to persons benefitting from opportunities 
offered by institutions (ibid., p. 301). I would argue that Rawls’s notion of justice as 
fairness is relevant to HIV counselling and testing policy and the implementation of it, 
both of which are set and implemented by institutions, such as the WHO, a hospital, or a 
community-based organisation providing HIV testing services. Rawls also noted that 
justice as fairness relies on the importance of one’s self-esteem and the ability to fulfill 
one’s intentions, which provides one with enough confidence to not begrudge others the 
fulfillment of their intentions (ibid., pp. 386-387). The connection of these ideas of Rawls 
behind justice as fairness seems directly related to respecting the autonomy of an 
individual to decide for herself whether she wants to test for HIV at an institution 
implementing routine testing or seek counselling and testing in the community or even at 
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home or not be tested for HIV. Rawls’s ideas certainly challenge the notion of coercive 
HIV testing as fair, and they position mandatory testing as wholly unfair and unjust.   
 
3.2.1 Justice and Self-Esteem and HIV Testing 
Also relevant to HIV testing and HIV/AIDS itself is Rawls’s examination of the feeling of 
shame regarding his theory of justice. Again Rawls focused on the importance of self-
respect and self-esteem; when an injury occurs to self-esteem, the resulting shame is both 
painful and encompasses the loss of a prized good, that is, one’s own self-esteem (ibid., p. 
388). There are several aspects of HIV testing potentially related to the loss of self-respect 
and self-esteem. The losses of self-esteem surrounding HIV testing include the lack of 
informed consent needed to promote an individual’s ability to choose to test for HIV or 
not. Being forced to test, or coerced into HIV testing, or to undergo mandatory testing has 
been noted as a loss of self-respect by individuals, including by pregnant women in Kenya 
and Uganda in a study cited above in Chapter 2 (Hardon, et al., 2012, p. 9). More 
prominently, testing HIV-positive has resulted in a huge loss of self-esteem and 
immediately provoking a sense of shame, as well as bringing on depression in many 
individuals, also cited in the previous chapter (Simbayi, et al., 2007, p. 1823; Eller, et al., 
2013, p. 1). Rawls noted self-esteem relates to “those on whom we depend to confirm the 
sense of our own worth” (ibid., p. 389). As noted earlier, patients seeking health care are in 
a position of lesser power regarding health-care providers, including HIV counselling and 
testing providers (Hamela, et al., 2013, p. 36). Patients are indeed dependent on them for 
their healthcare, and they are very vulnerable to disrespect from and poor interaction with 
healthcare providers, one of the most common examples of stigma and discrimination 
surrounding HIV/AIDS (Turan, et al., 2011, p. 2). Any patient seeking health-care 
provision is in a very vulnerable position to potential loss of self-esteem through what she 
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may feel is coerced HIV testing, particularly if she tests positive. In describing the feelings 
of moral shame and guilt, Rawls discussed the “diminishment” of the self based on one’s 
anxiety about the loss of respect from others and indeed loss of one’s own self-respect for 
not living up to one’s ideals (ibid., p. 391). This potential sense of shame and loss of self-
respect describes the fears of testing HIV-positive noted by many, based on community 
members’ reactions to and treatment of PLHIV, as well as how some women have 
described feeling about themselves (Simbayi, et al., 2007, p. 1823; van Lettow, et al., 
2012, p. 9). 
 
3.2.2 Human Rights Jurisprudence and HIV  
Rawls also discussed that in order to have a complaint against an institution, the injury to 
or unjust treatment of individuals by the institution must be shown (ibid., p. 385). A case 
related to justice as fairness and HIV testing was argued in Kenya in 2004 when a woman 
brought legal action against her former employer who had fired her based on her HIV 
status, which she claimed was a violation of her freedom from discrimination (Lawyers 
Collective and O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, 2013, p. 1). She also 
claimed that the doctor and the hospital that had tested her for HIV had done so without 
her consent, a violation of her right to privacy, and also had disclosed her HIV status to her 
employer without her knowledge, violating her right to confidentiality (ibid.). The High 
Court at Nairobi found her complaint a reasonable cause of action for the redress and relief 
of the violation of her human rights based on “the nature of the case, the universality of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and the development of human rights jurisprudence” (ibid.). This 
case legally connects the ethical principles of autonomy and justice with human rights 
jurisprudence regarding HIV testing and the violations of her rights as just cause for 
redress. It also illustrates several examples of rights violations in one case related to HIV 
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testing, showing how pertinent the ethical implementation of aspects of HIV testing can be 
to individual human rights and justice. Moreover, one might perceive based on the court 
judgment that the judge of the High Court at Nairobi would agree with the statement by 
Rawls that “the highest moral motive is the desire to do what is right and just simply 
because it is right and just” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 418).   
 
3.2.3 Rawls on Mill and Justice 
Also relevant to HIV testing is Rawls’s notion of reciprocity as reconciling “the points of 
view of the self and of others as equal moral persons” and that “neither concern for others 
nor for the self has priority” (ibid., p. 424). Based on these positions, Rawls likely would 
disagree with testing individuals for HIV against their will or in a coerced way via opt-out 
testing to promote the public health goal of decreasing new HIV infections because 
coercion undermines their equality and their individual autonomy. I believe he would 
consider such approaches to HIV testing as unjust policy of institutions, infringing on the 
just treatment of others. Rawls also expressed his notion of reciprocity regarding the views 
of philosopher John Stuart Mill, who famously wrote, “the only reason for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others” (Mill, 1999, p. 105). In regard to HIV testing, Mill’s view 
seems most applicable for individuals who know they are infected with HIV and who 
willfully do not disclose their status to their sex partners to intentionally spread infection. 
There have been two recent court cases in Canada regarding failure of non-disclosure of 
positive HIV status as constituting fraud, since the court found that exposure to infection 
can risk significant bodily harm (HIV Justice Network, 2012, p. 1). Yet Rawls felt that 
Mill would agree with the notion of reciprocity expressed by the principles of justice 
because he believed that Mill’s view was that “justice strikes a balance between altruism 
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and claims of the self” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 440). In fact according to philosopher Isaiah 
Berlin, Mill felt that “man has an indefeasible right to keep his private life to himself and 
to fight for this right” (Berlin, 1991, p. 159). Based on these views, HIV testing could be 
thought of as an act that should be balanced between the good of others and the good of 
oneself―not an act that should be surrendered to the good of others. Indeed, the violence 
that occurs against people living with HIV can be life-threatening, and it has ended the life 
of more than one woman in South Africa (Associated Press, 1998, p. 1; Carroll, 2003, p.1).   
 
3.2.4 Rawls on Justice and Equality 
Rawls did not contend that justice as fairness is the most stable conception of justice, and 
he felt he could not prove it to be so (Rawls, 1999a, p. 441). Yet he believed that moral 
persons are capable of having a sense of justice and have the desire to apply and act upon 
the principles of justice; and, that individuals with a lesser sense of justice should not be 
deprived from the full protection of justice (ibid., pp.442-443). Indeed, Rawls denied that 
basic rights and liberties should vary with individual capacity and that in the concept of 
justice as fairness any moral person is “owed all the guarantees of justice” (ibid., p. 443). 
This concept is also important regarding the HIV testing of women in Africa, women who 
may be illiterate and not endowed with a deep sense of self-efficacy and individual agency. 
Yet these women should be treated justly and fairly in regard to their decision to test for 
HIV or not. Justice obviously is relevant also to the HIV testing of minors, including 
adolescent girls who are under the age of consent in some countries. Like Kant, Rawls 
believed that equality is the first principle of justice and that it applies to all 
persons―irrespective of their position in society (ibid., p. 447). Consequently, even 
though most women generally are in a lesser socio-economic position than men in African 
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countries, their position should have no bearing on what is owed to them as moral human 
beings and their just treatment in regard to HIV testing.   
 
Rawls felt that justice is the most important principle of society and that it has the ability 
“to transform our perspective on the social world and to reconcile us to…the conditions of 
human life” (ibid., p. 448). Yet he also equated justice as fairness with the Kantian view of 
persons acting autonomously, expressing their nature as free and equal human beings and 
reflecting their situation as individuals in the world, subject to the circumstances of justice 
(ibid, p. 452). What is notable is that expressing one’s autonomy does not override being 
subject to the principle of justice. Indeed, Rawls believed that it is precisely our nature as 
free and rational human beings that makes us accountable for behaving justly (ibid., p. 
455). Therefore we should respect the autonomy of each person and treat each individual 
justly. We are individually accountable for the just treatment of other rational human 
beings, even if we are working in a very busy clinic with a monthly HIV testing target, 
even if we have just learned that our spouse is infected with HIV, and even if we have just 
heard our neighbor is deathly ill with AIDS and lives in the house where our children have 
played every afternoon for months.  
 
According to Rawls, “a well-ordered society affirms the autonomy of persons and 
encourages the objectivity of their considered judgments of justice” (ibid., p. 456). One 
could easily extrapolate this affirmation of autonomy and consideration of just judgments 
in regard to institutions supporting HIV testing and healthcare provision generally. For 
Rawls felt that “the collective activity of justice is the preeminent form of human 
flourishing” and that “the public realisation of justice is a value of community” (ibid., p. 
463). Clearly, Rawls did not separate the need for individuals to practice justice from the 
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need for community members to be just to each other. In fact, Rawls felt that we are 
mutually bound by accepting the principles of justice (ibid., p. 500). Likewise, institutions 
and community-based organisations also are bound by accepting and practicing the 
principles of justice. Rawls believed that justice is our first priority, which should govern 
all our aims and actions (ibid., p. 503). He implied that putting justice at the centre gives 
meaning to the ideas of respect and human dignity as respect for other persons is shown by 
treating them justly (ibid., p. 513). Near the end of his book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
wrote: 
  “Thus to respect persons is to recognize that they possess an 
  inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
  as a whole cannot override. It is to affirm that the loss of 
  freedom for some is not made right by a greater welfare 
  enjoyed by others” (ibid.). 
In reading these statements, it is hard to imagine that Rawls would justify coercive or 
mandatory HIV testing. It is hard to imagine that he would support the neglect of securing 
truly informed consent for HIV testing. And, it is hard to imagine that he would consider 
HIV testing alone without supportive counselling and access to other services to be a just 
intervention to protect public health.   
 
3.3 NELSON MANDELA, JUSTICE AND HIV 
It is hard to imagine that Nelson Mandela would have supported the coercive HIV testing 
of women either. And, it is even harder to imagine that he would have supported the HIV 
testing of children without providing them with access to ART if they tested positive. As 
an internationally prominent HIV/AIDS prevention and care advocate, Nelson Mandela 
said on World AIDS Day during his presidency in 1994: 
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  “We need to ensure that we provide the supportive environment 
  to afford people the capacity to protect themselves through  
  increasing access to condoms, drugs for sexually transmitted 
  diseases, access to health care and testing, and counselling  
  facilities. At all times we must speak out against the stigma, 
  blame, shame and denial that has thus far been associated  
  with this epidemic” (2013, p. 19). 
Clearly, Mandela’s words support the need for just treatment of PLHIV in the same way 
he supported the just treatment of all people. It is important to note how well he 
understood the need for counselling in regard to HIV/AIDS, which was unusual for 
someone of his generation and background; counselling was not commonly accessible to 
someone who lived in the circumstances in which Nelson Mandela did for most of his life. 
Yet similar to Rawls and others, Mandela focused on the importance of self-confidence in 
realising and maintaining individual agency. He realised how the stigma of HIV/AIDS 
undermines self-confidence for which counselling can be very beneficial. Mandela noted 
at the opening of Zola Clinic in Soweto in 2002, “…stigma is sometimes more dangerous 
than the terminal disease itself. Because you can cure, you can fight and live as long as 
possible with the assistance of drugs, but a stigma, it destroys your self-confidence” (ibid., 
p. 21). Self-confidence is closely interlinked with self-knowledge and self-care. As a man 
who had spent 27 years in prison, Mandela understood how important self-confidence is to 
surviving, to healthy living, and not losing hope against tremendous odds. He felt the pain 
of PLHIV when he spoke of being with people with HIV/AIDS during his presidency, and 
he noticed how other people moved to the other side of the room from them and even from 
him out of fear of infection. He movingly said at Nolungile Clinic in Khayelitsha in 2002, 
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“We must love, encourage and inspire people who are HIV-positive. This is the greatest 
contribution we can make in the fight against AIDS” (ibid., p. 22). 
 
Nelson Mandela focused on HIV/AIDS as an issue of justice and human rights. In 2003 at 
the famous 46664 concert held at Greenpoint Stadium in Cape Town, he stated, “AIDS is 
no longer just a disease: it is a human rights issue” (ibid., p. 23). And, at the opening of the 
first public-private HIV/AIDS treatment site in South Africa at GF Jooste Hospital in Cape 
Town that year, he said, “Health cannot be a question of income; it is a fundamental 
human right. We must give people hope that it is possible to lead a healthy, fulfilling life 
even with HIV/AIDS” (ibid.). Again Mandela focused on individual agency and justice, 
but also, importantly, the right to health. Yet he also realised that fundamentally 
HIV/AIDS is also a right to life issue. Mandela said in Switzerland late in 2003, “The most 
basic dignity, the right to live and to live healthily, is under threat from this destructive 
pandemic” (ibid.). When access to treatment for a terminal disease such as HIV/AIDS is 
unavailable as it was for about 20 years and remains unavailable to many in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as cited in Chapter 2, HIV/AIDS indeed is a right to life issue. Mandela understood 
this fact and articulated it clearly. Indeed, no one has been more eloquent than Nelson 
Mandela in speaking about HIV/AIDS and the impact it has on individuals and on society. 
What is also germane is that Mandela did not see a lack of resources as an excuse for the 
lack of a full-fledged response to the epidemic. In 2004, he said, “History will judge us 
harshly if we do not respond with all the energy and resources that we can bring to bear in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS” (ibid.).  
 
Most touchingly, Nelson Mandela proclaimed at a press conference he held on 6 January 
2005, “My son has died of AIDS” (ibid.). Tragically, Makgatho Mandela was his only 
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surviving son. His older son, Thembekile, died in a car accident while Mandela was in 
prison, and the prison authorities notoriously would not allow him to leave prison briefly 
to attend his son’s funeral (Mandela, 1995, p. 531). What may have caused Mandela even 
more pain in 2005 was that it was Makgatho who had sent the telegram to Mandela in 
prison on Robben Island in July 1969 informing him that Thembekile, who was 25, had 
been killed in a car accident, leaving two small children (ibid.). At the press conference 
about his son’s death, Mandela also said, “I hope that as time goes on we will realise that it 
is important for us to talk openly about people who die from AIDS” (2013, p. 23). It is 
clear from these and other statements made by Mandela that he saw himself as a powerful 
spokesperson on HIV/AIDS. To be a leader on this issue of social justice, he obviously 
realised he had to be a role model and lead by example. Moreover, the recognition of 
Mandela’s leadership on issues of justice and HIV/AIDS and his style of leading by 
example were repeated over and over by his former Robben Island fellow prisoners, his 
African National Congress (ANC) colleagues, and his grandchildren from 6-15 December 
2013 during many memorial services held for Nelson Mandela across South Africa 
(Associated Press, 2013, pp. 1-2).  
 
For someone who himself was deeply affected by HIV/AIDS―through his outstanding 
advocacy work surrounding the epidemic, his interaction with South Africans living with 
HIV, and the profound impact of the death of his son from this disease―it is not surprising 
that Mandela also had a special understanding of the impact of HIV/AIDS on women. At a 
later 46664 concert held in George, South Africa, in 2005, Mandela said, “Give a voice to 
the women of Africa in the fight against HIV and AIDS. Let their voices be heard in the 
centres of power. Let their voices be heard in the home. Let their voices be heard in the 
farms and factories, in the towns and villages” (2013, p. 24). Mandela saw women as the 
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voiceless souls of this epidemic, and he cried out for greater recognition of their 
importance in the collective response to HIV/AIDS and the need to give them their just 
due. Surely, if he had been asked, he would have demanded the right of women to test for 
HIV voluntarily and not to be denied the dignity of their right to choose whether to test for 
HIV or not when seeking healthcare. In my view there is no better way to state the current 
situation of African women regarding HIV/AIDS than what Mandela said in 2006 upon 
receiving Amnesty International’s Ambassador of Conscience Award at the Nelson 
Mandela Foundation:  
“We know that the AIDS pandemic affects us all, and that it 
is women who bear the most significant burden of HIV and  
AIDS. As daughters, mothers, sisters and grandmothers, every  
day they experience and live out the reality of this pandemic.  
They are the forgotten prisoners of today” (ibid., p. 24). 
Yet far too few have the understanding of the plight of African women and HIV/AIDS that 
Nelson Mandela so profoundly described.  As a former prisoner himself for 27 years, that 
he identified with African women as prisoners of HIV/AIDS shows his deep insight into 
the suffering and deprivation of their rights that millions of African women have 
experienced for decades.  
 
Perhaps Mandela’s insights into the plight of women surrounding HIV/AIDS were just one 
more manifestation of his own personal knowledge of sacrifice and the deprivation of 
human rights on which he was so sensitive toward others in similar circumstances. Within 
months of his release from prison in 1990, Mandela said, “The basic human rights of all 
our citizens have to be protected and guaranteed, to ensure the genuine liberty of every 
individual” (ibid., p. 116). And, “To deny people their human rights is to challenge their 
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very humanity. To impose on them a wretched life of hunger and deprivation is to 
dehumanise them” (ibid.). Mandela continued speaking on this theme, including 18 years 
later in 2008, “Where there is poverty and sickness, including AIDS, where human beings 
are being oppressed, there is more work to be done. Our work is for freedom for all” (ibid., 
p. 117). It is well recognised that Mandela dedicated his life to justice and freedom for all, 
including women, and including PLHIV. He said in 2005: 
  “We live in a world where the AIDS pandemic threatens the very 
  fabric of our lives. Yet we spend more money on weapons than 
  ensuring treatment and support for the millions infected by HIV. 
  It is a world of great promise and hope. It is also a world of  
  despair, disease and hunger” (ibid., p. 24). 
It is illuminating to think of Nelson Mandela and his views on freedom, justice, human 
rights and HIV/AIDS in contrast to the attitudes of some healthcare providers in Africa in 
having no guilt about coercing HIV testing, saying they felt it benefitted patients, which is 
an act of paternalism and is unethical (Evans and Ndirangu, 2011, p. 7). Based on his 
statements on the need for care and support of PLHIV, I believe Nelson Mandela would 
disagree strongly with the WHO continuing to justify routine counselling and testing as an 
approach by healthcare providers where no or inadequate treatment is available to 
individuals testing HIV-positive, including PMTCT for only about 60% of pregnant 
women testing positive, which the WHO recognised in 2012 is common across Africa 
(WHO, 2012, p. 48). 
 
3.4 JUSTICE AND HEALTH RIGHTS 
Regarding access to health rights, human rights law professor Katarina Tomasevski 
developed a number of legal arguments on health rights in 1995 that were published as a 
86 
 
chapter in the book, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. While Tomasevski (1953-
2006) did not live to see her arguments come to fruition through relevant policy, her points 
are no less relevant and perhaps more so now than they were 15 years ago. They continue 
to provide history and illumination to the ongoing struggle for human rights related to 
health care, which has been a prominent banner of thousands of individuals and groups 
fighting for the past 10-20 years for a more comprehensive global and national response to 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic based on human rights. The following are some excerpts from 
Tomasevski’s chapter on health rights published in 1995 that are relevant to this paper:  
  “The right to health creates entitlements for individuals and 
  corresponding obligations for governments…access to health care 
as an individual rights does not enjoy global recognition. One  
reason for this is the reluctance of governments to translate  
into practice such an individual entitlement which necessitates  
a large investment” (1995, p. 125).  
Tomasevski provided more reasons why global health remains a contentious issue among 
governments: pointing out that the factors that either enhance or jeopardise health have a 
scope far beyond the health sector itself and intersect at the societal level through how 
developed it is and at the individual level through access to employment or income 
opportunities, housing, water and sanitation, and adequate nutrition (ibid., pp. 125-126). 
She also described how the legal reason for human rights related to global health and 
indeed public health itself are still evolving historically, including in relation to health law 
because health is subject to “vast legal regulation,” which generally is not guided by the 
standards of human rights (ibid., p. 126). And, because issues surrounding public health, 
such as the control of communicable diseases, preceded the recognition of human rights 
historically, public health law developed without reference to individual rights (ibid., p. 
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127). Tomasevski also noted the international situation on human rights related to health 
regarding the relevant legal and regulatory documents available in 1995, suggesting they 
were “fragmentary provisions scattered through a variety of international legal and 
declaratory instruments rather than a uniform, consistently developed body of law” despite 
the general acknowledgement that national governments hold the responsibility for the 
health of their populations (ibid., pp. 128-129). In the following passage, she also 
addressed the conjuncture of human rights and health related to medical ethics, and the 
intersection of medical ethics with human rights related specifically to AIDS: 
“Human rights standards in health are complemented by medical 
ethics…Public health has been affected by the principle that law  
and not medicine should regulate restrictions of fundamental  
rights and freedoms. As always in human rights, movements to  
reinforce the universality emerge in response to violations. Before  
AIDS, little attention had been paid to human rights violations  
targeting the ill or the disabled, or to the denial of access to health  
care” (ibid., pp. 135, 139). 
 
In laying out her arguments on health rights, Tomasevski did not limit her legal arguments 
on the right to health care to women and girls, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet she 
recognised that the HIV epidemic epitomises violations of the individual right to health 
care for which so many have fought and are still fighting in many countries, especially in 
Africa. In regard to HIV/AIDS, the human right to health care has been largely neglected 
or ignored by health authorities in favor of a determined focus in some countries to 
impinge the human rights of individuals in the name of protecting public health. However, 
just testing millions of people for HIV does not prevent the spread of the epidemic. 
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Ironically, as also presented herein, we have learned in the past few years based on 
research study results, which have received global recognition, that treating people for 
HIV and AIDS may prevent thousands, if not millions, of new infections through 
decreasing the infectiousness of people living with HIV (Cohen, et al., 2011, p. 493).  
 
3.5 HEALTH RIGHTS AND HIV  
For public health authorities to rely on long established health law to implement health 
policy that is misguided in its application to this particular infectious disease recognises 
neither its salience to the HIV epidemic, nor its salience to the contemporary recognition 
and enforcement of human rights. Ignoring or avoiding individual and collective human 
rights simply continues bad public health practice. I have chosen to focus specifically on 
the rights of women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa related to the epidemic and 
specifically to HIV testing because I believe these individuals, and collectively as a group, 
are the most vulnerable to human rights violations related to the HIV response and indeed 
to GBV, social disenfranchisement, community condemnation, and familial abandonment. 
They need protection from these prevalent consequences of testing positive for HIV and, 
through research study results that will be described in Chapter 5, from the frequent stigma 
and discrimination resulting simply from the HIV testing itself, whether they test positive 
or negative. What’s more, it is important to protect human rights from the outset, that is, 
from being given the opportunity of counselling and testing for HIV and deciding whether 
or not to test, rather than focusing only on the point after testing HIV-positive when 
treatment should commence, or testing HIV-negative when a referral should be made to 
supportive services to help maintain one’s negative status. All of these steps are necessary, 
and only invoking the need for a rights-based approach after an individual has tested HIV-
positive is simply too late to respect, protect, and fulfil individual human rights. 
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I am concerned that in 2013-2015 there is growing international impetus to support the 
human rights related to HIV/AIDS of ‘key populations’ such as sex workers, gay men, 
people who inject drugs, transgender persons, and persons in detention and prison while, at 
the same time, there seems to be complacency about and even neglect of protecting the 
HIV/AIDS-related human rights of women and girls, who comprise 57% of the HIV 
infections in Africa (Beyrer, 2013, p. 1; UNAIDS, 2013, p. 78). This situation seems ironic 
when there is growing awareness of the impact of GBV on the HIV infection of women 
and girls (UNDP, 2012, p. 64). Certainly, the human rights―all human rights―of sex 
workers, gay men and women, people who inject drugs, transgender persons, including 
transgender women, and persons in detention and prison should be protected. But it should 
not have to take another Nelson Mandela to recognise that women in Africa are the 
prisoners of this epidemic. In December 2013 the President-Elect of the International 
AIDS Society, Chris Beyrer, wrote of  excluding access to prevention and treatment 
services of the key populations named above, “These exclusions are violations of the right 
to health and to dignity and, because untreated HIV infection is fatal, of the right to life 
itself. This is morally unacceptable and scientifically indefensible” (Beyrer, 2013, p. 1). 
Beyrer is right in writing that denying these individuals their human rights, including their 
right to life itself, is morally indefensible. Mandela surely would agree with him, as do I. 
But it also is crucially important to realise that women continue to be denied their basic 
human rights, including their right to life itself, on a daily basis in many areas in Africa 
where treatment for HIV/AIDS remains unavailable (and unavailable to men also). The 
right to life is indeed the most fundamental right human beings have. Yet it can be 
overlooked or simply forgotten in regard to individuals who feel powerless in society, 
which is the common plight of African women and is an issue of social justice. 
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UNAIDS has recognised that “persistent gender inequality and human rights violations 
that put women and girls at greater risk of and vulnerability to HIV continue to hamper 
progress and threaten the gains that have been made in preventing HIV transmission and in 
increasing access to antiretroviral therapy” (2010, p. 1). However, this joint UN 
programmatic body also recognised that discrimination against and brutality and injustice 
toward women and girls means they are excluded from decision-making and crimes 
against them can be committed with impunity (ibid.). These statements acknowledge that 
women and girls continue to suffer indignities and that their human rights frequently are 
ignored, sometimes by societies at large in addition to their sex partners, family members, 
other members of their communities, and even health workers. Indeed, the Special 
Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health noted in 2011, 
“Providing women and girls with knowledge and skills relating to their sexual and 
reproductive health, related education and information enhances their freedom in making 
informed health-related decisions, and promotes their equal participation in society” 
(Grover, 2011, p. 19). This statement centres on the right of women and girls to health, 
including the right to sexual and reproductive health information, which includes 
information about HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infection (STI) prevention, 
treatment, care, and HIV testing. What’s more, the Special Rapporteur went on to write in 
2011 that States have an obligation to fulfill the right to health, requiring the development 
of strategies to ensure that “comprehensive sexual and reproductive health education and 
information is provided to everyone, especially women and girls” (ibid.). Consequently, 
where such information is not available, which it is not in many clinics in Africa due to the 
lack of resources and/or lack of government will, individuals are being denied the 
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realisation of their right to health. The Special Rapporteur also noted in 2011 that women 
and girls are the most likely to be affected by the related gap in available health services 
because they have a higher risk of HIV and STI exposure, as well as maternal mortality, 
unsafe abortions, and unwanted or unplanned pregnancies (ibid., p.18). Finally, the Special 
Rapporteur highlighted that “women often have less power or control in their relationships, 
which makes them disproportionately vulnerable to coercion, abuse and exploitation,” 
preventing them from enjoying the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health (ibid.).  
 
There is clear recognition in some quarters that women and girls are not realising their 
right to health especially in regard to sexual and reproductive health, including HIV/AIDS, 
and there are some efforts to promote greater attention to this need. For example in 2013, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights established two landmark 
resolutions, urging states to: (1) “protect and promote women’s right to land and property” 
as many women have been pushed off their land and have lost their property when their 
spouses have died of AIDS, and, (2) “to put in place mechanisms to ensure that women 
living with HIV are not subjected to coercion, pressure or undue inducement by health care 
providers…in order to secure consent for sterilisation” (Ezer, 2013, p. 1). This statement 
by the African Commission acknowledges the same type of coercion some health care 
providers exert on women for HIV testing. The Open Society Institute (OSI) found these 
African Commission resolutions to be bringing African women “one step closer to 
justice,” but the OSI noted that it is up to African states to ensure the critical human rights 
protections of women by respecting, protecting, and fulfilling their fundamental human 
rights (ibid.). Unfortunately, there has been no noticeable follow-up to date to these 
African Commission resolutions in African states. One can only hope progress will be 
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made in the future. Ironically, in April 2014 in South Africa, the Gauteng Department of 
Health made a settlement agreement to pay an HIV-positive woman nearly half a million 
rands for damages, including the pain and suffering she felt resulting from her coercive 
sterilisation in a public hospital (Skosana, 2014, p. 1). And, according to a spokeswoman 
for the NGO, Her Rights Initiative, the forced sterilisation of HIV-positive women has 
been reported in all the provinces in South Africa (ibid., p. 2). 
 
According to Gruskin, Mills and Tarantola, “Integration of human rights in international 
health systems is increasingly driven by the recognition that the respect, protection, and 
fulfillment of human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights is necessary―not 
because they are the binding legal obligations of governments, but because they are 
essential for improvement of the health status of individuals and populations” (2007, p. 
449). They also pointed out that it is important regarding human rights not only to focus on 
the outcomes of health interventions, but also on the way they are implemented (ibid., p. 
453). This is one of the purposes of this thesis, that is, to examine how HIV counselling 
and testing protocols are implemented currently in Africa, and the impact of the 
implementation of these protocols especially on the rights, ethical treatment of, and just 
actions toward women and girls.  
 
The following are some additional general points and specific examples from sub-Saharan 
Africa that support the importance of exposing these challenges to the bioethical and 
human rights of women and girls to help determine and generate preventative and 
supportive mitigation policies and mechanisms. The current implementation of some HIV 
testing protocols, especially routine testing, of women and girls in various locales in sub-
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Saharan Africa challenges their rights as individuals and collectively as a group amidst an 
extremely stigmatised disease epidemic. According to Watts and Seeley: 
  “The gender-related aspects of HIV stigma, including that violence  
  and the fear of violence may act as important barriers to women 
  accessing services, testing and disclosure, have long been  
documented”  (2014, p, 1). 
And, according to a recent study on interpersonal violence (IPV) and HIV in Uganda: 
 “HIV positive status and disclosure might increase risk of  
interpersonal violence (IPV), and fear of violence can prevent 
women from learning and sharing their HIV status and from 
accessing treatment” (Wagman, Gray, Campbell, et al., 2014, p. 2).  
In a paper Tomasevski wrote in 2005 on the human rights approach to HIV/AIDS, she 
noted that earlier in the epidemic, “HIV testing was dangerous because it could lead to the 
loss of livelihood or even life” (p. 1). However, I would posit that in many places HIV 
testing remains dangerous because individual rights related to HIV/AIDS remain 
unprotected, as many of the examples outlined earlier in this paper have documented. This 
situation is especially the case for women and adolescent girls. Further, while human rights 
related to HIV/AIDS nowadays may be more recognised in some locales than they were 
earlier in the epidemic, they still are not realised by many individuals and by women and 
girls as a group in sub-Saharan Africa. Their rights can be frequently and easily violated. 
The lack of truly informed consent related to HIV testing as well as the commonality of 
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coercion to test are just two examples, which are described via various examples in 
chapters herein.   
 
In 1998, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
UNAIDS released the HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines, which noted 
the following on the human rights of women: 
“Discrimination against women, de facto and de jure, renders them 
disproportionately vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Women’s subordination 
in the family and in public life is one of the root causes of the rapidly  
increasing rate of infection among women. Systematic discrimination  
based on gender also impairs women’s ability to deal with the  
consequences of their own infection and/or infection in the family, in  
social, economic and personal terms” (1998, p. 41).  
These international guidelines from the UN also explained:  
“HIV/AIDS demonstrates the indivisibility of human rights  
since the realization of economic, social and cultural rights,  
as well as civil and political rights, is essential to an effective  
response. Furthermore, a right-based approach to HIV/AIDS  
is grounded in  concepts of human dignity and equality which  
can be found in all cultures and traditions” (ibid., p. 38).  
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If anything, the recognition of the need to respect the human dignity and equality of 
women and girls has become more important as time has gone on as shown by the 
statement, above, by UN agencies in 1998. Much of the philosophical background and 
more recent research study results enumerated in this paper identify the fundamentality of 
these principles and how women and girls still strive in Africa to reach the apex of the 
pyramid of human dignity and equality—on the same level as men and boys—rather than 
continuing to flounder at the bottom.  
 
3.6 RECENT HIV AND RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA  
Also important to bear in mind is that by honoring and protecting the individual and 
collective rights related to HIV counselling and testing, there is a greater likelihood of 
reaching the public health goal of decreasing the number of new infections. One aspect of 
this is that maintaining the confidentiality of HIV testing itself and the results of each HIV 
test will help prevent girls and women from being exposed to unnecessary, unwarranted, 
and harmful stigma and discrimination. According to a recent study on adolescents living 
with HIV in Zambia, one 17-year-old girl described why she had not disclosed her HIV-
positive status to any of her friends, “I will be segregated and they will only want to play 
with those who are not HIV positive” (Denison, Banda, Dennis, et al., 2015, p. 3). 
Protecting the lives of adolescents living with HIV is a very serious issue: between 2005 
and 2012, HIV-related mortality among adolescents living with HIV increased globally by 
50% (ibid., p. 1). Moreover, the majority of the 2.1 million adolescents living with HIV 
around the world reside in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.). Most importantly, adolescent girls 
are at greater risk biologically and socio-culturally of HIV infection than adolescent boys, 
which is readily reflected in the different HIV prevalence rates between boys and young 
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men aged 15-24 years and girls and young women in the same age group in six Southern 
African countries, as noted below, in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)’s 2014 Contextual Scorecard and Factsheet on HIV (Africa Coalition on 
Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2014), p. 1):  
Table 1: HIV Prevalence in Females & Males Aged 15-24 in 6 Southern African Countries 
Country HIV Prevalence % 
Females Aged 15-24 
HIV Prevalence % 
Males Aged 15-24 
Botswana 6.0% 3.5% 
Lesotho 10.5% 5.8% 
Mozambique 6.1% 2.7% 
Namibia 4.8% 2.7% 
South Africa 13.1% 4.0% 
Swaziland 12.4% 7.1% 
Source: SADC/Africa Coalition on Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2014  
 
As is illustrated above, in most of these countries, the HIV prevalence rate in girls and 
young women is twice the rate in boys and young men, although in South Africa the rate in 
girls and young women is three times higher than in boys and young men. These statistics 
show the extreme vulnerability of young females to HIV, most particularly in South 
Africa, where the largest number of people living with HIV in any country in the world 
reside, estimated at 6.8 million in 2015 of which about 56%, or an estimated 3.9 million, 
were women (UNAIDS, 2014b, pp. A27, A33; UNAIDS, 2015, p. 1). Surrounded by 
South Africa, Lesotho illustrates another country where young women are extremely 
vulnerable to HIV: in 2013 young women in Lesotho aged 20-24 had the highest HIV 
prevalence rate in the world in their age group at 24% (O’Grady, 2014, p. 6). 
 
Whether the decision is to be made by a woman or a man or a boy or a girl, facilitating the 
freedom of choice about whether to test for HIV or not will prevent HIV testing from 
being the hurdle some see it as and thus do not access health care for fear of mandatory or 
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forced testing or the inability to receive any treatment and care for any illness without first 
testing for HIV. While this is a human rights issue related to the freedom of choice for 
every individual, it is most pertinent to women, especially women and adolescent girls, 
whose rights can be ignored or overridden through coerced HIV testing. An example from 
the analysis of recent research study results from HIV prevention intervention trials of 
women in several sub-Saharan African countries using antiretroviral therapy (ART) to 
prevent sexual transmission of HIV described how the need for “choice” for women 
regarding HIV prevention methods is only starting to be understood by researchers (even 
though most of the researchers who were involved in the studies are women themselves): 
“Although the importance of choice has been recognized and incorporated into 
contraceptive provision, it is an emerging idea in HIV prevention” (Mack, Evens, Tolley, 
et al., 2014, p. 2). One wonders how and why the concept of women having a choice of a 
product to use for such a crucial health-related issue as HIV prevention in sub-Saharan 
Africa would not have occurred as a key issue previously over the 30-year HIV epidemic? 
I believe these findings also highlight how little understanding remains of the socio-
cultural predicament of women in sub-Saharan Africa related to the realisation of their 
human rights generally and specifically in regard to their health. The confluence of gender 
inequality, GBV, and the HIV epidemic can be a deadly equation for many, if not millions, 
of women and adolescent girls in sub-Saharan Africa. That this fact is only starting to be 
understood based on the failure of recent HIV prevention research trials seems rather 
astonishing. Yet this situation supports the need for more attention to the human and health 
rights of these women and girls related to the HIV epidemic and indeed to the starting 
point of HIV testing in order to be able finally to launch an effective response to this 
pandemic. 
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While it is important to recognise when, where, and how human rights regarding 
HIV/AIDS are infringed by health care providers, it also is important to reflect the 
profound views supporting the rights of patients expressed by some leading health care 
providers. Marcia Angell wrote in 1993, more than 20 years ago, “We should be loath to 
abandon or modify the patient-centered ethic, and we should be wary of ethical 
justifications for doing so” (p. 136).  Moreover, Angell did not separate the duties of 
physicians toward their patients from those duties we all have toward other human beings: 
“Ethics should be based on fundamental moral principles governing our behavior toward 
one another” (ibid.). Also, Edmund D. Pellegrino, writing specifically about the treatment 
of AIDS patients, wrote in 1987, more than 25 years ago, “three things―the nature of 
illness, the non-proprietary character of medical knowledge, and the oath of fidelity to the 
patients’ interests―generate strong moral obligations” (p. 131). Thus like Jonathan Mann, 
Nelson Mandela, and some others, it is hard to imagine Angell and Pellegrino agreeing to 
coercive HIV testing simply to test more patients for HIV and, where it is available, not 
providing treatment to patients who test HIV-positive and need it.   
 
It also is important to realise the influence the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had on global 
health generally, including the increasing recognition of the right to health and access to 
social justice for individuals and groups with health issues of serious concern. Brandt 
wrote that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had “powerful effects on research and science, 
clinical practices, and broader policy,” and has “reshaped conventional wisdoms in public 
health, research practice, cultural attitudes, and social behaviours” (2013, p. 2149). While 
acknowledging the truth of Brandt’s statement, it is important to focus on the 
implementation of HIV/AIDS policy as it plays out on the ground. There have been many 
changes in HIV/AIDS-related policies in many countries since the epidemic started. 
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Brandt noted that early reactions to the epidemic in some countries “reflected traditional 
approaches to public health and the “police powers” of the state, including mandatory 
testing, isolation, detention, and quarantine” (ibid., p. 2151). Such policies and practices 
have not changed everywhere over the last 20 years, however. Cuba remains an example 
where mandatory testing is still the policy for pregnant women, the sex partners over the 
last six months of individuals testing HIV-positive, and anyone diagnosed with an STI 
(Hoffman, 2004, pp. 208-209). Moreover, anyone testing positive in Cuba must go to a 
sanatorium for eight weeks of HIV/AIDS education and quarantine (and permanent 
quarantine, i.e., jail, if an individual is found to practice unsafe sex afterward); and, 
pregnant women are provided with PMTCT services, but must deliver by caesarean section 
to minimise HIV transmission to the baby (ibid.). One beneficial aspect of Cuba’s 
HIV/AIDS policy and practices, though, is that the country has made its own generic HIV 
medications since 2001, which are administered to positive individuals by HIV specialists 
(ibid., p. 209). While Cuba has slowed the spread of HIV, the island nation has 
accomplished this by ‘policing’ its epidemic, especially through the use of its mandatory 
testing policy of pregnant women, and not by aligning its HIV/AIDS policies and practices 
with the principles of social justice.  
 
Despite Cuba’s ability to control its HIV epidemic through restrictive policies, many have 
noted the global epidemic is so large and spread so widely around the world, even 
supranational, that no individual country can adequately address its epidemic amidst 
globalisation and the extensive movement of people, international trade, and that infectious 
diseases know no borders (Brandt, p. 2152). Consequently, nations and sectors must work 
together to staunch the spread of HIV through shared endeavors, which was the rationale 
for the founding of UNAIDS in 1996, now comprised by 11 UN agency cosponsors with 
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financial support from many nations, and which takes the lead on human rights policy 
related to HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 2013).  There also is growing international realisation that 
only by recognising and protecting human rights, including the rights to treatment and 
care, gender equality, and health information, will HIV interventions―directed both at the 
individual and population levels―be successful (Brandt, p. 2152). However, such 
acknowledgment of the need to work together still has not coalesced into delivering the 
range and volume of services needed to prevent, treat, and care for HIV infection 
anywhere in the world, with the greatest need continuing in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
provision of equity through social justice to PLHIV, and especially women in regard to 
HIV, remains elusive. 
 
The efforts to scale up HIV counselling and testing continue despite some clinicians and 
public health officials trying to ‘normalise’ the epidemic by routine testing of as many 
people as possible in the face of largely undiminished stigma and discrimination and 
amidst the voices of human rights advocates who remain concerned about any lack of 
privacy, confidentiality, counselling, and consent surrounding HIV testing (Branson, Viall 
and Marum, 2013, p. S118). Some of the problems surrounding the implementation of 
routine testing in Africa have been explored in Chapter 2 herein. But it also is worth noting 
that in 2010 fewer than half of the hospitals in the US were planning to implement the 
CDC’s routine testing policy initiated in 2006 (ibid.). This example of what is actually 
happening on the ground shows that efforts to contain the spread of HIV are still hindered 
by a lack of resources, both human and financial, even in the wealthiest countries in 
comparison to the resource-constrained countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Because of the 
problems emanating from the substantial stigma and discrimination surrounding HIV that 
continues in sub-Saharan Africa (and elsewhere) and the extensive lack of resources to 
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respond to the continuing epidemic, including for the scaling up of HIV testing, some are 
promoting home-based HIV testing. Home-based HIV testing has seen a high uptake in 
some of the limited studies done in Africa to date (ibid., p. S119). The key aspects of 
home-based testing are that it is voluntary and confidential. Whether counselling is made 
available surrounding home-based testing varies, but at least the testing has not been 
coerced as far as we know. That the testing is done at home and not at a public facility, 
where concerns about confidentiality, stigma, and discrimination remain common, means 
that it is more appealing than facility-based testing to many people, including Africans 
(ibid.). How the linkages to treatment and care will work for individuals testing HIV-
positive at home, however, remain as outstanding issues, since these facilities still are not 
widespread in Africa, as noted earlier. Because PLHIV, and especially women living with 
HIV, feel excluded, unequal, and stigmatised, it is unclear whether home-based HIV 
testing could be one path toward helping to resolve the various needs for social justice 
currently embedded in the HIV epidemic. But it is important to provide more options 
regarding HIV testing that respect each individual’s human rights and preserve the needs 
for informed consent, confidentiality, access to counselling, and access to prevention and 
care services for individuals who need them, whether they test negative or positive. 
 
In regard to justice and health care, Beauchamp and Faden wrote 35 years ago, “It is hard 
to imagine that we are not obliged by a string of moral principles such as beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice to provide a decent minimum of health care” (1979, p. 128). They 
argued that there is a social obligation to provide health care goods and services as an 
aspect of social justice; what they noted as problematic was the scope of what such health 
care goods and services should encompass (ibid.). While Beauchamp and Faden were not 
writing about the HIV epidemic in 1979, their argument is just as relevant today, if not 
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more so. Regarding the HIV epidemic and justice, it is salient to note that justice related to 
health care concerns the rights of everyone, not only those who can pay for their own 
health care. According to Plato, justice consists of rendering to each person her due, what 
she has a right to, and thus to do someone justice means to uphold or protect the person’s 
rights (Gewirth, 2003, p. 220). Gewirth has noted that rights are important interests not 
only of individuals, but also of groups (ibid.). Using this paradigm for justice related to 
health care, then, each individual has a right to health care and, indeed, an individual as a 
member of a group diagnosed with HIV or AIDS has a right to health care. It is unjust that 
treatment for HIV is not available to many individuals diagnosed HIV-positive living in 
sub-Saharan African countries where treatment is available only to a limited extent. 
What’s more, treatment is available in some areas only to those who can pay for it. Yet 
even where ART is free to individuals who have met the threshold for accessing treatment, 
only those who have the financial resources to be able to travel to a clinic once a month, 
which can be far from where they live, can avail themselves of ART monthly and adhere 
to the daily regimen. Even clinics located within walking distance can be very difficult for 
people who are ill to access (Kagee, Remien, Berkman, et al., 2011, p. 3). Moreover, the 
lack of financial resources has been a prominent reason for many women who have been 
provided with ART not adhering to the daily regimen due to the need to travel to access 
the medication on a regular basis (ibid., p. 5). According to Rachel Jewkes, “women’s 
subordinate position in a highly patriarchal society has critically shaped their HIV risk” 
(2009, p. 27). Indeed, it also shapes their opportunities to adhere to HIV medication. Many 
women also face additional political and cultural barriers to adherence, such as child-care 
burdens in addition to economic dependence upon men amidst the general structural 
barriers of poverty and health illiteracy, so common in Africa and which many women in 
Africa confront regarding health care-seeking behaviours and especially adherence to a 
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daily treatment regimen (Kagee, et al., 2011, pp. 3, 5; Phillips, Thebus, Bekker, et al., 
2014, p. 1).  
 
The health system itself is unjust when it does not address the needs of the poor and 
marginalised. The broader socioeconomic context of women’s HIV risk suggests that 
transforming gender roles to increase gender equity and promote women’s health is vitally 
important, not only for women but to provide greater ballast to society in the future 
generally (Jewkes, 2009, p. 37). Since a patriarchal society offers women fewer 
opportunities than men and women do not share equally in positions of power, this has an 
impact on society beyond women as they make up 50% of society (Isaacs, 2002, p. 131). 
The economic subordination of women in addition to their lower social status not only has 
a profound impact on the health of women, but it also has an impact on their families, their 
communities, and the larger society. I again wonder about the rationale behind routine 
testing in relation to justice when accessing treatment is so difficult, if not impossible for 
many, and adhering to it daily especially for the poverty-stricken, most prominently 
women, can be a losing battle.  Indeed, according to Boetsen regarding HIV risk and 
survival strategies, “The combination of poverty and gender inequality—with all its 
extremes of powerlessness, violence and abuse—trap many women in hopeless situations” 
(2009, p. 77). That some women recognise their socioeconomic subordination and 
systemic disadvantage, but feel powerless to address it is a social tragedy (Isaacs, 2002, p. 
132).  Yet this situation underscores the enormous health tragedy wrought by the HIV 
epidemic on society broadly and the further injustices of the epidemic as it plays out in the 
daily lives of individual women and gender collectively.  
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Jonathan Mann noted more than 15 years ago that modern human rights were developed 
entirely outside the health domain, and they seek to articulate the preconditions for human 
well-being in society rather than follow biomedical or public health traditions from the 
past (1997, p. 2). Thus Mann found human rights to be a more useful framework as well as 
a vocabulary and guide for analysing and responding to the societal determinants of health, 
which previous biomedical and public health conceptions largely ignored (ibid.). Mann 
came to this determination, which some agree with (including me), based on what he saw 
happening surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic on which he worked in Africa. He realised 
through his own observations that “human rights violations have health impacts, that is, 
adverse effects on physical, mental and social well-being” (ibid.).  I believe what Mann 
wrote in 1997, the year before he was killed in a plane crash, remains just as true and 
relevant today as it was then―that the adverse effects of human rights violations on 
physical, mental and social well-being “still remain, in large part to be discovered and 
documented” (UNAIDS, 2008b, p. 2; Mann, 1997, p. 2). In fact, in late December 2013 a 
missive was sent from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria calling 
for proposals to provide technical assistance on human rights, gender, and community 
systems strengthening, with the first step listed as a request to conduct a situational 
analysis to document the human rights barriers to accessing health services and gender 
equality in specific countries, including 25 countries in Africa (Global Fund, 2013, pp. 1, 
4-6). This example is illustrative of the progress that still needs to be made in documenting 
barriers to health care and gender equality, particularly in Africa. 
 
3.7 JUSTICE, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Interestingly, Mann also wrote in 1997, “human rights is a language most useful for 
guiding societal level analysis and work, while ethics is a language most useful for guiding 
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individual behavior” (Mann, 1997, p. 3). At the same time he made this distinction, Mann 
also wrote that individuals with specific roles and competencies, such as physicians and 
public health providers, need to mix human rights and ethical concepts and language in 
their work (ibid.). Thus Mann combined the need for professionals to protect the rights of 
individuals and the rights of groups. He also noted that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, ratified by the United Nations in 1948, starts with “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights,” with the dignity of all at the forefront of the 
document, not distinguishing the rights of one person from the rights of another person as 
all are equal (ibid.; UN, 1948, p. 1). Mann explicitly was trying to build bridges “between 
medicine and public health, and between ethics and human rights,” noting that the 
objective in doing so was to staunch competition and to secure justice in health care 
(Mann, 1997, p. 4). In writing about health and human rights, Mann, too, bound the 
concepts of individual human dignity together with justice for each and every person, and 
indeed justice for all, harkening back to John Rawls and Plato. As noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, Mann also felt that the evolving approach to women’s health, involving 
greater understanding of the specific health needs of women and how to address them, was 
based on health professionals learning that promoting and protecting human rights may be 
essential for promoting and protecting health (Mann, 1996, p. 1). It is my hope that this 
learning curve about women’s health, emphasised by Mann, and centrally the rights of 
women, is still evolving. And, that the arc of this moral universe, to paraphrase American 
civil rights leader Martin Luther King in 1965 and health and human rights leader Jonathan 
Mann in 1997, is indeed long, but will eventually bend toward justice (Mariam, 2009, p. 
1). 
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In analysing the right to health care in regard to HIV/AIDS treatment and its relationship 
to HIV testing, it is important to position these issues within the larger context of the HIV 
epidemic and the attitudes of many that have significant impacts on the response to it, 
including the continuing marginalisation of the rights of women. According to women’s 
non-governmental organisation leader and self-professed PLHIV Alice Welbourn,  
“…the way out of the HIV pandemic is not through medication  
alone but through nurturing respect, care, dignity, support, rights,  
happiness―and safety―for everyone affected by HIV, everywhere.  
I look forward―still―to the day when these women’s rights  
initiatives also will be given the credit and recognition they  
deserve” (2013, pp. 2-3).  
Welbourn poignantly pointed out that while treatment should be provided to individuals 
who need it, which many believe will help slow the spread of HIV infection, just relying 
on a biomedical fix to the epidemic will not end it. She, too, understands the role of human 
rights, and especially women’s rights, in society’s overall confrontation with the epidemic 
and the need to change attitudes toward those affected by it. In taking this understanding 
further, one realises that fighting for the rights of women essentially means that one is 
fighting for the rights of all individuals affected by the epidemic. And, placing the HIV 
epidemic in the larger framework of human rights, what American revolutionary leader 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789 also is salient: “What is true of every member of society, 
individually, is true of all of them collectively; since the rights of the whole can be no 
more than the sum of the rights of the individuals” (Jefferson, 1789, p. 7). This statement 
is particularly apt for conjoining the health rights of individuals with the health rights of 
society collectively. If the rights of individuals are not protected and realised, then the 
collective rights of society also cannot be protected and realised.  
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As Ashford has written, “Human rights claims are claims of basic justice” (2007, p. 185). 
Ashford also has argued that human rights claims can be made toward private individuals 
and social institutions (ibid.). Human rights impose corresponding duties, which require 
taking positive actions (ibid., pp. 184, 187). In relation to health care this means that health 
care providers have a positive duty to provide health care, as do health-care related social 
institutions, such as the WHO, in relation to its policies, or a hospital in relation to its 
mandate for health care provision. It also is incumbent on these institutions to promote 
human rights in regard to their policies toward and implementation of health care, 
including HIV testing protocols. According to Ashford, an individual agent or institution 
also is responsible for any violations of negative duties of justice when harm has occurred 
to an individual based on the action or non-action of the individual or institution acting as 
an agent (ibid., pp. 204-205). This stance on the negative duties of justice also relates to 
HIV testing. Where HIV-positive test results have been made known to other community 
members or a spouse who has inflicted related punishment on an individual, the lack of 
confidentiality has resulted in a specific harm caused by the individual or institution, 
violating the duty of justice. As seen in the case in Kenya discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the woman whose positive status was made known by a hospital to her employer resulting 
in the loss of her job also involved a legal claim, which the court agreed was a violation of 
her human rights. It is worth noting, however, that the violation of the human right to 
justice in regard to the disclosure of confidential HIV status is not based on a woman being 
beaten by her spouse or a member of the community, or losing her job, which is the result 
of the disclosure. Rather, the violation is based on the disclosure of her HIV status itself, as 
the health-care provider and the institution have a negative duty not to violate her right to 
confidentiality. In regard to positive and negative duties related to justice, Ashford has a 
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different view than that of Kant as he drew a distinction between positive and negative 
duties, whereby positive duties should be seen as duties of benevolence rather than as 
duties of justice (ibid., p. 213). Specifically in regard to HIV testing, I would argue that 
positive duties are duties of justice rather than benevolence, or beneficence (depending on 
the exact word used by different philosophers historically to convoke the same or a similar 
idea), the bioethical principle that will be explored to a greater extent in the following 
chapter.  
 
Importantly, Ashford also has focused on the right to justice as existing independently of 
any institution and what its relevant policy may be, as institutions are supposed to be 
“minimally just” (ibid., p. 217). If institutions fail to guarantee the right to justice for every 
human being, “and such failure is reasonably avoidable, they are judged to be unjust,” 
according to Ashford (ibid.). Ashford’s view is aligned with Scanlon’s view of justice, 
which is that an action is right if and only if it is not prohibited by a set of moral principles 
for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject (ibid., p. 209; 
Scanlon, 1986, p. 151). In other words, it is accepted that others would agree someone has 
performed a right action if there could be no reasonable objection to it. How this relates to 
HIV testing is that individuals and institutions must abide by the principles of justice in 
their implementation of HIV testing protocols and in all their actions related to HIV 
testing, including both before and after testing individuals and groups. If any action occurs 
that could be felt by the majority to be unjust or which could be reasonably considered 
unjust, it would be a wrong action and against the principles of justice. 
 
Prominent health ethicist Norman Daniels has focused on the social determinants of health 
in regard to justice, health. and healthcare, writing that promoting social justice is a crucial 
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step toward improving health because what is needed for social and political well-being is 
also needed for mental and physical health (2001, p. 6). Daniels acknowledged that social 
inequality is important at the individual level, but also, “the more unequal a society is in 
economic terms, the more unequal it is in health terms” (ibid., p. 7). What is especially 
germane to Africans is that Daniels feels that “health inequalities across demographic 
groups are unjust when they result from unjust distribution of the socially controllable 
factors affecting health” (Daniels, 2009, p. 36). Daniels also acknowledged that financial 
and geographical barriers to access health care impose different burdens on the health care 
needs of particular groups and that positive steps should be taken to ensure unmet needs 
are detected (Daniels, 1996, p. 199). If one considers the situation of most women in 
Africa, they are socially and socioeconomically inferior to men, as noted earlier, and many 
have lesser access to health care because of their more limited socioeconomic conditions 
and opportunities. Consequently, their health is at greater risk of potential harm because 
fundamentally the importance of their health is not equal to that of men as viewed by 
society. According to Daniels, health inequalities that derive from social determinants are 
unjust (Daniels, 2001, p. 8). Thus by applying the principle of justice related to health as 
explicated by Daniels, the inequality of the health of women in Africa can be seen as 
unjust, one of the themes of this thesis. If one accepts this premise, then it becomes 
necessary to determine whether there is a gender difference in regard to HIV testing in 
Africa resulting in potentially unequal approaches, unequal implementation, and unequal 
outcomes. I would posit that this unjust situation is certainly true in regard to routine 
testing in Africa because: (1) more women than men are tested for HIV through routine 
testing because women biologically have a greater need than men to access health care, 
which is where routine testing occurs; (2) women have a greater risk of coercive testing 
than men due to their inferior position of power in relation to health care providers, 
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especially during pregnancy, explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis; and, (3) women are less 
able to adhere to treatment for HIV after it has been provided than men based on their 
lower socioeconomic status and their role as the primary care provider in the family unit, 
which inhibit adherence and was cited earlier in this chapter. 
 
Of significance is that Daniels also has examined the right to health care and distributive 
justice, whereby “justice requires that all societies meet health care needs fairly based on 
reasonable resource constraints” (ibid., p. 9). However, he has noted that there is no 
agreement on the principles of distributive justice that would guide the determination of 
how to set fair limits on health care provision (ibid.). Based on the extensive range of 
competing health care needs, there is moral disagreement about what constitutes the fair 
allocation of health care resources (ibid.). Nonetheless and importantly, Daniels has noted 
the need to “appeal to human rights protections against discrimination, to be more specific, 
as in decisions about HIV/AIDS treatment policy or coverage for services,” illuminating 
the situation of inequality and injustice occurring in regard to access to HIV/AIDS 
treatment, particularly the problem African women have in accessing and adhering to 
HIV/AIDS treatment if they test HIV-positive (2009, p. 38). Moreover, Daniels has listed 
“preventive, curative, and rehabilitative personal medical services” as integral health care 
needs that individuals require in order “to maintain, restore or provide functional 
equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning,” which he claims supports 
each individual having a range of opportunity through which each one can lead a satisfying 
or happy life (Daniels, 1996, p. 185). Daniels felt that impairment of normal functioning 
through disease constitutes “a fundamental restriction on individual opportunity relative to 
the normal opportunity range” in that normal opportunity range is a crude measure of the 
importance of health care needs at the macro or societal level (ibid., p. 188). Daniels 
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claimed that “we ought to subsume health care under a principle of justice guaranteeing 
fair equality of opportunity” in describing his theory of distributive justice (ibid., p. 189).  
 
Central to Daniels’ important focus on discrimination related to HIV/AIDS treatment 
policy is that discussion about the morality of providing ART to Africans who need it and 
the immorality of not providing it as a part of national resource allocation toward health 
care has been ongoing in regard to HIV/AIDS for years both in Africa and in external 
donor countries. For example, the Abuja Declaration, which emanated from the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and was signed by some 50 African heads of state in 2001 pledging to allocate 
15% of each country’s annual budget to the improvement of the health sector, was based 
on a number of factors in addition to the morality of the pledge (OAU, 2001, p. 5). The 
Declaration states: 
  “We recognize that the epidemic of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis 
  and Other Related Infectious Diseases constitute not only a major 
  health crisis, but also an exceptional threat to Africa’s development, 
  social cohesion, political stability, food security as well as the  
  greatest global threat to the survival and life expectancy of African  
  peoples” (ibid., p. 3). 
Clearly, the African heads of state recognised the extreme impact the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
was having on their countries’ security, economies, and future stability, rather than taking 
the decision based on a moral imperative alone. Nonetheless, the Declaration also 
acknowledged the greater impact of the epidemic specifically on women, “We recognise 
that biologically, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection. In addition, 
economic and social inequalities and traditionally accepted gender roles leave them in a 
subordinate position to men” (ibid., p. 2). The Declaration also prioritised mobilising 
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human, material, and financial resources to provide care and support and quality treatment 
to infected populations, and it called on donor countries to complement the resources 
allocated by African countries themselves to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and the related 
infectious diseases (ibid., pp. 5-6). In its various aspects, only a few of which are noted 
here, the Declaration focused on the principles of justice, the right to health care, and 
distributive justice via the request for contributions to health systems and treatment from 
countries with much greater financial resources than African countries. This request for 
financial resources from donor countries was essentially a request for the practice of 
cosmopolitanism by these countries (Pogge, 2002, p. 86). In recognising we are all one 
global community, a sense of responsibility was imposed on external donor countries by 
the Declaration to provide available aid where it is needed as a manifestation of justice. 
Cosmopolitanism essentially aims to balance a lack of equality and increase equity through 
wealthier countries recognising the equality of the citizens of impoverished countries and 
providing external aid. The globalisation of infectious disease, especially HIV, fits this 
paradigm centrally. Providing aid for treatment of African PLHIV and resources for the 
weak health systems in these countries is an aspect of practicing global justice to which the 
Abuja Declaration tipped its hat and for which a number of external donor countries 
should be commended for their support. Indeed, Daniels also pointed out the obligations to 
justice of each individual beyond that of nations, “all individuals have duties of justice to 
promote just institutions: this means professionals and their institutions,” cementing this 
need within the healthcare system itself and those who profess to serve it (2009, p. 40). 
More specifically Daniels wrote, “I am inclined to apply that same approach to the 
relationship between social obligations to meet health needs and professional obligations 
of clinicians,” bringing the obligation to practice justice by individual clinicians toward all 
the individuals they counsel, diagnose, and treat (ibid.).  
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According to Beauchamp and Childress, “justice is a group of norms for distributing 
benefits risks, and costs fairly” (2001, p. 12). In their examination of distributive justice 
and what it means, Beauchamp and Childress noted that egalitarian theories of justice 
related to health specify that persons should receive an equal distribution of health care, 
while not requiring an equal sharing of all possible resources (ibid., p. 233). Yet what an 
equal distribution of health care would consist of remains in question given the differences 
in health status and need for health care from person to person. Beauchamp and Childress 
also focused on justice through the operation of just procedures, such as fair play, rather 
than focusing on just outcomes through an equal distribution of resources (ibid., p. 232). 
This notion of justice also supports the just and fair implementation of HIV testing 
protocols so that everyone is treated equally, and no one is discriminated against through 
any action or treated unfairly in any way. Procedural justice also is linked to the need to 
respect each and every person’s autonomy to prevent unfair discrimination against 
particular persons based on a perceived lack of equality. Procedural justice also 
appropriately acknowledges that health care resources are limited, and it aims to use a just 
and fair process in establishing what the limits are―despite ongoing disagreements about 
what they should be. 
 
In regard to justice, Michael Sandel has differentiated the “independent self” or “private 
identity” from the “public identity” of moral persons (2000, p. 323). He observed that the 
private identity of the independent self can change over time based on a person’s aims and 
attachments, yet in contrast, “our “public identity” is not affected by changes over time in 
our conceptions of the good” or what should constitute justice to other human beings 
(ibid.). In our public identity, according to Sandel, there should be no special aims, 
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attachments, loyalties, or allegiances; rather, the primacy of justice must prevail toward 
everyone (ibid.). Sandel has delineated what we owe to ourselves, or our friends or family 
members, as different from what we owe to each other as fellow human beings. One might 
view this contrast made by Sandel as similar to the difference between autonomy, what we 
owe to ourselves, and justice, what we owe to other human beings. Positioning his stance 
as “justice and community,” Sandel posits that it is precisely because we cannot know each 
other or each person’s ends or aims well enough “to govern by the common good alone” 
that we need justice (ibid., p. 324). In other words, because we are a community, we need 
justice as our guide. Yet Sandel does not call himself a communitarian. He argued that 
“principles of justice that derive their moral force from values commonly espoused or 
widely shared in a particular community or tradition” is the communitarian way of linking 
justice and the good, whereby the values of the community defines what it just or unjust 
(Sandel, 1998, p. x). However, Sandel holds that rather than rights resting on prevailing 
social values, which he sees as the communitarian view, “rights depend for their 
justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve” (ibid., p. xi). He believes both 
communitarians and liberals, such as Rawls, who believe that “certain individual rights are 
so important that even the general welfare cannot override them,” avoid judging the 
“content of the ends that rights promote” (ibid., pp. x, xi). As his critique of those who 
criticise the priority of right, Sandel thinks that as individuals we can make sense of our 
moral and political obligations, that is, the ends we choose for ourselves and the ends we 
choose in regard to others, in wholly voluntarist terms (ibid., pp. 186-187).  Moreover, to 
Sandel, the self is of primary importance: “As the self is prior to the aims it affirms, so a 
well-ordered society, defined by justice, is prior to the aims—communitarian or 
otherwise—its members may profess. This is the sense, both moral and epistemological, in 
which justice is the first virtue of social institutions” (ibid., p. 64). 
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To Sandel, it would seem, the paternal attitudes of health care providers deciding it is in 
the patient’s best interest to test her for HIV whether she wants the test or not, or is even 
aware she has been tested specifically for HIV, do not promote or fulfill justice. And, as 
“justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” according to Sandel, justice rather than 
paternalism is what social institutions should aim to practice (ibid.). Sandel’s point of view 
that we do not know enough about each other and each other’s aims to really know what 
the ‘common good’ is for each other is an interesting underlying premise that seems to 
support the essential need for the practice of human rights. Sandel also undermines the 
basic premise behind utilitarianism, that a morally good action is one that benefits or 
promotes the greatest good or happiness of the greatest number of people, when he writes 
that we do not really know what the common good is (ibid., p. 324; Merriam-Webster, 
2013, p. 1). Moreover, Onora O’Neill in her book, Bounds of Justice, wrote that most 
contemporary utilitarians “argue energetically that paternalism and violations of rights do 
not maximise utility,” supporting the increasing recognition and influence of human rights 
and the need to subvert paternalistic attitudes related to the provision of justice (2000, p. 
33).  
 
In considering distributive justice it is worth noting Robert Nozick’s statement that “it is 
best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb 
meant to approximate the general result of applying the principles of rectification of 
injustice” (1968, p. 231). Sandel also argued, “Where justice replaces injustice, other 
things being equal, the overall moral improvement is clear” (1998, p. 32).  I believe there 
are a variety of problems inherent in making decisions about distributive justice, such as 
exactly what, to whom, who provides it, and who decides? Thus I find Nozick’s 
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conception of it as “applying the principles of rectification of injustice” to be a more 
comfortable notion than some other descriptions of the aim of distributive justice (1968, p. 
231). Nozick’s conception seems to be a recognition of the need to attempt to balance 
justice where injustice already is apparent or has occurred, rather than establishing some 
type of standard for justice when the whole system is unequal at the start regarding access 
to goods and services and indeed basic health. Distributive justice in health care is 
complicated by the inequalities in the health status of individuals and populations, the 
resource constraints of health care systems worldwide and especially in African countries, 
and that each and every human being has some health care needs. Thus it appears to be 
impossible to be objective about distributive justice related to health care.  
 
In regard to HIV testing, if one goes back to the Beauchamp and Childress definition about 
the fair distribution of the benefits, risks, and costs, then there certainly are greater related 
risks and costs to individuals and groups who already are marginalised by society, which 
includes women and girls. The greatest benefit of HIV testing occurs, of course, to 
individuals who will have access to ART soon after testing HIV-positive and who will be 
able to adhere to the medication on a daily basis, which is questionable for many women. 
According to Onora O’Neill, “…we have no reason to think that principles of justice are 
relevant only to the action of individuals” (2000, p. 160). And, “We need in particular to 
be able to judge what specific institutions and action are needed if poor women in poor 
economies are to be accorded justice” (ibid., p. 159). O’Neill focused specifically on 
gender and justice when she wrote the following, which also resonates strongly in regard 
to the principle of informed consent as it relates to justice as well as autonomy: 
  “Dissent becomes harder when capacities to act are less developed 
  and more vulnerable, and when opportunities for independent action 
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  are restricted. Capacities to act are constrained both by lack of 
  knowledge and abilities and by commitments to others. Institutional 
  arrangements can disable agency both by limiting capacities to reason 
  and act independently and by raising demands to meet the needs and 
  satisfy the desires of others. Apparent ‘consent’ to such arrangements 
  does not show they are just. Whenever ‘consent’ reflects ignorance,  
or lack of capacity or opportunity to do anything but ‘consent’, it does  
not legitimate. Thinking in this way about justice we can see that it  
demands more, not less, to be just to the vulnerable, who are easier to 
deceive and to victimize than the strong because their ‘consent’ is all  
too easily elicited. Yet both idealized and relativized accounts of 
  justice tend to conceal the fact that justice to the weak demands more  
than justice to the strong. Idealized accounts of justice tend to ignore 
vulnerability and relativized accounts to legitimate it” (ibid., p. 163).  
Taking into account the normality of the demands of others on women and their 
vulnerability to power structures, O’Neill has encapsulated in a beautifully articulated 
paragraph how intertwined are the needs and obligations of individuals and institutions for 
respecting autonomy, agency, and justice of women, especially in sub-Saharan African 
countries. When women are coerced or forced into routine testing for HIV, their rights 
clearly are overridden, and the obligations of individuals and institutions to respect their 
rights through the provision of services are ignored and maligned. Since the bioethical 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence also arise surrounding this discussion of 
justice related to HIV testing, most prominently of women, these two principles will be 
examined in the following chapters.        
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CHAPTER 4: HIV TESTING AND BENEFICENCE 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION TO BENEFICENCE 
  “…No qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and 
  approbation of mankind than beneficence…nothing can bestow more 
  merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an 
  eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit arises from its 
  tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness 
  on human society” (Hume, 1751, pp. 2, 4).   
Eighteenth century philosopher David Hume considered ‘beneficence,’ which stems from 
the Latin, “bene,” and “facere”—to do well—as a quality of human nature; and, he 
considered ‘benevolence,’ stemming from “bene” and “volens”—an intention to do well—
as a principle of human nature (Norton, 1993, p. 179; Encyclopedia of Bioethics, p.1; 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, p. 2). However, Hume did not believe that 
practicing benevolence should be impartial toward everyone in the way he felt justice 
requires (Penelhum, 2003, p. 250). Hume did not believe that beneficence is owed to 
mankind in general, but to one’s family members, friends, or fellow citizens (ibid., p. 249). 
He believed that benevolence promotes the happiness of others and that acting from such a 
motive makes a person virtuous (Norton, 1993, pp. 161-162). Hume also felt that 
practicing a beneficent act expresses “the highest merit, which human nature is capable of 
attaining” (Hume, 1751, p. 1).  
 
According to philosopher Onora O’Neill, many ethical traditions extol universal 
benevolence, including love for all mankind or a concern for all (1996, p. 195). Indeed, 
philosophers Cicero, Seneca and Kant conceived of beneficence as a duty, although 
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without a corresponding right (Frankena, 1982, p. 63). Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius 
Cicero wrote in his historically and ethically influential letter to his son, De Officiis (“On 
Duties” or “On Obligations”), in 44 B.C. in the last year of his life that “Beneficence needs 
to be trained by practice” (Cicero, 1887, p. 2).  Cicero also wrote, “Duties of justice and 
benevolence to be preferred to those of prudence or wisdom,” giving priority to the duties 
that focus more on actions toward others than on duties to the self (ibid., p. 3). However, 
many philosophers do not consider benevolence and beneficence as basic ethical principles 
or duties on par with justice as the basic structure of society and framework for social 
stability (Rawls, 1999a, p. 47; Rizzo, 2008, p. 883).  
 
Beneficence is considered by many, including philosopher John Rawls, to be a 
supererogatory action, which O’Neill defines as “action that exceeds the demands of duty, 
yet is ethically admirable” (1996, p. 206; Rawls, 1999a, p. 94). She categorises 
beneficence as a social virtue that is practiced selectively and feasibly. As a social virtue, 
beneficence is not required to be practiced toward everyone in general or to a maximum 
amount, but to whom one wants to show “help, care, love, generosity, support or 
solidarity” (ibid., p. 195). Thus because beneficence is not required toward everyone, an 
act of beneficence is “unclaimable, unwaivable and unenforceable, and there will be no 
universal rights to others’ virtuous action” (ibid.). O’Neill also noted that because social 
virtues such as beneficence arise due to special relationships to others and flourish within 
these relationships, they do not “replicate the structure or tasks of special duties of justice” 
(ibid., p. 196). Even dependent relationships that create special opportunities or special 
urgencies for specific forms of help, care, or concern remain imperfect obligations as 
opposed to justice, a perfect obligation with required action owed to all, claimed both 
O’Neill and Rawls (ibid., pp. 188, 196, 197; Rawls, 1999a, p. 301). O’Neill also noted, 
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however, that commitment to practicing the universal principles of justice is most 
effectively expressed by the specific institutions designed to limit risks of injury and “to 
secure and maintain basic capacities and capabilities for action for all” (l996, p. 191). Thus 
she further separated the practice of beneficence from the more fundamental need for all to 
practice justice. 
 
4.1 HISTORY OF BENEFICENCE IN THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE 
Yet practicing beneficence is expected of medical providers rather than considering such 
actions they undertake as extraordinary or ‘supererogatory’. The Hippocratic Oath (430 
B.C.?), a compilation of ancient texts on the proper behavior of physicians and their 
relationship to their patients, includes the principle of beneficence: “Salus aegroti suprema 
lex,” or “the well-being of the patient shall be the supreme law” (Martin, 2003, p. 182; 
Pappas, Kiriaze and Falagas, 2007, p. 347; Gaizler and Nyeky, 2011, p. 1). The 
Hippocratic Code (Corpus Hippocraticum), known more commonly as the ‘Hippocratic 
Oath,’ has guided the practice of Western Medicine for more than 2,000 years (Pappas, 
Kiriaze and Falagas, 2007, p. 348). According to bioethicists Beauchamp and Childress, 
health care providers’ professional obligations and virtues have been seen as commitments 
to the practice of beneficence ( 2001, p. 176). Of interest is that the ancient thinking behind 
health care providers practicing the principle of beneficence may be appreciated more in 
the present day by Eastern European medical practitioners than by practitioners in many 
other countries. Beneficence is seen in Eastern European countries as the main principle of 
the Hippocratic Oath guiding the doctor-patient relationship as opposed to doing no harm 
to patients, the principle of non-maleficence, which shall be explicated in the following 
chapter (Gaizler and Nyeky, 2011, p. 1). While medical training in some countries may 
prioritise the primacy of the principle of non-maleficence over beneficence, O’Neill has 
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noted that many unknown health care workers live their lives “attentively devoted to 
caring for others across weary and difficult years” (1996, p. 207).  Swiss physician Martin 
also tellingly noted that “salus should not be understood as only health, but also as safety 
(at worst, survival)” (2003, p. 182). Moreover, Beauchamp and Childress have pointed out 
that practicing beneficence means taking positive steps to help others, not merely 
refraining from harming them (2001, p. 165).  
 
Beauchamp and Childress also discussed the bioethical conflict between a health care 
provider not interested in following a patient’s wishes and wanting to make a contrary 
decision about a patient’s care supposedly in the patient’s best interest (ibid., p. 165). This 
example describes how respect for autonomy challenges paternalistic views by health care 
providers, which they may view as beneficence, about where the best interests of a patient 
may really lie. Beauchamp and Childress describe the conflict between respect for 
autonomy and ‘professional beneficence’ as a central problem in biomedical ethics (ibid., 
p. 176). I would argue that health care providers should keep in mind when making such 
decisions, however, Martin’s salient point that health, safety, and survival must enter into 
the multi-layered equation for a health care provider as they naturally do in a patient’s 
decision-making. This consideration is important even if the provider is not well 
acquainted with the patient’s personal circumstances. Moreover, these three factors—
health, safety, and survival—are at the center of individuals’ routine-testing decisions. The 
context of such HIV testing and the patient’s life and circumstances become central 
elements of the testing decision given the possible outcome of a diagnosis of a potentially 
deadly illness amidst a social environment dangerously rife with stigma and 
discrimination. The three elements also should be at the core of the understanding of 
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healthcare providers related to the decisions individuals make on whether to undergo 
routine testing for HIV or not. 
 
Bioethicists Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, rather than agreeing with 
Beauchamp and Childress that respect for patient autonomy and beneficence are in conflict 
with each other, noted that in some cases there can be a ‘tension’ between the values of 
patient welfare, or beneficence, and respect for persons, or patient autonomy (1987, p. 45). 
Yet they also focused on the importance of context:  
  “There is also no way to define clearly what is absolutely best for  
the patient in medical terms alone. That definition is always related  
to the values the patient professes, those the institution and society  
assume, and those the culture holds to be important. Lacking any 
unequivocal definition of “benefit,” the physician cannot presume to 
define the whole of the patient’s good without essential input from 
the patient” (ibid., p. 38). 
In fact Pellegrino and Thomasma proposed a model for medical decisions they called 
“beneficence in trust” (ibid.). One rationale for their model was that when a health care 
provider trains to be and then offers herself to another as a healer, implicit in this 
relationship is a sense of trust and a promise from the provider “to help and to act on 
behalf of the good of the patient” (ibid., p. 41). According to Pellegrino and Thomasma, 
“Medicine as a human activity is of necessity a form of beneficence” (ibid.). Moreover, 
they also focused on the unique situation of each patient—that each patient must be 
handled individually, not only for medical reasons but because of the moral implications of 
providing a healing service to fellow humans who are in a more vulnerable position than 
oneself and who potentially or really are suffering (ibid., pp. 41-42). Thus Pellegrino and 
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Thomasma clearly acknowledged the power differential between the health care provider 
and the patient. Noting that both autonomy and paternalism are superseded by a health care 
provider’s obligation to act beneficently, Pellegrino and Thomasma also wrote that 
choosing between acting to foster autonomy or acting paternalistically should be based on 
what benefits the patient most, not on the provider’s intellectual convictions or emotional 
impulses (ibid., p. 42). This sense of beneficence flies in the face of nurses who have 
coerced women to test for HIV ‘because it’s in their best interest’. When, according to 
Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, “beneficence provides the 
primary goal and rationale of medicine and health,” it seems impossible not to cite the 
importance of healthcare providers practicing beneficence in implementing routine HIV 
testing protocols by respecting a patient’s autonomous decision on whether to test or not, 
abiding by the patient’s decision, and not pretending that the test is mandatory or coercing 
the patient into testing because it supposedly is in her best interest (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1994, p. 271; Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1987, pp. 41-42). 
 
According to Kass and Gielen, beneficence requires the balancing of benefits and harms 
that may result from an action to determine whether or not, on balance, the action is 
beneficial (1998, p. 92). Health care providers generally do not know what all the 
individual harms may be to someone who tests HIV-positive. Yet they certainly know that 
HIV remains a highly stigmatised disease with possible negative repercussions directed 
toward individuals from spouses/partners, family members, colleagues, and community 
members. They also should realise that it may not be in the patient’s best interest to test for 
HIV if no treatment for the disease is available if s/he tests positive, or possibly no 
treatment will be made available until the person has become very ill. It may be in the best 
interest of others if the patient tests HIV-positive and then refrains from having sex or uses 
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condoms every time she has sex so as not to transmit the virus. However, many African 
women are not in a position to refrain from having sex with their husbands or regular sex 
partners, nor can they negotiate condom use as this effort indicates they may be HIV-
positive with potentially disastrous effects, including GBV, abandonment, or ejection from 
their homes (MacPherson, Richards, Namakhoma, et al., 2014, p. 6; Richardson, Collins, 
Kung, et al., 2014, p. 1). According to an editorial in The Lancet in 2006, “Moreover, most 
research indicates that testing alone has little or no effect on behavior. The crucial step is 
counselling and promotion of behavior change” (Lancet, 2006, p. 1118).  Yet as discussed 
in previous chapters of this thesis, coercion by health care providers for patients to undergo 
routine testing for HIV remains a common practice in some clinical facilities in Africa, 
which is hardly a beneficent act.  
 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, “rules of beneficence present positive 
requirements of action,” rather than prohibitions of negative action, as will be explored 
later related to non-maleficence (1994, p. 262). They called this principle of beneficence 
‘positive beneficence’ (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 175). They highlighted another 
principle of beneficence, which they called ‘utility,’ which “requires that agents balance 
benefits and drawbacks to produce the best overall results,” more or less the same view as 
Kass and Gielen (1998, p. 92.). This approach of balancing benefits and drawbacks is the 
fundamental basis for the importance of respecting patient autonomy and for health care 
workers not assuming or patriarchally deciding that the community’s best interest is 
paramount. Indeed, the concept of self-preservation will be investigated in the following 
chapter. Beauchamp and Childress also nodded to the concepts professed by Pellegrino 
and Thomasma in stating that “sometimes beneficence is viewed as incorporating the 
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patient’s autonomous choices in the sense that the patient’s preferences help to determine 
what counts as a medical benefit” (2001, p. 176).  
 
Nonetheless, Beauchamp and Childress disagreed with their contemporaries Pellegrino and 
Thomasma and ancient medical ethicists on the real status of beneficence in medical 
practice, stating: “Neither the patient nor the physician has premier overriding authority, 
and no preeminent principle exists in biomedical ethics, not even the obligation to act in 
the patient’s best interest” (ibid., p. 177). This seems to be a very broad statement to make 
even though Beauchamp and Childress say they believe it is consistent with beneficence 
being the primary goal and rationale of medicine and health care (ibid.). While, of course, 
there are limits to a health care provider being in the position to meet all the patient’s best 
interests, I would argue that beneficence should be the primary goal of a health care 
provider—to help and to heal a patient, if needed, rather than simply not doing the patient 
any harm, which is the more common objective of the Hippocratic Oath in many countries 
nowadays. It almost seems that “salus aegroti suprema lex” simply has been forgotten in 
many countries, or at least in essence has been neglected. Or, perhaps the healing tradition 
described over the course of millennia by health care providers as their true calling has 
been overridden recently by other, more mundane vocational priorities—heightened 
professional and/or social status, long-term financial opportunities available through the 
practice of medicine, or disinterest in the time-consuming responsibilities involved in 
healing? Perhaps for many contemporary physicians, the calling to be “a healer” no longer 
exists. Some of these reasons likely were behind Pellegrino and Thomasma’s bioethical 
undertaking of cementing beneficence as pre-eminent in the medical lexicon in the present 
day—as it indeed was in ancient times. They wrote,  
“Ultimately, the good of the patient depends as much on the  
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physician’s character as his capacity to make these judgments. 
Furthermore, it depends on the extent to which he can be trusted 
to keep the good of the patient as his primary aim” (1987, p. 4). 
 
Moreover, Beauchamp and Childress went on to delimit the scope of beneficence in 
medical care, writing, “…the medical profession’s role of beneficent care of patients is 
misconstrued if modeled primarily on philanthropy, altruism, and personal commitment” 
(1994, p. 270). This statement seems to belie the importance of any individual’s calling to 
be a healer. Beauchamp and Childress further stated that instead of health care providers 
professing beliefs and personal endeavors of philanthropy, altruism, and commitment in 
medicine, their care of patients is rooted in reciprocity, that is, giving and receiving, which 
creates an obligation of beneficence to patients and to society—although what that specific 
obligation is was “difficult” for them to specify (ibid.). Nonetheless, they identified the 
obligation of beneficent treatment of a patient by a physician as due to the relationship of 
the patient and provider, also recognising that “the idea that beneficence expresses the 
primary obligation in health care is ancient” (ibid., pp. 270-271). Consequently, while 
Beauchamp and Childress show respect for the importance of beneficence in health care 
and a certain regard for its long-standing pre-eminence in the medical realm, they do not 
seem to give the same weight to beneficence as an integral and necessary character trait in 
health care providers as did Pellegrino and Thomasma. Rather, Beauchamp and Childress 
seem to focus on beneficence as a professional obligation to patients more aligned with 
being accountable as a service provider. Yet the sense of beneficence falling under the 
rubric of providing a service to their patients as a core bioethical principle of health care 
providers seems no different than an auto mechanic providing good service for a car due to 
the payment she will receive from the owner, which is also a professional obligation. Thus 
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this designation of beneficence by Beauchamp and Childress seems more akin to Rawls’s 
focus on justice as a mutually agreed contractual obligation to other human beings rather 
than beneficence (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 46, 95). While Rawls saw beneficence as a 
supererogatory characteristic of individuals along with courage and mercy, he claimed that 
upholding justice was a positive natural duty (ibid., p. 94). He believed that the concept of 
benevolence was a “second-order notion” (ibid., p. 223). According to Rawls, the contract 
doctrine presupposes that all the parties to it are moral persons and rational individuals 
with “a capacity for a sense of justice,” and that based on their equal dignity, “they are to 
be treated as the principles of justice require” (ibid., p. 289).  
 
Philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan served as the classic source for what has 
developed into modern social contract theory, explicated by Rawls initially in 1958 and 
more recently by others (Hobbes, 2000, p. 63; Rawls, 1999a, pp. 306-308; Nagel, 2000, p. 
296). Yet the approach used by Beauchamp and Childress in addressing beneficence as an 
obligation of health care providers to their patients is in essence what Hobbes called in 
1651 “commutative justice,” not beneficence (Hobbes, 2000, p. 72). Hobbes wrote that 
“commutative justice is the justice of a contractor—that is a performance of a covenant in 
buying and selling…exchanging…” (ibid.). In other words, to Hobbes commutative justice 
would be the appropriate term for health care providers giving their patients their due, that 
is, as service providers selling health services to the individuals who need these services. 
This reflection of Hobbes’s notion of ‘commutative justice’ seems to be the forerunner of 
Beauchamp and Childress’s description of beneficence as rooted in the reciprocal 
relationship of giving and receiving. However, I would argue that Beauchamp and 
Childress’s denotation of beneficence as giving and receiving is a necessary, but 
insufficient condition for beneficence. It is difficult to determine from some of their 
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descriptions, aspects, or definitions of beneficence whether Beauchamp and Childress 
really endow the principle of beneficence with any real bioethical moral authority. While it 
can be difficult to separate moral principles from each other in a fully comprehensive and 
comprehensible way, I would argue that some of the explanations of beneficence related to 
health care by Beauchamp and Childress do not seem very satisfactory. As reviewed 
above, I would argue that one or more of their descriptions of beneficence veer into the 
realm of justice; thus I do not believe they have given beneficence its just due. 
 
Historically, 40 years after Hobbes introduced the premise of a hypothetical contract 
among individuals across society as a means to respect and ensure the practice of justice, 
philosopher John Locke wrote in 1691 about what he called the “social compact” in Two 
Treatises of Government (1960, p. 108). Locke’s social compact was “fair to everybody” 
and each person made the same sacrifices to have the same benefits through 
“consent”…“guaranteeing, defining and giving substance to everybody’s freedom” (ibid.). 
Likewise, according to contemporary philosopher Thomas Nagel, Rawls’s contract theory 
was based on “the fundamental attitude toward persons on which justice as fairness 
depends is a respect for their autonomy or freedom” (2000, p. 296). Thus it appears to me 
that the idea of contract theory or contract doctrine, which Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls used 
to conceptualise the requirement of justice or freedom for everyone in society has been 
extrapolated by Beauchamp and Childress to encompass the beneficent relationship 
between a health care provider and her patients. Although there is a similarity to the social 
contract in the provider-patient relationship, I would argue that this relationship loses the 
central core of what beneficence really is. Beneficence is not justice or freedom that is 
owed to everyone, or to all patients, it is care, and indeed the best care possible, which is 
owed to patients by health care providers. Thus to me beneficence falls into the realm of 
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what O’Neill and Rawls defined as a supererogatory obligation to all individuals in social 
relationships, that is, as a virtue but without a corresponding right held by all individuals 
(O’Neill, 1996, p. 137; Rawls, 1999a, pp. 94-95). For health care providers, however, 
beneficence in its fullest sense becomes a normative obligation owed to the individuals 
who are their patients. Importantly, Hippocrates wrote in Of the Physician, “A good 
physician avoids all measures that are not conducive to the welfare of the patient,” (1846, 
p. 19). In other words, patients have a right to beneficent care from health care providers, 
not just the right to get care from health care providers, but the right to receive as good 
care as possible. This right also is aligned and consistent with the World Health 
Organization’s Constitution adopted in 1946, which states, “The enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being 
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social conditions,” 
although WHO’s Constitution relates more specifically to the obligations of nation states 
rather than individual healthcare providers (WHO, 1946, p. 1).   
 
4.2 BENEFICENCE AND FEMINIST THEORY 
Of relevance to beneficence and to an ethic of care is the recent emergence of feminists, 
such as psychologist Carol Gilligan and philosopher Virginia Held, who have emphasised, 
or over-emphasised in O’Neill’s view, that women have a distinctive moral voice and 
vision and caring ethic that they believe encompasses the totality of morality (Gilligan, 
1985, pp. 15, 17, 22, 26, 30, 34; O’Neill, 2000, p. 109; Held, 2006, pp. 88, 95). This is not 
a view for which I would argue as there would be no need for a special focus on the 
principle of beneficence in bioethics if care encompassed all moral principles. Moreover, 
that women have been historically and currently the main caregivers in the family and in 
society as a whole has been based at least partly on their biology—as the half of human 
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society capable of giving birth, feeding, and nurturing infants. The extension of women as 
the main caregivers in society across all age groups has not been because they are uniquely 
endowed with the moral characteristics integral to the ethic of care. The evolution of 
women’s position in society is still ongoing via the thrust for equality due to their lower 
socio-economic status, especially in developing countries, and particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where patriarchy continues to reign supreme in the social, economic, and most 
political spheres (MacPherson, Richards, Namakhoma, et al., 2014, pp. 5-6). Perhaps some 
might view a caregiver, a woman’s traditional role, as the opposite of a warrior, a man’s 
traditional role and desire to take advantage of women’s traditional role as caregivers as 
the all-encompassing embodiment that subsumes all other roles, virtues, and moral planes? 
Yet as a woman I find women’s subservient role in society as the group generally stuck 
with familial caregiving when elevated by some to the pre-eminence, or supreme law to 
use Hippocrates’s phrase, of human morality to be ironic at best. This conception also is 
potentially exploitative in pigeon-holing women in their traditional box only as caregivers, 
rather than also as socially, economically, and politically productive human beings with 
equal status to men. What’s more, every human being has the potential to care for other 
human beings and, when mature, to take good care of other human beings. To believe that 
only women possess such characteristics and capacities actually belies the equality of the 
sexes and the need for men to accept more responsibility as caregivers in many families 
and in society in general.  
 
Some feminists have separated the ethics of care from care as it is conceptualised in virtue 
ethics. In virtue ethics, care is characterised by virtue ethicist Michael Slote as the primary 
virtue in a morality based on a motive of caring, which “can offer a general account of 
right and wrong action and political justice” (Held, 2006, p. 19). Yet some feminists claim 
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that virtue ethics focuses on the states of character of an individual, while the ethics of care 
is concerned with caring relations (ibid.). For example, feminist Virgina Held suggests that 
“Care is not the same as benevolence, in my view, since it is more the characterization of a 
social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social relations are not 
reducible to individual states” (ibid., p. 42). Both of these accounts seem to elevate “care” 
to a position that sounds more god-like or saintly, or perhaps ‘supererogatory’, than 
someone simply undertaking a caring or beneficent act. Perhaps what is meant is an 
attitude, which would then encompass both the ‘motive,’ which is important to virtue 
ethics, and the relationship, which is important to the feminist ethics of care. Held goes on 
to state that “care involves moral considerations at least as important as those of justice” 
(ibid.).  Yet she also thinks that she trumps Slote’s concept of care because her definition 
requires the disposition to care, the ability to engage in care, and the exercise of care (ibid., 
p. 51). Thus perhaps Held was leading up to the steps involved in a caring act? However, 
Slote has “argued that the individual trait or virtue of (empathetic) caring is ethically more 
fundamental than caring relationships” (2007, p. 86). In this statement Slote has agreed 
with liberal feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who wrote, “the flourishing of human 
beings taken one by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the 
state, or the nation or the religious group” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 62). While Slote has 
recognised the differences some feminists have with his views on care, prioritising caring 
relationships over his motive, attitude, or virtue of care, he believes it is not necessary to 
decide between the two approaches to care (Slote, 2007, p. 118).  
 
Thus what some feminist philosophers have added to the philosophical dialogue is the 
importance of taking into account groups and the positions of groups in the ethical 
equation. Feminist philosopher Susan Sherwin articulates this point of view as follows: 
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  “The types of questions feminists add to the moral agenda cannot 
  be captured from within the moral and political resources of liberal 
  individualism; they require a different type of moral and political  
  framework…The questions that feminists raise involve more than 
  violations of individual autonomy or failures of distributive justice 
  among individuals in isolation…Feminists ask how different social  
  groups are likely to be affected…We can only begin to explore 
  strategies for eliminating the injustice represented by these group- 
  based harms and benefits if we understand the fact that they are 
  essentially group-based in their construction. Thus we need a moral 
  and political ontology that recognizes the possibility of group-based 
  harms and benefits even if we remain committed to the view that  
  all harms ultimately attach to individuals” (2002, pp. 283, 285). 
Feminist Held also interpolated this difference between individual and group rights, 
writing, “When justice is the guiding value, it requires that individual rights be respected. 
But when we are concerned with the relatedness that constitutes a social group and is 
needed to hold it together, we should look, I think, to care” (Held, 2004, p. 68).  
 
4.3 BENEFICENT PRACTICE TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 
In contrast to Held’s views, I would agree more readily with Slote’s stance regarding 
individuals and groups that “morality—both in the form of moral virtue and in the form of 
moral obligation or duty—centers around the empathetically caring concern to promote the 
welfare of other individuals or groups of individuals” (2007, p. 118). However, I would 
argue that in the social realm justice is more basic than care as an obligation to every 
individual human being and as the more fundamental conceptualisation of morality. It is 
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possible for individuals to be just to everyone, but not to provide individual care to 
everyone as this depends on individual circumstances and available resources. Thus I agree 
with Rawls that there is a “natural duty of justice,” and that it is a “fundamental 
requirement for individuals” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 296).  Slote insightfully wrote, “Our 
ordinary thought about the morality of individual action divides, by and large, into two 
main categories: moral issues about beneficence or helping others, and moral issues about 
deontology” (2007, p. 36). Since deontology is “the theory or study of duty or moral 
obligation: the ethics of duty,” according to Webster’s Dictionary, or “duty-based ethics”, I 
would classify justice as a duty, both to individuals and to groups (Webster’s New 
International Dictionary, 1966, p. 603; Kay, 2014, p. 2). But I would argue that care or 
beneficence is a choice one makes as to whether to give it to other individual human 
beings—except in the case of health care practitioners when beneficence toward patients is 
a duty. Moreover, according to Moodley, “all doctors have a responsibility to provide 
beneficial treatment” (2011, p. 57). This thinking also is consistent with rights-based 
theory. According to philosopher Ronald Dworkin,  
“Right-based and duty-based theories…place the individual at the  
center, and take his decision or conduct as of fundamental  
importance. Right-based theories are…concerned with the  
independence rather than the conformity of individual action.  
They presuppose and protect the value of individual thought and  
choice” (1977, p. 172). 
As well as valuing the choice of individuals, Dworkin also emphasised the importance of 
concern and respect, which I would argue are aligned with care but are not encompassed or 
superseded by care. Dworkin also wrote, 
  “…justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of 
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  all men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they 
  possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or  
  excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to  
  make plans and give justice” (ibid., p. 182).    
What Dworkin is famous for, though, is his notion of individual rights as trumps:  
  “Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. 
  Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective  
  goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they 
  wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient  
  justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them”  
  (ibid., p. xi). 
This important contemporary philosophical and human rights paradigm by Dworkin 
prioritising individual rights reflects the stance for which I am arguing in this thesis related 
to the routine HIV testing of women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa. But, I would argue, it 
also encompasses the routine HIV testing of anyone anywhere. The collective goal of 
testing people for HIV supposedly to stem the epidemic does not justify routine testing as 
beneficent treatment of individuals. The procedure does not in many cases provide them 
with an opportunity for real choice. And, as mentioned earlier, just testing people for HIV 
will not have an impact on new infections and the epidemic as a whole without treatment 
provision for individuals who test positive. Treating the individuals who test positive and 
providing them with access to ART soon after they test HIV-positive would be beneficent 
treatment (Kavanagh, Cohn, Mabote, et al., 2015, p. 1). It also would help prevent further 
spread of HIV. But I also believe it is a duty of justice to make ART available to 
individuals testing HIV-positive if routine testing is the testing protocol implemented. I 
believe routine testing should not be implemented where there is no linkage to the 
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provision of ART, including not “offering” routine testing where only single-dose 
nevirapine is available to help prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. For example, 
the prevention of HIV transmission from mothers to their infants is of limited value if the 
mothers die while the children are very young, leaving them without anyone to care for 
them (Alcorn, 2014, p. 1). Moreover, maternal mortality based on HIV infection can 
predict child mortality (ibid.). Also, the threat of drug resistance is growing. A recent study 
in South Africa showed a high prevalence of resistance to ARVs among infants newly 
diagnosed with HIV, with 57% of the infants who had undergone PMTCT resistant to the 
category of drugs that includes nevirapine, non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors 
(NNRTIs), which is still the most commonly used drug for PMTCT in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Carter, 2014, p. 1). Drug-resistance means that microorganisms causing infection have 
become resistant to the medication(s) used to treat the infection, rendering the drug(s) 
ineffective. Thus the use of these drugs does no good, and the use of them also can spread 
drug-resistant virus in the case of HIV.  Even so despite these issues, it remains up to each 
individual to decide whether she wants to access ART if testing HIV-positive and indeed 
decides she wants to get tested in the first place if routine testing is offered, whether or not 
she is pregnant. The issues surrounding self-preservation will be explored in the following 
chapter in relation to the principle of non-maleficence. 
 
Philosopher Anthony Price argues that choice is the same as practical judgement and 
identifies the origin of such intended reasoning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
writing that “we make a choice to take or avoid something, but form an opinion about what 
it is, or in what way it is beneficial; choice is commended for having the right object” 
(2005, p. 265). Thus a beneficent action, whether it will be beneficial to ourselves or to 
another person, involves reasoning and choosing whether to take a certain action.  Price 
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describes his view of beneficent choice in conjunction with philosopher Sarah Broadie’s 
explanation of Aristotle’s stance on the practical judgement of health care practitioners: 
“all ultimately aim to produce or preserve what everyone values and refers to as ‘health’, 
but the end which figures in the premises of medical deliberation differs with experts of 
different caliber or different training” (ibid., pp. 264, 267). What is in contention here is 
what Aristotle called “what is best” for the patient; and, Broadie noted that different 
practitioners can have different visions and goals for ‘what is best’ for the patient, 
depending on the practitioner’s background, training, and experience (ibid., p. 267).  
 
Philosophers Keld Thorgaard and Uffe Juul Jensen also have noted the importance of each 
individual patient to Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics; that each patient deserves 
special treatment or what can be called beneficent treatment, “the physician treats the 
patients ‘one by one’ and his responsibility is to the health of the individual patient” (2011, 
p. 5). This statement is consistent with the rights of the individual and that each patient has 
specific traits and particular circumstances that need to be taken into account in making 
beneficent choices (ibid., pp. 3, 5). Thorgaard and Jensen also stressed the important claim 
by clinician and medical ethicist Alvan Feinstein in 1994 not only of the importance of 
patient autonomy, but the inclusion in decision-making of the patient’s judgment on what 
she feels is the end goal of beneficent treatment (ibid., p. 3). According to Feinstein, they 
noted, patients “are the only persons who can suitably observe, evaluate, and rate their own 
quality of life and the important features of their own health status” yet, “patients have 
seldom been asked or allowed to indicate their own values and beliefs”  (ibid.). Thorgaard 
and Jensen also saluted the importance of clinician and ethicist Henrik R. Wulff and 
medical researcher Peter C. Gotzsche’s emphasis in clinical decision-making on uniting 
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humanistic and ethical components, “from an understanding of the patient as a fellow 
human being” (ibid., p. 2).  
 
The thinking outlined above by Thorgaard and Jensen, Feinstein, Wulff and Gotzsche 
supports health care providers including an analysis of the individual patient’s needs; a 
knowledge and understanding of the context; and, a recognition of the patient’s equality 
with oneself not only in decision-making about treatment, but in discussing any health-
related decision. I would posit that the patient’s medical and social history also must be 
considered as part of the patient’s needs and context, which could have an impact on the 
patient’s HIV and health status. All of these elements feed into—or should feed into—
decision-making on routine testing. Health care providers should realise and not neglect 
the importance of these factors in decision-making. Without such understanding of the 
various influential factors, it seems unlikely, if not impossible, that anyone could grasp 
what a beneficent decision would be regarding another person, including a patient.  
Moreover, as noted by Feinstein and Thorgaard and Jensen, the patient should have 
confidence in the health care provider’s choices regarding the patient, or in the 
comprehensive laying out of the choices to the patient, with the underlying assumption of 
receiving beneficent care (ibid., p. 3).  Having such confidence goes hand-in-hand with the 
notion that the patient believes she will be receiving beneficent care; that the health care 
provider will be looking out for her best interests; that the provider will consult with her 
when a choice needs to be made; and, if appropriate, that the health care provider may 
make a recommendation about the best possible choice to make. However, the choice 
should be the patient’s decision when the patient is competent, rather than coerced, or 
potentially be considered an example of a decision actually made by the provider in a 
paternalistic way. As, according to Feinstein, only individuals themselves “can suitably 
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observe, evaluate and rate their own health status,” meaning patients are in the best 
position to judge what is best for themselves in health care (ibid., p. 8). The focus here, 
obviously, on what is best for the patient rather than what may seem to be best for the 
community. 
 
In Hume’s conception of virtue, he considered the two qualities most useful in other 
people as benevolence and justice, yet he considered the qualities most useful to ourselves 
to be different (Russell, 2013, p. 99).  The qualities Hume considered most useful to 
ourselves will be explored in the next chapter. Bioethicist Justin Oakley believes that 
“Medical beneficence qualifies as a virtue because it focuses doctors on their patients’ 
interests and blocks inclinations towards the unnecessary interventions of defensive 
medicine” (2013, p. 205). Unnecessary testing is one aspect of “defensive medicine”, or 
the anxiety about possible malpractice lawsuits, which can be practiced by physicians or 
other health care providers. I would argue that routine HIV testing of everyone presenting 
for healthcare, the HIV testing protocol used in some countries nowadays as mentioned 
earlier, can be considered as defensive medicine or perhaps more appropriately as 
defensive public health. Where and when HIV testing is not warranted, it is not beneficent 
unless it is done expressly at the patient’s wishes or is initiated by the patient in the case of 
a request for voluntary testing. Oakley also noted that virtue ethicists have done little work 
on various questions of justice in healthcare, including the ethical concerns that have been 
raised surrounding infectious diseases and emerging pandemics, which is one of the 
bioethical principles this thesis is attempting to address along with beneficence and the 
other ethical principles (ibid., p. 215). 
 
4.4 BENEFICENCE AS A VIRTUE 
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Philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas called the virtue of doing good 
“beneficentia” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 121). And virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre discussed 
how Aquinas described how a single action of doing good, a beneficent action, may also 
encompass other virtues, such as the virtue of charity, the virtue of taking pity, or the 
virtue of justice (ibid.). However, Aquinas separated the virtue of justice into different 
parts, stating that giving someone what is owed to them is strict justice, not a manifestation 
of the virtue of justice (ibid.). To Aquinas the beneficent individual gives more than what 
justice requires or is owed to another human being; beneficence can even be a case of how 
helping to relieve another’s distress relieves one’s own distress (ibid.). Thus, beneficent 
actions can serve more than one purpose. Surely many healthcare providers practice 
beneficence in this way, in which relieving a patient’s ills relieves the provider’s distress. 
Also, vice versa, a provider may be distressed by her inability to relieve a patient’s illness. 
MacIntyre suggested, following Aquinas, that one action can be just, generous, beneficent, 
and indeed stem from pity all at the same time; however, individuals need to be educated 
to form this understanding of beneficence in its various manifestations (ibid.). One 
wonders whether many healthcare providers in countries where medical education does not 
priortise “salus aegroti suprema lex” are trained in the provision of any form of 
beneficence, much less how a beneficent action they may perform toward a patient can 
also be a virtuous action encompassing other virtues? 
 
MacIntyre also described how distributions of power can play out through acts of 
beneficence, that is, on the parts of both the giver and the receiver as, he noted, was 
recognised by many other thinkers, including Foucault, Augustine, Hobbes, and Marx 
(ibid., p. 102). He highlighted how “institutionalised networks of giving and receiving” 
can both mask and protect positions of power in which “victimisation and exploitation” 
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can be part and parcel of participation in such networks (ibid.). MacIntyre also advised that 
“in our lives we have to learn how to live both with and against realities of power” (ibid.). 
This advice is germane for all healthcare providers and is especially resonant regarding 
routine HIV testing where positions of power can undermine justice, beneficence, and 
other virtues. Respecting autonomy through the implementation of the informed consent 
process, rendering justice, and providing beneficent treatment through using complete 
protocols for HIV testing and making referrals for treatment or follow-up care and support 
is aligned with MacIntyre’s view that the best is “when a distribution of power has been 
achieved which allows power to serve the ends to which rules of giving and receiving are 
directed” (ibid., p. 103).   
 
In discussing beneficence and benevolence ethicist Simon Robinson has pointed out that 
“empathy is closely connected to the virtue of benevolence” (2008, p. 116). Empathy with 
one’s patient seems essential to providing good healthcare, the ability to identify what the 
patient is undergoing, enduring, or suffering from, to walk in the shoes of the patient. I 
would argue that empathy is also needed as a part of the process of benevolent decision-
making. Robinson describes empathy as “the capacity to hear and understand underlying 
feelings” (ibid., pp. 116-117). Empathy is a quality essential to the counselling process 
and, according to psychologist and HIV/AIDS counsellor Alta van Dyk, “empathy should 
be used in all phases of the counselling process” (2008, p. 235). Empathy should be 
involved in any discussions between patient and provider related to HIV testing if the 
patient has not volunteered for HIV testing and wants to discuss her particular situation 
and potential fears of the test or the test result. In HIV testing it also is essential to notify 
the patient in advance of the benefits and potential harms of such testing, including its 
clinical benefits and risks such as discrimination or abandonment, according to the 
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guidelines of the WHO (2010c, p. 10). Moreover, according to the WHO’s protocol for 
routine testing, the client or patient must be given an opportunity to ask questions in the 
pre-test information session that is required to be provided by the healthcare practitioner or 
counsellor (ibid.). Robinson also has noted how practicing empathy enables healthcare 
providers to be aware of and accept their own limitations as a professional and as a person 
and also to be conscious of not taking a paternalistic attitude toward the patient by 
imposing their own needs on the relationship (2008, p. 117). As mentioned earlier, urging 
patients to test for HIV to reach testing quotas obviously would be paternalistic and defy 
the practice of empathy. Also noted by Robinson is that while empathy is essential to the 
caring and counselling professions, it is not unique to these professions, thus supporting 
empathy and beneficence as what he calls a ‘transferable’ virtue (ibid.).  
 
Robinson also noted that empathy is “a foundation of spiritual awareness,” which recalls 
the Hippocratic focus on the healer having spiritual powers (ibid.). For, according to 
Hippocrates, the healer “dare not ascribe to his art unqualified power, when he reflects on 
its frequent failures; even when success attends, it is to Heaven alone he owes it” 
(Hippocrates, 1846, p. 6). This quote is included not to imply that all healing is God’s 
work, but that there is a spiritual side to healing, which may be diminishing in importance 
among contemporary health care providers. For example, Robinson has identified the key 
importance of virtues in the practice of care, as follows: 
  “Virtues are necessary for the delivery of professional care,  
  including spiritual care and the capacity to respond ethically. 
  On the other hand, virtues also involve the spiritual needs of  
  the carer. Carers need a sense of unconditional acceptance, a 
  work context that they can put their faith in and which gives  
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  the space to work through their life meaning, the development  
  of hope and so on….The generation of hope thus demands that  
the truth be arrived at through empathy, with all its ambiguities  
and limitations” (2008, pp. 125, 145).  
This passage suggests how important it is to carers to practice beneficence to maintain the 
spiritual side of their profession involved in healing, that not being true to patients also 
means not being true to oneself. To pretend to patients that HIV testing is standard 
operating procedure without any caring attached to it, and without acknowledging the 
needs for beneficence in its implementation, prevents the healthcare provider from 
delivering this health service in the way it is supposed to be done, which also is a 
manifestation of taking the first step toward the power to heal.  
 
In considering the beneficent treatment of women in healthcare, it is essential to realise 
that women as individuals and as a group need consideration, as described earlier. They 
individually and as a group may be subject to neglect, coercion, and/or abuse, which may 
play out in healthcare situations. Pregnant women may be considered as the most 
vulnerable of women, both individually and as a group. Not realising the contextual needs 
of women, including individual pregnant women, who are asked to undergo routine testing 
is negligent. Talking them into testing for HIV when they would prefer not to is indeed 
coercive. And, lying to them that routine testing is actually mandatory for pregnant 
women—or for any woman—is abusive of their inferior position of power in the 
healthcare realm. Yet in medical ethics, beneficence means “the active promotion of 
goodness, kindness and charity” (Moodley, 2011, p. 57). And, in Roman law, beneficence 
meant a “right,” which is resonant with its importance in healthcare to Hippocrates and 
implies more than just a contractual relationship (ibid., p. 203).  What’s more, the World 
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Health Organization has focused on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in regard 
to HIV testing, stating, “…governments are also responsible for ensuring that HIV testing, 
like all other essential health services, is not offered, recommended or provided in a way 
that discriminates against any person or group of people” (2010c, p. 10). And, according to 
the WHO, “Governments must do all they can to prevent such human rights violations, 
both for the protection of the individual and the effectiveness of the national response to 
HIV” (ibid.). Thus the WHO supports pro-active beneficent action by governments to 
prevent human rights violations related to HIV testing—not simply that governments must 
prosecute human rights violations after they are committed. Indeed, the WHO supports 
prevention of human rights violations toward individuals occurring from HIV testing as 
well as toward groups, recognising that HIV policies and programmes must be rights-
based to succeed. And, I would argue, HIV testing programmes should prioritise the 
practice of beneficence in the implementation of the testing protocols, especially toward 
women and girls, who are the most vulnerable in the power structure embedded in the 
provider-patient relationship. The following chapter will develop this need further, 
focusing on the principle of non-maleficence. 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
CHAPTER 5: HIV TESTING AND NON-MALEFICENCE 
 
5.0 THE EMEGENCE OF NON-MALEFICENCE  
  “The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, know the  
present, and foretell the future--must mediate these things, and  
have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely,  
to do good or to do no harm” (Hippocrates, 1868, pp. 8-9). 
The quote, above, from Of the Epidemics written by Hippocrates circa 400 B.C. is what 
some believe to be the source for physicians of the admonition, “Primum non nocere” or 
“First do no harm,” which is the bioethical principle of non-maleficence (McGraw-Hill 
Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine, 2002). “First do no harm” is commonly 
attributed to text included in “The Oath” of Hippocrates, although some say this is an 
erroneous attribution as the quote actually originated in his treatise on epidemic diseases 
(1868, pp. 8-9). The Hippocratic Oath does state, however, that “…for the benefit of the 
sick…I will keep them from harm and injustice,” or according to the von Staden 
translation, “But from (what is) to their harm or injustice I will keep (them)” (Miles, 2004, 
p. ii). For more than 2,000 years through history, physicians and health care practitioners 
have designated their basic duty in the practicing of their profession as to do no harm to 
the patient. Perhaps not coincidentally, about 20 years before Hippocrates wrote Of the 
Epidemics, Plato wrote in 380 B.C. in a dialogue in the Republic, through which he had 
Socrates explaining his treatise on justice, “We have shown that it is never just to harm 
anyone” (2000, p. 25). It is plausible that years later Hippocrates may have been 
consciously adapting Plato’s focus on not doing anyone harm as a principle of justice to 
his own principle on the just practice health care practitioners should direct toward their 
patients.  
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5.0.1 Mill and the Harm Principle 
Yet what is known as the ‘harm principle’ in philosophy and bioethics is commonly 
attributed to philosopher John Stuart Mill based on his statement in his book, On Liberty, 
originally published in 1859, “…the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others” (1999, p.6). Thus the ‘harm principle’ is a principle that originated in antiquity 
regarding medical care, yet it is used more widely today as a principle related to individual 
freedom and justice far more broadly. What is especially germane to both one’s own health 
care and the health care of others and even to making one’s own decision about HIV 
testing is that Mill went on to write in On Liberty,  
“The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable  
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely  
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over  
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” 
(ibid.).  
Mill did not write that decisions about our bodies and minds should depend on what may 
affect others. He focused his statement on the central premise that one’s body is one’s own 
property, and we are not to base our decisions about what to do or not to do with our 
bodies on the feelings or priorities—or even the health—of others. This is the central 
premise of a woman’s right to her own reproductive health decisions, even though this 
right is hotly debated today in many cultures, religions, and countries. It also is the premise 
behind self-efficacy and health-seeking behavior, which is of central importance to both 
individual and public health. Mill went on to say in the same essay,  
  “Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily,  
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or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering  
each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling  
each to live as seems good to the rest” (ibid., p. 8). 
In this statement, Mill not only points out how important it is for the individual to maintain 
control over his or her body, but that mankind as a whole benefits from each person being 
the “proper guardian” of their own health. He also centers decision-making about health 
matters in the individual, rather than taking a ‘public health approach’ that many today 
consider to be the overriding focus.  
 
Yet, ironically, Mill seems to have been especially prescient regarding the circumstances 
of present society when he wrote in the same treatise, 
  “…There is also in the world at large an increasing inclination 
  to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both 
  by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as 
  the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to 
  strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual,  
  this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously 
  to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more 
  formidable” (ibid.). 
Mill might have been writing specifically about the argument between public health versus 
individual health and the right of society trumping the right of the individual. Yet he was 
not. He was really writing about the liberty of the individual and individual thought and 
decisions in a more profound way beyond just focusing on health. Mill made the reader 
realise he was identifying and describing a broader paradigm when he wrote at the end of 
his “Chapter 1, Introductory” chapter in On Liberty, “Those grounds, when rightly 
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understood, are of a much wider application than to only one division of the subject…” 
(ibid., p. 9). Thus he understood that some might find his writing narrowly focused on one 
subject or another, while he was really taking an all-encompassing stance on individual 
liberty and the rights of individuals. 
 
Mill went on to write in Chapter 4 of On Liberty, “…with respect to his own feelings and 
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably 
surpassing those that can be possessed by any one [sic] else” (ibid., p. 2). In his 
understanding of individuals and his support for their right to their own decision-making 
about themselves, Mill also may have been alluding to their right to informed consent in 
such decision-making. Or, one would think that he certainly would agree with the right to 
informed consent of individuals regarding their health care. But what Mill is substantially 
known for regarding individuals and health care is indeed the “harm principle,” which 
supports the right of individuals to make their own health-care decisions if they will not 
harm anyone else. And, he also supports the need for health care providers not to harm 
individuals. I posit that Mill also meant that health care practitioners should not harm any 
individuals in the name of ‘public health,’ because that would deny them the freedom of 
choice and thus their liberty, as well as inflict potential harm on them.  
 
Importantly Mill also noted in On Liberty, the duty one has to oneself:   
  “The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than  
  prudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of  
  these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for  
none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held  
accountable to them” (ibid., p. 4).  
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Mill was writing not only on the importance of individual freedom, but also on the 
importance of individuals to exercise that freedom. Concurrent with supporting each 
individual to demand respect from others, Mill, in emphasising self-respect, also called on 
individuals to care for themselves and to develop themselves. He set the locus of 
accountability for doing so on oneself. Thus Mill saw self-development and self-care as a 
personal responsibility.  However, Mill did not see self-development as benefiting only the 
self; he acknowledged that others can benefit from individuals’ self-development. In 
Chapter 3 of On Liberty, he wrote, “In proportion to the development of his individuality, 
each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more 
valuable to others” (ibid., p. 7). Consequently, in stating his views on individual freedom, 
Mill was not neglecting the needs of society, but noting that what benefits individuals also 
can benefit the larger society. This recognition of the overall social value emanating from 
protecting individuals is similar to that of Warren and Brandeis, who both subsequently 
became justices in the United States Supreme Court, in writing in the Harvard Law Review 
in the U.S., some thirty years later than Mill in 1890, that “…the protection of society must 
come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual” (1890, p. 11). While 
Warren and Brandeis were writing primarily about the right to privacy, their stance is 
essentially the same as that of Mill in his writing about individual freedom; that is, the 
individual has a right to freedom and the freedom to protect or maintain her or his 
individual privacy. Such a right to privacy also relates to the right to confidentiality 
regarding one’s own health information. 
 
5.0.2 Non-Maleficence and Individual Freedom 
The importance of individual freedom and the individual freedom and privacy to make 
one’s own decisions, including private decisions, is also entwined with philosopher 
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Immanuel Kant’s notion of autonomy. According to Mary Gregor’s translation of Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which he wrote in 1785, Kant’s conception of 
individuals is that we are self-governing and, because of this, we are autonomous moral 
beings (Gregor, 1998, p. xxix). Gregor also noted that respecting a person as a rational 
being, which is central to Kant’s philosophy, means that we must respect her right to make 
her own decisions about her own life and her own actions (ibid., p. xvii). Of course, this 
perspective also encompasses respecting her right to decide whether to be tested for HIV—
or not. What Kant also is known for in his Groundwork, however, is “the concept of 
necessary duty to oneself” (Kant, 1964, p. 91). Perhaps his most well-known statement in 
the Groundwork is the following: 
  “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in 
  your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a  
means, but always at the same time as an end” (ibid.).  
In this passage, Kant is not only supporting the primacy of the self, but also the need to 
respect other persons as one respects oneself, and to see them as autonomous beings who 
are not to be used simply as a means to further one’s own goals or treated as objects to 
which one acts for or against. Kant’s approach to the treatment of other human beings also 
can be stretched to embrace HIV testing:  individuals should not be tested for HIV simply 
because health care providers wish to know if they are infected with the virus just to try to 
prevent others from being infected, but only if each individual will benefit from the test 
result herself—after deciding if she wants to be tested for HIV—through the provision of 
same-day antiretroviral therapy (ART), if needed and available, or through a referral for it, 
and through access to the available means of prevention of HIV transmission. This stance 
and upshot seems to be aligned with Kant’s thinking in the following passage from the 
Groundwork: 
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  “For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such 
   promise cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, 
  and so cannot himself share the end of the action” (ibid., p. 92). 
And,  
  “For then it is manifest that a violator of the rights of man  
  intends to use the person of others merely as a means without 
  taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they ought 
  always at the same time to be rated as ends—that is, only as 
  beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of  
  the very same action” (ibid.).  
That Kant would have difficulty agreeing with the focus of public health workers on 
testing as many people for HIV as possible, and not necessarily through an informed 
consent process, with the hope to subvert new infections without making treatment 
available to all who test HIV-positive seems undeniable based on his writing. Kant went 
on in the Groundwork to further explicate the duty one has to oneself: “…in regard to 
contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not enough that an action should refrain from 
conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonise 
with this end” (ibid.). Thus Kant was explaining that individuals have a positive duty to 
respect themselves and to behave and act with their own self-respect highest in their 
mind—at the same time they do not behave or act in such a way as to disrespect others. 
Consequently, like Mill in the century that followed, Kant believed that the duty to respect 
the self precedes the duty to respect others, yet it should not preclude respecting others. 
Kant seems to be describing the need that each one of us has, or should have, to balance 
our own needs with the needs of others in developing ourselves and in ‘living a good life.’ 
Yet this is no more a need of every individual than it is also a need of each and every 
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health care provider. This brings us back to the importance of autonomy to Kant, who 
wrote in the Groundwork, “Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human 
nature and of every rational nature” (ibid., p. 97). He also wrote in the Groundwork 
relevant to this argument, “the above principle of autonomy is the sole principle of ethics” 
that is, respecting oneself and respecting others is the fundamental approach we should 
take to our own behavior and our behavior toward others (ibid., p. 102). That Kant’s 
expectation is as relevant for health care providers as it is for others underlies this 
argument related to Kant’s principle of respect for autonomy in that human beings are an 
end in themselves and not a means for testing anyone for HIV, whether we are deciding to 
test ourselves or whether we are involved in testing others. Moreover, South Africa’s 
“Patient’s Rights Charter,” which underscores patients’ right to dignity, guarantees each 
person “the right to participate in decision-making on matters affecting one’s health” 
(Department of Health (DOH), 1996, p. 3). The Charter also pertains to HIV testing as it 
states, “A person may refuse treatment and such refusal shall be verbal or in writing 
provided that such refusal does not endanger the health of others” (ibid., p. 11). And, the 
Charter also supports a focus on care of the self: the first responsibility of every patient or 
client is “to take care of his or her health” (ibid., p. 16). Thus the South African Patients’ 
Rights Charter is aligned with Kant’s dictum of respecting oneself and others and the duty 
of caring for oneself as fundamental ethical principles. In the laying out of the rights and 
responsibilities related to individuals and health care, the Charter also is aligned with 
Mill’s ‘harm principle’ and the bioethical principle of non-maleficence—to do no harm.  
 
5.1 NON-MALEFICENCE AND SELF-PRESERVATION 
Writing in the 1700s, Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau also focused on the moral 
development of the individual, through what he called “amour de soi,” or love of the self 
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(Grimsley, 1973, pp. 54-55). Rousseau claimed that man’s amour de soi was his most 
primordial characteristic (ibid., p. 55). To Rousseau, the fundamental urge of man is the 
basic impulse of self-preservation, the will to survive (ibid., p. 33). He also called amour 
de soi the only passion that is natural to man (ibid., p. 46). Hence to Rousseau, in his 
pedagogical treatise and novel entitled Emile, in which he described his views on the 
human condition, self-preservation is the first and foremost instinct that any of us have; it 
is basic to human nature and natural law that our fundamental desire is to continue our 
existence (O’Hagan 2003, pp. 22, 59; Grimsley, 1973, p. 44). Moreover, Rousseau 
considered self-preservation, or amour de soi, to be one of the four basic elements of 
human nature, along with freedom, compassion, and perfectibility (O’Hagan, 2003, p. 22). 
Rousseau’s special focus on self-preservation is a basic feeling with which it is likely 
every person can identify—that our most fundamental urge is the will to survive. It is the 
stuff of which military medals are made; that is, medals are bestowed on those who 
endanger their existence, who test their survival, who risk their lives. It is the highest stake 
anyone can bet, and we honor individuals who have jeopardised their own lives to save the 
lives of others or to help save their countries. While Rousseau considered our will to 
survive as part of our animal nature, he separated human beings from animals in that 
humans also make decisions on a higher plane than mere survival (Clarke, 2003, p. 120). 
Human beings reflect on what is likely to be beneficial or harmful to them, according to 
Rousseau, and make decisions based on the aspects they see in any situation or action 
(ibid.). Again, we see in Rousseau the principle of harm and the potential for harm to the 
self as the field of engagement for decision-making.      
 
In recognising that humans have more sophisticated mind/body characteristics than other 
animals, Rousseau also noted that the will to survive has no inherent moral quality 
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(Grimsley, 1973, p. 55). It is when encountering other human beings, according to 
Rousseau, that morality comes into play (ibid.). However, some contemporary 
philosophers (and this author) believe morality also concerns human beings’ treatment of 
animals, not only how we treat each other, as well as the necessary conservation of natural 
resources, which in contrast with Rousseau’s philosophy is presently considered to be 
interlinked to the survivability of human beings and animals (and plants).  
 
What in bioethics is now called empathy, or the identification with another, commonly 
referred to as ‘walking in the shoes’ of another, is what Rousseau termed to be the ‘pity’ 
we feel in identifying with a ‘suffering creature’ (ibid., p. 57). While Rousseau saw pity as 
characteristic of “an expansive soul,” he stated that there are other elements in the self 
beyond pity, which form the basis of morality (ibid.). Rousseau went on in Emile to 
describe the importance of conscience and reason to guide human action and endeavor and 
that these two human characteristics support each other (ibid., p. 67). Yet, Rousseau, too, 
like a number of other philosophers discussed in this paper, emphasised the importance of 
the “freedom to choose” in pursuit of the good, beyond survival, and that our bodies and 
senses play a key role in such pursuits (ibid.). 
 
In the development of his theory on amour de soi, Rousseau explicated that in its highest 
form, it is no longer just an impulse toward survival in human beings, but that it embraces 
various other aspects of our existence (ibid., p. 68). In fact, Rousseau equated amour de soi 
in its highest form as the ‘love of the soul’ (ibid., pp. 68-69). He stated in Emile: 
  “But when the force of an expansive soul makes me identify 
  myself with my neighbor, and I feel my own self, so to speak, 
  in him, then it is in order not to suffer myself that I want him  
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  not to suffer. I am interested in him out of love for myself, and 
  the reason for the precept is in nature itself which inspires in me 
  the desire for my own well-being in whatever place I feel myself 
  to exist. From this I conclude that it is not true that the precepts  
  of natural law are founded on reason alone. They have a base  
  more solid and sure. Love of men derived from love of self 
is the principle of human justice” (Rousseau, 1762, IV. 523. Fn 
/235. Fn, O’Hagan, 2003, p. 129). 
I wonder if anyone could possibly disagree with this passage as a description fundamental 
to morality, if not a description of every aspect of morality. As, according to Rousseau, 
when we see ourselves mirrored in other human beings, we understand and practice justice 
toward them as we do (or should do) to ourselves.  
 
Likewise, I would posit that it is so common for women to see their calling as caring for 
others rather than themselves that it is important for women to be raised to care for 
themselves as a being of primary importance. I also believe that African society 
traditionally views African women as second-class citizens (as I have explicated earlier in 
this paper), which is still playing out in 2015 in the inequitable and sometimes forced HIV 
testing of women, and particularly pregnant women, in sub-Saharan African countries. I do 
not believe that Rousseau would view this practice as just, fair, or equitably human, and 
surely not as the practice of amour de soi in its highest form. The coercion practiced by 
some health care providers to get women to test for HIV is certainly not ‘love for the soul.’ 
In my view, it leans more toward love for the self in its lowest form when the objective is 
to raise HIV testing rates simply for health care professionals to ostensibly show higher 
rates of personal or institutional productivity as I argued earlier.  
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English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, writing in the 1600s, also focused on self-
preservation. But, unlike Rousseau, according to Tuck, Hobbes felt that self-preservation is 
a moral principle and a natural right (Tuck, 1989, p. 51). Hobbes felt that this natural right 
is balanced by a fundamental duty or ‘natural law’ to abstain from harming others, except 
when one’s “own preservation is at stake” (ibid.).  In 1640 in his treatise, Elements of Law, 
Hobbes wrote, “It is therefore a right of nature: that every man may preserve his own life 
and limbs, with all the power he hath” (ibid., p. 60). According to Hobbes’s ‘general 
theory of action,’ which he outlined in Leviathan in 1651 and which was his most original 
contribution to the theory of the state, human beings act in such a way as to secure what 
we believe to be good for us, and the right to preserve ourselves is a special case of this 
general right (ibid.; Skinner, 1999, p. 7). In fact, to Hobbes the right to self-preservation is 
the only natural right we have (Tuck, 1989, p. 60). While Hobbes recognised that a person 
might have wants that have nothing to do with surviving, he felt that such wants were 
irrelevant to the natural right of survival (Hobbes, 1991, p. xvii). Similar to his 
contemporary, Hugo Grotius, who was a Dutch philosopher, jurist, and theologian, Hobbes 
felt that whatever else people may believe, they will always want to preserve themselves; 
and, that all men will agree with this right (Tuck, 1989, p. 61). In Leviathan, Hobbes again 
asserted man’s right to self-preservation and wrote that this right “is the Liberty each man 
hath to use his own power as he will himselfe [sic], for the preservation of his own nature” 
(ibid., p. 63). Hobbes was pointing out that what he called “Liberty” was actually man’s 
right, rather than a duty related to other people, and it is up to each person to decide how to 
protect oneself in exercising that right. Hobbes went on to write in the Leviathan, “…for 
no man is obliged (when the protection of the law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the 
best means he can” (Hobbes, 1991, p. 208). Thus Hobbes was citing the primacy of the 
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right to self-preservation even when what should be legal protection for one’s life is not 
evident or has fallen by the wayside. He reiterated his stance on this principle when he 
wrote, “…no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation” (ibid.).  
 
Hobbes’s clearly articulated views were fundamental in laying the groundwork for the 
right of the individual that has evolved in liberal philosophy (Mansfield, 2011, p. 112). 
That we have the right to preserve ourselves and to be able to individually determine how 
we can preserve ourselves is directly related to: deciding whether or not to test for HIV, 
whether or not to take ARVs if one tests HIV-positive and they are available, and whether 
or not to tell a sex partner, spouse, friend, neighbor, or family member that we are living 
with HIV if doing so potentially will jeopardise our ‘life and limb,’ or make our own self-
preservation extremely difficult. To Hobbes, the right to refuse an HIV test would be a 
basic decision open to each individual. Of relevance to voluntary HIV testing is what 
Hobbes wrote about man’s transfer of his own right to benefit someone else, “For it is a 
voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himself” 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 93). Consequently, one would not expect Hobbes to agree with the 
revocation of one’s right to voluntary testing for HIV if it would not be of benefit to the 
person to be tested for the disease, especially if it could invoke harm through stigma or 
discrimination or harm to the self via internal stigma.   
 
In contrast to Hobbes’s focus on the laws of nature as maxims of prudence towards our 
own self-preservation, according to Nicholas Jolley, English philosopher John Locke 
identified the law of nature as strictly emanating from God in his Second Treatise on 
Government (Jolley, 1999, p. 203). Because human beings are God’s property, according 
to Locke, we have a duty under natural law not to destroy other human beings as to do so 
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would be to destroy his property (ibid., pp. 197, 203). In his Second Treatise on 
Government, written in 1689-90, Locke expounded this theory: 
  “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
  every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who 
  will consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought 
  to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions…”  
(2000, p. 75). 
In this passage, Locke identified several fundamental philosophical principles: namely, 
that we are all equal human beings, that we are all independent of each other, and that we 
have no right to harm another human being by taking away his life, injuring his health, or 
robbing him of his possessions. It is germane to highlight the importance Locke denotes on 
the right of another to his health and to harm another’s health is to go against natural law, 
which we have no right to do to another human being.  In the same treatise, Locke 
expanded his argument and included the right to self-preservation: 
  “Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself and not to quit 
  his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own 
  preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as  
  he can, to preserve, the rest of mankind, and may not, unless 
  it be to do justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, 
  or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, the 
  health, limb, or goods of another” (ibid.).    
Thus Locke recognised the right to self-preservation as a fundamental right of natural law 
and also used it as the ground for human beings having no right to harm another human 
being. The central core of Locke’s philosophy is his theory of personal identity, which has 
formed the basis for modern conceptions and discussions of personal identity, although his 
158 
 
focus on natural law goes at least as far back as Stoic philosophy (Jolley, 1999, pp. 101, 
197). Many scholars also believe that Locke’s focus on life, liberty, etc., was the origin of 
U.S. President Thomas Jefferson’s phrase, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” as 
“inalienable Rights” and the protection of these rights as national objectives that he 
inserted into the American Declaration of Independence, which he drafted in June 1776 
(Jefferson, 1776; Jolley, 1999, p. 203).  Importantly, in Locke’s passage, above, Locke 
again included health as a noteworthy right that cannot be transgressed by another, unless 
that person has committed an offense against justice, i.e., has broken the law. In 
considering health and the right not to transgress it, I would argue that this notion also 
includes transgressions against another’s mental health, and that to test someone for HIV 
and not enable them to have access to ART if they test positive and want access to 
treatment is to harm them mentally. I believe that not only is it a human rights violation, 
but it is personally abusive to test someone for HIV unless the testing is voluntary because 
of the commonality of stigma and discrimination and because testing itself does not 
prevent the spread of HIV. An example of the potential impact of testing positive for HIV 
and not having access to treatment for the disease was summarised by a pregnant woman 
living in Uganda, 
  “What is the use of testing when you know you cannot access 
  medicine from your nearest health centre, and you can’t travel to  
  reach where the medicine is given? This can worsen your health 
  with stress and probably kill you, so it is better when you don’t 
  confirm your HIV status” (UNAIDS, 2014a, p. 10). 
 
In the view of French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) individuals have value as 
free and rational human beings; thus we should treat others with the respect they deserve 
159 
 
(Marshall, 1998, pp. 152-157). Descartes’s view about our necessary treatment of other 
human beings goes hand-in-hand with his view on how we should treat ourselves: to value 
oneself as a free and rational human being is to have self-esteem, and it is the freedom of 
the will in exercising one’s rationality that is an individual human being’s real worth 
(Marshall, 1998, p. 151). He also believed that freedom of the will is a necessary condition 
to be able to value oneself; and, that self-satisfaction is the product of a personal 
commitment to one’s individual freedom (ibid.).  
 
According to his Passions of the Soul, written in 1649, the year before he died, Descartes 
believed one has perfect duties to oneself to act in a certain way or to refrain from acting in 
a certain way (ibid., p. 158). One perfect duty to oneself, according to Descartes, is to 
maintain one’s physical well-being, which also allows the pursuit of the personal 
endeavors of one’s choice (ibid., p. 162). He also believed that we have duties to others, 
including the perfect duty of practicing justice toward others and also the imperfect duty of 
practicing charity or benevolence toward others (ibid.). According to “Cartesian” 
philosophy, that is, the philosophy of Descartes, one should not commit an unjust act 
toward others; thus harm of another can never be justified (ibid., p. 163). To Descartes, 
ideal persons “esteem nothing more highly than doing good to others and disregarding 
their own self-interest” (ibid., pp. 165-166). Consequently, one’s self-preservation is a 
perfect duty to Descartes. Yet in practicing benevolence toward others, one’s own well-
being should not be threatened, as this would go against the proper use of one’s reason or 
rationality, which also is a perfect duty (ibid., p. 166).  This view of Descartes is 
concurrent with the “Primum non nocere” principle, albeit Descartes did not limit its 
necessary practice to physicians or healers. Rather, felt Descartes, it is a philosophical 
principle all human beings should practice toward each other.  
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5.2 NON-MALEFICENE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Moreover, Descartes went further than some other philosophers did in his stance on 
defending an individual’s right to pursue one’s self interest. To wit, by recognising and 
defending others’ rights to their own self-interests, one legitimises one’s own right to 
enjoy one’s self-interest (Blom, 1978, p. 16). Since Descartes held a deep respect for 
human reason, he believed that each of us has an obligation to exercise our human reason 
(ibid., p. 18). And, exercising one’s human reason is one’s right by virtue of being human 
(ibid.). In this belief, Descartes was a forerunner of contemporary human rights theory, 
which rests fundamentally on the premise of human beings having the utmost value simply 
because they are human (Tasioulas, 2007, p. 76). Contemporary human rights theorists 
thus merely echo Descartes’s belief that “all men are of equal inherent dignity,” rather than 
developed a new principle they can claim as their own sine qua non (Blom, 1998, p. 18). A 
prominent example of such echoing is the start of the Preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ratified by the United Nations in 1948: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…”  
(UN, 1948, p. 1).  
John Tasioulas recently has examined human interests related to human rights: “Properly 
registering the moral significance of human interests involves seeing them as the interests 
of persons who merit equal respect in virtue of that status” [of their being human] 
(Tasioulas, 2008, p. 38). Nonetheless, Tasioulas differentiates human rights from human 
interests in that rights are capable of generating duties and that “human rights are indeed 
rights and not simply a special class of interests” (ibid., p. 30). One posits, then, that 
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humans not only have an interest in survival, but indeed the right to survival, to which 
there is a corresponding duty, which at least some recognise, that is, to help other human 
beings to survive. It is the survival of other human beings on which this paper partly rests 
and the related arguments to help others to maintain their survival in addition to justifying 
their right to survive as a right that has been authenticated by a number of philosophers 
throughout history. However, Tasioulas cogently pointed out that it is not possible to 
comprehensively specify the duties that a particular right generates once and for all, as 
such duties can vary corresponding to the changes in the nature of the agents, in the 
institutions that are formed to fulfill the relevant rights, and the social contexts surrounding 
human behaviours and practices (2007, p. 94). Yet Tasioulas defended the universal moral 
right and the human right against physical abuse, both of which are grounded as universal 
human interests (ibid., p. 97).  In carrying this principle further, Tasioulas clearly would 
support the right to survive as both a universal moral right and a human right. Importantly, 
Tasioulas states his rights-focused argument in a nutshell statement: “The underlying issue 
is not about enforceability or claimability; instead, it implicates one’s deepest moral-
philosophical commitments” (ibid., p. 99).  
 
Following the moral commitment premise of Tasioulas, in the case of nurses, for example, 
who may claim they are only following institutional or national practice in testing a 
pregnant woman for HIV whether or not she has exercised truly informed consent and 
agreed to such testing, in other words, the implementation of coerced testing, the nurses or 
other health care providers cannot reasonably ethically justify such an act based on an 
institutional or even a national norm. Further, nurses have a professional responsibility to 
help others to survive by nature of their chosen vocation. Moreover, nurses have an 
individual moral duty to help others to survive by virtue of their being human, using 
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Tasioulas’s reasoning, and especially in their chosen position of caring for other human 
beings. It seems to me that those in the ‘caring professions’ have the deepest and most 
profound duty to assist the survival of others. For what other reason could they possibly 
have chosen their profession than the ultimate need to help others to survive—assuming 
that this is the rationale for their vocational choice rather than purely for financial gain or 
other opportunism?  
 
5.3 NON-MALEFICENCE RELATED TO HIV 
That pregnant women living with HIV are in potential physical danger from their spouse 
or partner based on their status after disclosure of it to the spouse or partner has been 
described earlier in this paper a number of times. However, as time goes on an increasing 
amount of published research results underscore how important individual choice is to 
ethical decisions about HIV testing, especially for women and, most especially for 
pregnant women. The commonality of GBV, particularly in Africa, has received 
international attention for some ten years. For instance, in a study published by South 
Africa’s Medical Research Council in 2003, the researchers found through interviews with 
1,395 women in Soweto, outside Johannesburg, that intimate partner violence was 
prevalent (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, et al., 2003, p. 1). As examples, 13.7% of these women 
had experienced financial abuse; 67.5% of them had experienced emotional abuse; 50.4% 
had experienced physical abuse; and, 20.1% of them had experienced sexual abuse (ibid.). 
Moreover, 55.5% of the women reported that they had been physically or sexually 
assaulted by a male at some point previously in their lives (ibid.). The authors of the study 
concluded that “intimate partner violence seems to be associated with an increased risk 
that the abusive male partner has HIV,” which highlights the real possibility that a 
pregnant woman living with HV may have been infected by her current partner (ibid., p. 
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3). Consequently, some pregnant women run serious risk of intimate partner violence if 
they test for HIV and disclose their positive status to their spouse or partner if he may 
become abusive as a result.  
 
A recent study of nearly 2,000 women in Zimbabwe found that 33% of them reported 
intimate partner violence (IPV); and, their HIV status was associated with the intimate 
partner violence and with negative reactions immediately following disclosure (Shamu, 
Zarowsky, Shefer, et al., 2014, p. 1). What also is noteworthy about this study is that it 
showed that simply testing for HIV by these women precipitated IPV, whether they tested 
positive or negative, and that IPV was experienced by some of the women who had tested 
HIV-negative (ibid., pp.1, 4). The study’s coauthors emphasised the gendered nature of 
HIV testing and that the testing and disclosure by women to their partners can have 
unintended consequences, including suffering IPV during pregnancy, particularly if a 
woman had suffered previous IPV in the relationship (ibid., p. 1). This study clearly 
documents that the fear of HIV testing many African women have described can be very 
well founded, especially if they have been abused in any way by their sex partner. Also, 
the commonality of abuse that such a high percentage of the women underwent highlights 
the real threat that violence poses for many women in sub-Saharan Africa based on the 
pervasive gender inequality and occurrence of violence in society. It also is important to 
note that this study was the first to systematically measure IPV after HIV disclosure, which 
several authors have noted over the past ten years as a potential consequence of HIV 
testing for women (ibid., pp. 2-3). Moreover, the study’s authors noted two key points that 
relate to women’s reproductive rights and choices in this social context: 
1. “Control of women’s reproductive and sexual health decision 
making was found to be associated with IPV experiences during 
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pregnancy in this study and elsewhere” (ibid., p. 4).  
And, 
2. “The high rates [of violence] may simply suggest a high level 
of IPV in more patriarchal relationships where men adhere to more 
hegemonic masculine roles such as controlling practices and  
believing they have a right to women’s bodies” (ibid.). 
One might question whether the IPV the women suffered was even related to their testing 
for HIV or perhaps was an ongoing relationship-centred activity which they periodically 
had to endure for reasons totally unrelated to testing. To counter this potential view, 
Shamu et al., noted that their study findings showed that a significant proportion of the 
women who had never experienced abuse before they were pregnant first experienced the 
abuse after disclosing their HIV status—whether they tested positive or negative—and a 
significant proportion of these women who underwent abuse after disclosure had tested 
HIV-positive (ibid.). Consequently, the results of this study show concrete evidence that 
HIV testing for many women in sub-Saharan Africa and their decisions about whether or 
not to disclose that they have tested for HIV to their partner, no matter what their HIV 
status is, matter a great deal to the future of their relationships and potentially to their own 
future physical and mental health.  
 
For health care providers to pretend that testing everyone for HIV, or more specifically 
testing all pregnant women for HIV, is done only with their best interest in mind not only 
is misguided, but may be in many cases a maleficent act. The thinking of the health care 
providers in doing so, obviously, is a consequentialist approach, using the premise that 
these individuals are better off knowing their status, whether they test positive or negative. 
But, in reality, some of them may be worse off knowing their status, whether they test 
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positive or negative, if they share it with a previously or potentially abusive partner, or 
share it in a social context or a locale where simply testing for HIV is in and of itself 
considered to be an act commonly stigmatised, or when it is shared with others by a health 
professional without their knowledge. Health care providers in sub-Saharan Africa who do 
not recognise the real danger in which they may be putting some individuals, especially 
women, by insisting they test for HIV are acting either unconscious of or against Kant’s 
maxim that the end does not justify the means in their stance that their testing of another 
person for HIV is always the right thing to do either for the person’s good or for the good 
of public health—whether or not that person wants to be tested. According to Kant: “The 
duty of respect for my neighbor is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other to a 
mere means to my ends” (1996, p. 569). What’s more, Kant believed that acting in respect 
of other human beings is a human duty no matter what one’s relationship is with that 
person based on the following: 
  “In accordance with the ethical law of perfection “love your 
  neighbor as yourself,” the maxim of benevolence (practical 
  love of human beings) is a duty of all human beings toward 
  one another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love” 
  (ibid., p. 570).  
 
5.4 NON-MALEFICENCE AS A HUMAN DUTY 
Kant saw the need to respect other human beings as a primary duty of all of us—
“…showing respect for a human being as a moral being (holding his duty in highest 
esteem) is also a duty that others have towards him and a right to which he cannot 
renounce his claim” (Gregor, 1998, p. 580). Thus to Kant we have to respect our own 
rights and indeed the rights of others, which they should not forego and cannot give away. 
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It is hard to infer that Kant would agree with the public health priority in disease outbreaks 
to usurp the rights of others supposedly in the name of public health when there is no 
reason to assume that individuals may be infectious to others. This is the case when nurses 
or doctors decide to test everyone for HIV whether or not they may be infected with the 
virus and whether or not ART is immediately available as lifelong treatment to individuals 
who test positive. What’s more, the HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines 
published by the United Nations in 1998 specify the essential linkage of human rights and 
public health:  
  “In general, human rights and public health share the common 
  objective to protect the rights and well-being of all individuals. 
  From the human rights perspective, this can best be accomplished 
  by promoting and protecting the rights and dignity of everyone, 
  with special emphasis on those who are discriminated against or 
  whose rights are otherwise interfered with. Similarly, public 
  health objectives can best be accomplished by promoting health 
  for all. With special emphasis on those who are vulnerable to  
  threats to their physical, mental or social well-being. Thus 
  health and human rights complement and mutually reinforce 
  each other in any context. They also complement and mutually  
reinforce each other in the context of HIV/AIDS” 
 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for  
Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint United Nations  
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 1998, p. 37). 
It is interesting as well as ironic that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in 2006 and the WHO in 2007 subsequently put in place guidance on provider-
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initiated HIV testing and counseling (PITC) or “routine testing”—reversing the order of 
what was previously called ‘HIV counselling and testing’—without acknowledging that 
this directive was a potential infringement of the right to test for HIV voluntarily if fully 
informed consent was not observed in implementing the new HIV testing 
recommendations. 
 
In considering the total context of the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa where stigma 
toward and discrimination against people living with HIV is still the norm rather than an 
isolated incident, demanding or coercing patients in one‘s power to test for HIV defeats the 
fundamental health care principle and duty of “primum non nocere.” In his treatise, 
Practical Philosophy, based on Gregor’s translation, Kant felt that it is up to human beings 
to stand up for their rights, indeed to demand their rights: “Be no man’s lackey. – Do not 
let others tread with impunity on your rights” (Kant, 1996, p. 558). Further, Kant also 
focused on the importance of self-preservation to each and every person in the same tome, 
“…a human being is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his quality as a 
person and whether he must acknowledge in this a duty (and indeed a strict duty) to 
himself” (ibid., p. 547). Thus Kant saw the duty of self-preservation to be a duty of each 
human being and that to deny one’s need to preserve oneself is a “violation of duty to 
oneself” (ibid.). To Kant, and to some other philosophers as explored previously herein, 
the duty of self-preservation is the ultimate duty.     
 
It also is worth noting at this stage that the health of a pregnant woman is not only 
essential for her own self-preservation and indeed for her own well-being, but also for the 
well-being of her foetus. When a pregnant woman undergoes interpersonal violence, not 
only is her health affected, but IPV is also associated with adverse health outcomes for her 
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foetus (Meuleners, Lee, Janssen, et al., 2011, p. 1). Based on research conducted in 
Australia, the adverse maternal outcomes from IPV can include potential miscarriage (< 20 
weeks), placental separation from the wall of the uterus prior to birth, low placenta, 
preterm labour, premature membrane rupture, and postpartum haemorhaging (ibid., p. 2). 
As reported by the WHO, other research conducted in two cities in the USA found that 
consequences of IPV perpetrated on pregnant women also can result in low maternal 
weight gain, infections, and anaemia (WHO, 1997, p. 5). The adverse outcomes for the 
foetus or infant can include foetal distress, preterm birth, low birth weight (less than 2,500 
grams), foetal death, and infant death (Meulners, et al., pp. 1-2). Obviously, the 
consequences of IPV on pregnant women and their foetuses can be very serious, life-
threatening, and even result in death. Thus health care providers treating pregnant women 
and testing them for HIV should be cognisant of the range of potential negative impacts of 
HIV testing on these women, including possible IPV from spouses or partners after they 
test if they disclose having done so. Discussions about IPV by health workers with women 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and especially pregnant women, are needed as part of the HIV 
testing process. They should be deemed essential. 
 
In the WHO’s report on Violence Against Women: A Priority Health Issue, published in 
1997, the WHO identified what health workers can do both to prevent and respond to cases 
of violence against women, issues that are as salient now as they were more than 15 years 
ago: 
• “First, “do no harm.” Unsympathetic or victim-blaming 
attitudes can reinforce isolation and self-blame, undermine 
women’s self-confidence, and make it less likely that women 
will reach out for help. 
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• Be attentive to possible symptoms and signs of abuse and 
follow up on them. 
• Where feasible, routinely ask clients about their  
experiences of abuse as part of normal history taking. 
• Provide appropriate medical care and document in the  
client’s medical records instances of abuse, including 
details of the perpetrator. 
• Refer patients to available community resources. 
• Maintain the privacy and confidentiality of client 
information and records” (1997, p. 6). 
In addition to its focus on the role and responsibility of health workers to help prevent and 
respond to cases of violence against women, the WHO report listed 11 global declarations, 
covenants, resolutions, and special commission reports published to date that addressed the 
issue as of 1997 (ibid., pp. 7-8). The first global document mentioned in the WHO report 
was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN, 1948). Article 3 of the 
UDHR states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person; Article 5 
states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment (ibid., p. 7). Clearly, violence against women violates both Articles 3 and 5 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
I would argue that in its PITC/routine HIV testing implementation guidance, issued in 
2007, the WHO does not recognise how serious and widespread violence against women, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is. The guidelines do not include the six bullet points 
laying out specific actions that health workers “at a minimum” can do to prevent or follow 
up on such violence, which the WHO published ten years earlier (1997, p. 6).  The WHO 
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guidelines issued in 2007 do include discussing the risk of violence or suicide with patients 
who test HIV-positive, especially women (WHO, 2007, p. 11). Yet they do not recognise 
that simply testing for HIV can provoke violence, including verbal abuse, from others, 
including community members, as well as physical assault from spouses or partners, 
family members, or community members. Thus the WHO’s 2007 guidelines are too 
limited in the scope of their HIV testing implementation guidance to health care workers 
related to the commonality of violence against women. Again, the WHO’s obvious priority 
is testing for HIV; it is not counselling clients or patients who undergo HIV testing on the 
full range of topics important to discuss with them surrounding HIV testing and HIV itself.  
 
The WHO PITC/routine testing guidelines for counselling pregnant women who test HIV-
positive state that the discussion should include: “Use of antiretroviral drugs for the 
patient’s own health, when indicated and available, and to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission” (ibid.). This statement does not say a health care provider should always 
discuss antiretroviral drugs with the patient related to the patient’s health whether the 
drugs are available or not. Consequently, I would argue that this guidance violates the 
patient’s “right to know” what her options really are if she tests HIV-positive, even if 
access to ART would not necessarily be made available to her. Further, every client or 
patient testing for HIV should know that ART exists, whether the individual tests positive 
or negative at present, as the person may test HIV-positive in the future. In particular, 
women and men in sub-Saharan Africa should be made aware of ART as part of the 
counselling process surrounding HIV testing because the disease is so prevalent in the 
region. In fact, its commonality is the primary rationale for the WHO recommending 
routine testing for HIV as an intervention for all individuals seeking medical care in sub-
Saharan Africa, as described earlier in this paper.   
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The WHO PITC/routine testing guidance for counselling individuals testing HIV positive 
states: “Discuss possible disclosure of the result, when and how this may happen and to 
who” (ibid., p. 11). The guidance does not appear to acknowledge that disclosure may be a 
bad idea depending on the living and/or working conditions of the person testing HIV-
positive—with women and girls as the most vulnerable members of this group. In sum, the 
guidelines seem to be negligent in their limited acknowledgment of IPV as well as 
violence in general, especially toward females in sub-Saharan Africa. I contend that the 
2007 WHO PITC/routine testing guidance runs the risk of maleficence in its lack of 
comprehensiveness about the potential for violence against women and girls who test for 
HIV, whether they test negative or positive for the virus. This slant of the routine testing 
guidance seems odd as in 2006, the year before the PITC/routine testing guidance was 
published by the WHO, an article published in The Lancet, based on the WHO Multi-
country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence, reported the lifetime 
prevalence of physical and/or sexual partner violence ranged from 15% to 71% (Garcia-
Moreno C, Jansen HA, Ellsberg M, et al., 2006, p. 1266). Moreover, the Lancet article 
started by stating: 
  “Violence against women is now widely recognized as a serious 
  human rights abuse, and increasingly as an important public  
  health problem with substantial consequences for women’s  
  physical, mental, sexual, and reproductive health” (ibid., p. 1260). 
Based on the findings of the WHO study published before the WHO recommendations on 
PITC/routine testing for HIV were published, the lack of cognisance of the need for more 
sensitive and explicit guidance on the potential negative repercussions of HIV testing on 
women, especially for those testing positive, seems like more than a mere oversight. It 
172 
 
appears that the needs of individual women were not adequately recognised either in the 
HIV pre-test process or in the post-test process guidelines for health care workers in 2007. 
While the guidelines mention the possibility of violence if a woman tests positive for HIV, 
they do not appear to take into account that this is a public health problem; it is not only a 
problem for individual women. It is a problem for families, communities, and the public 
health system as a whole. Both the 1998 UN report on violence against women and the 
Lancet article published in 2006 show much greater awareness of the size of the problem 
of violence against women than the WHO PITC/routine testing guidelines. Again, I would 
argue that the principal emphasis of the WHO’s 2007 PITC/routine testing guidelines is on 
testing and the reasons why, according to the WHO, it is so important to test people for 
HIV, rather than what the potential negative implications can be for individuals 
surrounding HIV testing. In short, the risks of HIV testing are not adequately addressed by 
the guidelines.  
 
I believe that the potential maleficence of inadequately assessing the risks of HIV testing 
rather than focusing mainly on the possible beneficial outcomes of HIV testing, which in 
no way are guaranteed, should be addressed by the WHO and by national programmes and 
institutions that continue to push HIV testing as the main intervention priority. Instead, the 
intervention priority should be on ART enrolment as soon as possible of anyone testing 
HIV-positive and referrals to prevention support opportunities for anyone testing HIV-
negative, as well as discussion of the prevention of onward transmission of anyone testing 
positive. As mentioned earlier, just testing people for HIV does no one any good without 
good accompanying counselling, whether they test positive or negative. Based on all the 
possible negative repercussions of HIV testing outlined herein, coerced HIV testing 
certainly can be a maleficent act, albeit an unintended result, if violence or suicide is the 
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outcome of an HIV test. I would posit that either no or inadequate discussion of the 
potential for violence occurring after HIV testing is also a potentially maleficent act. And, 
it should not be an HIV counselling and testing discussion topic reserved only for women. 
 
It cannot be over emphasised that abused women are at an increased risk of anxiety, 
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicide, and drug and alcohol abuse (Hegarty, 
Gunn, O’Doherty, et al., 2010, p. 2). The most common physical health problems resulting 
from IPV include injuries, chronic pain, gynecological, cardiovascular, neurological and 
gastrointestinal effects (ibid.). Adolescent girls and young women under age 25 are at even 
greater risk of violence, with pregnant women and girls at greatest risk, according to a 
study in Western Australia that took place from 2002-2008 (Meuleners, et al., 2011, p. 3). 
For adolescent girls, pregnancy is an especially risky time as they face the stress of making 
the transition to becoming a parent when they may not be emotionally, mentally, or 
physically ready to be a mother (UNICEF, 2014a, p. 50). If these pregnant adolescents live 
in sub-Saharan Africa, it is likely that they will be asked to test for HIV or possibly even 
coerced into testing for HIV. With sub-Saharan Africa’s high rate of IPV, some of these 
young women will run a high risk of IPV resulting from having had an HIV test, 
particularly if they test HIV-positive and disclose this to a partner who does not support 
their HIV testing action. Violence suffered by pregnant adolescent girls can be extremely 
damaging to both the mother and her child, resulting in miscarriage, stillbirth, premature 
labour or delivery, low birth weight, or even maternal mortality (ibid.).  
 
Indeed, violence against young women is a serious problem in sub-Saharan Africa. For 
example, according to UNICEF, in Eastern and Southern Africa, at least 12% of girls aged 
15-19 reported incidents of physical violence in the previous 12 months, which documents 
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a high level of violence undergone by girls in this age group (ibid., p. 49). Moreover, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 42% of girls in this age group reported incidents of 
physical violence in the previous year (ibid.). Physical violence toward young women and 
girls itself can be described as an epidemic out of control in some areas, with a dangerous 
conjunction where the HIV epidemic also is out of control, such as in Southern Africa.  
According to UNICEF survey results, 64% of women aged 18 to 24 in Zimbabwe reported 
incidents of physical violence prior to age 18 (ibid.). The adult HIV prevalence rate in 
Zimbabwe in 2013 was 15%, showing the confluence of these two epidemics with serious 
implications for adolescent girls and young women related to potential HIV infection 
(UNAIDS, 2014b, p. A9).  
 
Based on reviewing the context of HIV testing in sub-Saharan Africa, it is hard to 
understand why the WHO PITC/routine testing guidelines included such a limited focus on 
the potential negative outcomes of HIV testing. The WHO was a co-sponsor of the first 
randomised, controlled trial (RCT) of voluntary HIV counselling and testing, a three-
country study conducted in Kenya, Tanzania, and Trinidad from 1995 to 1998 (The 
Voluntary HIV-1 Counseling and Testing Efficacy Study Group, 2000, p. 111). This 
study’s coauthors reported on “negative life consequences such as physical beatings and 
break-up of relationships” resulting from women testing HIV-positive, especially if the 
partner tested HIV-negative, results which were reported in The Lancet in 2000 (ibid., p. 
110). Moreover, the same Lancet article also noted in another study “common signs of 
depression in women who found out that they were HIV-1 infected” (ibid.). Consequently, 
it hardly can be surmised that the WHO simply was not aware of interpersonal violence or 
depression as possible outcomes of HIV testing, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
particularly as experienced by women. The seriousness of these potential outcomes from 
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HIV testing seem to have been ignored or overridden by WHO’s focus on testing as many 
people as possible, even where no ART is available, or only to a very limited extent and to 
a very limited few, supposedly under the guise of a public health emergency or, at least, 
strategy. 
 
Based on the discussion above, I do not believe that WHO’s focus and guidelines on 
PITC/routine testing essentially are non-maleficent. I believe routine testing can be non-
maleficent if testing is truly voluntary, not coerced, involving informed consent, 
counselling is provided, including post-test counselling to everyone who tests for HIV, 
whether their results are positive or negative, and referrals are given for people who test 
negative or positive and, most importantly, ART is made available to anyone testing HIV-
positive. If ART is not available to anyone testing positive, I would argue that 
PITC/routine testing is maleficent—unless it is fully informed and voluntary with enough 
time allowed after the suggestion is made by the health care provider for the patient to 
make a considered decision to opt in—and the patient is told that ART will not be made 
available if the individual tests HIV-positive.  
 
Many articles have noted that there is a real risk of depression and/or IPV after testing 
HIV-positive for many women in sub-Saharan Africa, especially if they do not have access 
to ART and other support systems.  The same Lancet article published in 2000, quoted 
above, also stated: 
  “Women need communication and negotiation skills to 
  enable them to discuss sexual and other issues with their 
  partners” (ibid.). 
And, 
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  “…VCT strategies cannot be offered without giving the  
social, physical, and financial support needed to ensure that  
people who discover that they are HIV-1 infected have the  
protection and resources they need to cope with their diagnosis,  
especially women” (ibid.). 
We are still years, if not decades, away from meeting this goal. However, the closest we 
can come to it is by providing ART to all individuals testing HIV-positive and through the 
provision of other health and psychosocial support mechanisms or at least referrals for 
them. That all of these services remain extremely sparse or simply unavailable in rural 
areas in sub-Saharan Africa again calls into question the non-maleficence of PITC/routine 
testing. According to a Commentary in late 2014 in the Journal of the International AIDS 
Society, 
  “Gender inequality and violence against women remain 
  important drivers of the HIV epidemic, particularly in 
  sub-Saharan Africa, where women and girls represent 
  57% of people living with HIV. It has long been recognized 
  that gender inequality is a core issue that underpins women’s 
  vulnerability to HIV in the region, with a combination of 
  social, economic and cultural factors contributing to the 
  higher levels of HIV infection occurring among women” 
  (Watts and Seeley, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Regarding pregnant women, single-dose nevirapine is still the most common method used 
to prevent mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, even 
though the WHO 2013 treatment guidelines recommend making lifelong ART available to 
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pregnant women who are HIV-positive (WHO, 2013a, p. 92). What is also worrying is that 
in five sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, South Africa, and 
Swaziland, there was a decline in PMTCT coverage in 2012 (UNICEF, 2014b, p. 8). 
Moreover, in four countries, Angola, Chad, DRC, and Nigeria, the national coverage of 
PMTCT in 2012 was less than 20% (ibid.). It seems very questionable to recommend that 
all pregnant women be routinely tested for HIV where ART, and only single-dose 
nevirapine in many cases, which can cause drug resistance to ART use by HIV-infected 
individuals later on, is not available to 80% of the pregnant women who would undergo 
HIV testing. Further, it seems negligent in 2015 to still use single-dose nevirapine as the 
primary PMTCT protocol when this will not protect the mother’s health and there is 
strong, growing evidence of the real risk of survival of a baby or a young child after the 
death of the mother, and even before her death when she is too ill to provide appropriate 
care for her child (Clark, Kahn, Houle, et al., 2013, p. 1). Clark et al.’s study in South 
Africa in 2013 showed that the survival of young children is put at substantial risk when 
the mother becomes very ill, with a period of very high risk of child death in the two 
months prior to the mother’s death and in the two months following her death (2013, p. 8). 
The study’s coauthors documented that this effect is 1.5 times greater when the mother has 
HIV/AIDS or TB, although the overall pattern is the same for other serious illnesses a 
mother can suffer (ibid.). According to Clark et al., “Severe maternal illness coupled with 
declining ability to feed infants and children is a certain indicator of impending 
catastrophe” (ibid.). The following statement points out how crucial providing ART to the 
mother really is, not only to save her life, but also to save the life of her child: “The 
increasing rollout of antiretroviral therapy to mothers with HIV should lead to improved 
child survival, and there is evidence for this in other southern African countries” (ibid.).   
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Expanding on a topic noted earlier herein, it is salient to HIV testing and important to point 
out how common depression is in women generally. According to a recent editorial in The 
New York Times, “Depression is the most important thief of productive life for women 
around the world” (Rosenberg, 2014, p. 1). Testing positive for HIV, especially if there is 
no access to ART or access is extremely difficult, can provoke depression. A study 
conducted in KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa found that suicide ideation rates 
were high among pregnant women with an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy and even 
higher among pregnant women who had tested HIV-positive (Rochat, Bland, Tomlinson, 
et al., 2013, p. 650). According to Rochat, et al.: 
  “The link between antenatal depression and suicide ideation  
is important since in many Southern African settings the  
burden of antenatal depression is between 30% - 47% and  
risks are compounded by multiple factors including: HIV,  
with up to 43% of pregnant women in worst affected areas  
testing HIV-positive, high rates of unplanned pregnancies  
and intimate partner violence” (ibid., p. 651). 
An interview with one of the women in the study in KwaZulu Natal is telling regarding the 
centrality of her HIV test to her depression and suicide ideation: 
  “The cause of all these worries I have is that I am  
HIV-positive, my life really changed that day, I haven’t 
  told anybody, I am scared, where to start…all of these 
  really bad feelings started when I got my results, when I 
  learnt that I was positive” (ibid., p. 655). 
It also is important to bear in mind the impact of GBV on women, resulting in depression. 
The KZN study’s coauthors also noted that intimate partner violence as well as partner 
179 
 
conflict are strongly associated with antenatal depression in southern Africa; however, 
recent research in Europe has shown that accessing HIV treatment may lower suicide in 
HIV-infected individuals (ibid., p. 657). Nonetheless, the coauthors suggested that “it is 
probable that depression itself may inhibit a women’s engagement with health services 
during pregnancy,” which supports the serious consideration that needs to be given to the 
whole notion of routine testing of pregnant women for HIV even where ART is available 
to them (ibid., p. 658).  
 
What’s more, there is still too little recognition of the potential consequences of HIV 
testing on individual mental health and indeed why HIV testing is so scary to so many, 
especially women, including pregnant women. The authors of an article on a recent study 
of suicide ideation, depression and HIV among pregnant women in rural South Africa 
concluded:  
  “In HIV epidemic settings, routine HIV testing in PMTCT  
programmes means that many women learn their HIV-positive  
status for the first time during pregnancy. It is well accepted  
that learning one’s HIV-positive diagnosis is a negative life  
event, shown to be associated with onset of depression among  
non-pregnant women in South Africa and internationally” (ibid.). 
Moreover, the same authors of the study noted a key point related to universal testing, 
which is the same thing as routine testing of pregnant women or anyone seeking care in a 
healthcare setting:  
“Since universal screening is seldom cost-effective in the absence  
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of access to treatment, significant policy and public health  
investments are required to make suicide prevention and  
intervention feasible for pregnant women in these settings” (ibid.). 
 
Enabling full access to health education and information about HIV prevention and 
treatment on the community level and in primary and secondary schools will help women 
and girls protect themselves from the virus and provide the impetus for understanding and 
acknowledging potential HIV infection and seeking treatment and care, if needed. 
Moreover, this opportunity should be provided to everyone, especially in high HIV-
prevalence settings, including through special educational campaigns. This educational 
need is urgent based on the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly on women and girls. It may seem superfluous to reiterate how important the 
effects of the HIV epidemic have been on the economic development and health 
achievements in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is worth noting that a systematic analysis 
of the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study 2013 showed that “HIV/AIDS has had a 
large enough effect to negate progress made in other causes contributing to decreases in 
life expectancy, particularly in southern sub-Saharan Africa” (GBD 2013 Mortality and 
Causes of Death Collaborators, 2015, p. 152). What’s more, AIDS-related deaths in 2013 
numbered 220,000 in South Africa, and 240,000 in Nigeria, showing that these two sub-
Saharan African countries have HIV epidemics clearly remaining out of control (UNAIDS, 
2014b, p. A57). In addition, two sub-Saharan African countries show that the PMTCT of 
HIV also remains a moving target related to education about, local awareness of, and 
access to PMTCT: in 2013 only 3% of the pregnant women in Madagascar who needed it 
were able to access PMTCT medication; and, in Nigeria only 31% of HIV-positive 
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pregnant women were able to do so (ibid.). These statistics are stunning, especially related 
to Nigeria, where nearly a quarter of a million people died from AIDS-related causes in 
2013 (ibid., p. A63). Finally, regarding the 2013 statistics from UNAIDS related to 
HIV/AIDS, seven sub-Saharan African countries highlight how less than 50% of the 
people living with HIV who should be receiving ART, according to their national 
guidelines, were accessing it in 2013: only 1% in Madagascar; 23% in Nigeria; 24% in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 31% in both Lesotho and Mozambique; and, 43% 
in South Africa, the country with the highest number of HIV-infected people in the world 
(ibid., pp. A67-A68). These statistics document how great the continuing need is for 
education on HIV/AIDS, including on prevention and treatment, across sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as the limited access to ART that is available, and the prevailingly high 
degree of stigma and discrimination that prevent many from seeking or continuing 
treatment, particularly women.   
 
Providing ART to all women and girls who test HIV-positive will open the door to greater 
numbers of these individuals seeking HIV testing when they learn treatment definitely will 
be available if they test positive and will remain accessible to them. On the other hand, 
knowing that there will be a lack of treatment access if one tests HIV-positive has been 
and continues to be a serious deterrent to HIV testing where there is no treatment 
available, or treatment only available to those who are very ill, when it may be too late to 
really help. This has been a common observation across countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
is particularly relevant to women, who are more vulnerable to and suffer more commonly 
from HIV-related stigma and discrimination in this region. According to the authors of a 
recent study on the initiation of antiretroviral therapy (ART) and viral suppression in South 
Africa and Uganda,  
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“The most important outcome metrics for HIV testing programmes  
are the proportions of participants tested and linked to HIV care, and  
viral suppression among those who initiate antiretroviral therapy” 
(Barnabas, van Rooyen, Tumwesigye, et al. 2014, p. e74).  
Protecting pregnant women who test for HIV and particularly pregnant women who test 
HIV-positive from potential stigma and discrimination through counselling about whether 
they should share information about their test, including their test results, and with whom, 
and the inclusion of personal risk-reduction counselling about HIV and potential future 
GBV is an urgent need in all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, especially southern African 
countries with South Africa as a priority. Based on recent research conducted in sub-
Saharan Africa, Watts and Seeley determined that: 
  “Even with a highly effective prevention technology, such as  
PMTCT medication, violence and the fear of violence pose  
an important barrier to the elimination of vertical HIV 
transmission, and to ensuring that broader maternal and  
child health goals are met” (2014, p. 2). 
All women and girls who test for HIV should receive personalised counselling about the 
possibility of GBV, how to prevent it, how to protect themselves as much as possible if it 
occurs, and where to access care and support and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) for 
potential HIV infection—whether the violence they have suffered relates specifically to 
HIV testing or not. Based on their study of the effectiveness of an intimate partner 
violence (IPV) and HIV prevention interventions in Uganda in 2014, Wagman and 
183 
 
colleagues had an important finding and recommendation for the future related to HIV 
counselling and testing for women: 
  “HIV counselling and testing provides an opportunity to screen for  
and address IPV and counsellors could mitigate important contextual  
risk factors for HIV transmission that are associated with experiences  
of violence. We also recommend that HIV counselling and testing  
services consider the needs of violence survivors and offer risk  
reduction counselling and disclosure support in the context of women’s  
risk of abuse” (Wagman, Gray, Campbell, et al., 2014, p. 9). 
 
Understanding that many women in sub-Saharan Africa have very limited, if any, access to 
health care due to their socio-economic inequality with men, extensive poverty that limits 
their access to transportation to clinics, and a common lack of knowledge about health care 
as well as HIV prevention, care, and treatment options is still an unacknowledged political 
priority in most countries—as it is a general problem for most of the population because of 
extensive poverty. These ongoing conditions have an impact on the future economic 
development of these countries and indeed future generations. This is an even more serious 
issue related to women and girls living with HIV because of their compromised immune 
systems, which means they are more prone to other opportunistic infections, including 
pneumonia, tuberculosis, etc., as well as malaria, and mental health issues. In 2014, 
Kendall, et al. consulted with 30 international researchers and policymakers and reviewed 
the literature on HIV-related maternal mortality in sub-Saharan Africa and compiled 
several important findings, including: 
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  “Ensuring that people living with HIV are screened for  
tuberculosis and given prophylactic treatment is a core activity  
for HIV treatment and tuberculosis control programmes.  
Pregnant women living with HIV have an elevated risk of   
developing tuberculosis disease and of maternal death… 
Pregnancy and HIV both increase women’s susceptibility  
to acquiring malaria and to developing active tuberculosis  
disease. Coinfection with either malaria or tuberculosis 
are also associated with increased risk of maternal death  
compared with women who have tuberculosis or malaria  
but are not living with HIV” (Kendall, Danel, Cooper,  
et al., 2014, pp. S251-252). 
The lack of HIV treatment also exacerbates HIV disease progression, including the 
potential for developing AIDS-related cancers. A number of studies have taken place or 
are currently being conducted to learn more about how HIV relates to cancers among 
women in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this is not a newly discovered concern or new 
topic for research as the following shows: 
“HIV has always been associated with certain unusual cancers,  
especially Kaposi’s sarcoma and non-Hodgkin lymphomas, as well  
as cervical cancer…in the low income HIV-endemic regions of  
sub-Saharan Africa, malignancies related to HIV have long been  
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recognized as a major public health problem” (Cubasch, Joffe,  
Hanisch, et al., 2013, pp. 177-178). 
While research is ongoing about the impact of HIV on breast cancer among women in sub-
Saharan Africa, women living with HIV are at increased risk of cervical cancer, which has 
been known in South Africa for a number of years. Women who start to have sex at a 
young age, as a girl or in adolescence, are at increased risk of human papillomavirus 
(HPV) infection and developing cervical cancer even if they have sex with only one 
partner; their risk increases if they have sex with many sex partners (Africa Coalition on 
Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2014, p. 1). In fact, “cervical cancer is the leading 
cause of cancer death in women in southern Africa” (Richter and Dreyer, 2013, p. 291). A 
recent study among women attending public health clinics in one area of South Africa’s 
Gauteng Province documented the highest rate of high-risk human papillomavirus 
(hrHPV) ever recorded in an unselected screening population (ibid.). It is also worth noting 
that Nigeria and South Africa are the two countries with the highest numbers of women 
with cervical cancer in Africa, which happen to be the same two countries with the largest 
numbers of people living with HIV, as mentioned earlier in this chapter (Africa Coalition 
on Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2014, p. 3; UNAIDS, 2014b, p. A57). This is 
important related to HIV testing because the high rates of cervical cancer and tuberculosis 
among women in Africa, with an estimated 380,000 TB cases overall in South Africa in 
2013 as one example and 510,000 sub-Saharan African women dying of TB in 2013 as 
another, highlight the important opportunity for women who go to a clinic for screening 
for cervical cancer or TB to also test for HIV at the same time (WHO, 2014, p. 16). Yet if 
women feel they may be forced to test for HIV via routine testing if they go to a clinic for 
any sign or symptom of any illness, they may forego a clinic visit out of fear of HIV 
testing, a visit that could save their lives or at least prolong their lives if they have TB or 
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cervical cancer—whether or not they are infected with HIV. Indeed, HIV infection 
significantly raises the risk of persistent HPV infections in women, which can lead to 
cervical cancer (Africa Coalition on Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2014, p. 4). 
Consequently, the vulnerability of sub-Saharan African women to these diseases is yet 
another reason why HIV testing using ethical protocols is important, even urgent, for 
women in sub-Saharan Africa. What is needed to change the contextual hurdles of HIV 
testing is to decrease HIV-related stigma and discrimination with community prevention 
interventions against GBV and enforcement of laws protecting human rights; to increase 
greater accessibility for impoverished women who want to test for HIV; to strengthen the 
communication and media dissemination of health-specific messages re: HIV prevention 
and treatment to help more women understand the importance of testing for HIV; and, to 
make ART readily and regularly available to them and their family members if they or 
their partners or children test HIV-positive. Without these pieces being put into place, the 
routine testing of women remains unethical in my view. 
 
Widespread understanding of the extensive health vulnerability of women living with HIV, 
especially pregnant women, still does not exist in any country in Africa. This situation 
remains largely unrecognised and unappreciated as a national and regional health crisis. A 
report released in 2015 by the Salamander Trust in the UK in conjunction with the WHO 
summarised the findings from a global survey of women living with HIV, which may be 
the first such survey (conducted in seven languages) ever undertaken. The report 
highlighted many issues that have received too little, if any, attention in the past, including 
the prevalence of mental health issues among women living with HIV: 
“HIV diagnosis is, in itself, a flashpoint for immediate and on-going  
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mental health problems, especially depression, feelings of rejection,  
shame, self-blame, anxiety, insomnia, loneliness, and body image  
anxieties. Respondents’ extremely high figures of HIV and mental  
health co-morbidity, which exceed previously quoted figures, may  
be provoked by, or have their roots in, a wide range of factors,  
including GBV—especially sexual violence, stigma (either HIV- 
related or related to gender identify and sexual orientation—often  
worsened by punitive legal and policy environments), poverty or  
financial stress, and homelessness” (Orza, Welbourn, Bewley,  
et al., 2015, p. 31). 
 
As the caregivers in families as well as having a lower socioeconomic position in society, 
women and girls are plagued with more responsibilities in the home and support for family 
members while they themselves are more vulnerable to health issues related to 
reproduction and their greater biological vulnerability to HIV infection. The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights reported in 2013 how 
women’s unpaid care work affects them, including how the HIV/AIDS epidemic takes a 
heavy toll on women and girls: 
“Across the world, women and girls commit substantially more time  
than men to unpaid care work…the unequal distribution, intensity and  
lack of recognition of unpaid care work undermines the dignity of  
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women caregivers, obstructs their enjoyment of several human  
rights on an equal basis with men, undermines progress towards  
gender equality and entrenches their disproportionate vulnerability 
 to poverty across their lifetime…The HIV/AIDS pandemic has  
severely disrupted and/or increased unpaid care work in many  
countries. Women are affected by the virus in greater numbers  
than men…studies show that HIV/AIDS caregivers experience  
a negative impact on physical and mental health…Eighty per  
cent of family caregivers in South Africa have reported  
reduced income levels” (Sepulveda Carmona, 2013, pp. 4, 12, 16).   
 
In addition, women are frequently blamed for bringing HIV into the family when the 
testing of anyone for HIV in many families occurs only because of a woman’s pregnancy, 
a health event making these women more vulnerable to GBV, including psychological and 
emotional abuse. According to Watts and Seeley and the researchers who conducted a 
study on HIV and intimate partner violence in pregnancy in Johannesburg, South Africa, 
the study respondents described: 
 “…how HIV diagnosis during pregnancy, and subsequent partner  
disclosure, are common triggers for violence within their relationships,  
with their disclosure of infection causing conflict, usually related to  
perceived infidelity and the notion that women are “bringing” the  
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disease into the relationship” (2014, p. 2). 
Moreover, the HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines of the UN published 
in 1998 recognised the common attribution of the cause of HIV infection specifically to 
women as follows, 
“HIV/AIDS prevention and care for women are often undermined 
by pervasive misconceptions about HIV transmission and 
epidemiology. There is a tendency to stigmatize women as 
“vectors of disease,” irrespective of the source of infection. 
As a consequence, women who are or are perceived to be HIV- 
positive face violence and discrimination in both public and  
private life” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner  
for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint United Nations  
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 1998, p. 42).  
Also, the authors of a recent analytic study of HIV-related maternal mortality in sub-
Saharan Africa summarised precisely why gender stigma and discrimination and GBV are 
so destructive to women related to HIV, especially to pregnant women: 
“Gender discrimination and HIV-related stigma violate human  
rights and contribute to poor health outcomes, in part by creating  
barriers to women’s utilization of essential maternity and HIV  
services. Anticipation or experience of disrespect and abuse in  
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maternity care and HIV-related stigma and discrimination, including 
internalized stigma, have been associated with avoidance of skilled 
delivery, refusal of antenatal HIV testing, and for women living  
with HIV, not enrolling in HIV services, and reduced adherence  
to ART for prevention of vertical HIV transmission. One of the  
most egregious forms of gender discrimination, Intimate Partner  
Violence, is associated with increased likelihood of acquiring  
and living with HIV and with poor reproductive health outcomes  
among all women” (Kendall, Danel, Cooper, et al., 2014, p. S255).  
In a relevant case in the European Court of Human Rights in 2003 between an applicant 
and France, the expert legal comments from the Center for Reproductive Rights centered 
on the human rights of the pregnant woman when she has been injured resulting in the 
involuntary termination of a wanted pregnancy: 
“Recognizing the injury caused to the pregnant woman when a 
wanted pregnancy is lost is consistent with human rights standards 
relating to women’s health and physical integrity. When addressing 
issues of violence against pregnant women, international human 
rights bodies have recognized such violence as an infringement 
of the rights of the pregnant woman…” (Katzive and Zampas,  
2003, pp. 9-10). 
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There are just so many issues women who test positive for HIV face in southern Africa 
related to the predominance of poverty, the commonality of interpersonal violence, and 
possible depression resulting for their situations in general, especially if they are pregnant 
and exacerbated by testing HIV-positive, that it seems impossible to justify the rather 
cavalier attitude that everyone should be routinely tested for HIV, most particularly 
pregnant women. To think that PITC/routine testing is non-maleficent based on the 
evidence cited herein is ignorant, if not maleficent itself. 
  
The following final chapter will tie the various threads together explored herein on the 
bioethical and human rights implications surrounding the HIV testing of women and girls 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter will reach some conclusions as well as provide some 
recommendations for HIV testing and counselling interventions that promise some success 
in respecting and abiding by the individual and collective rights of these groups, while also 
addressing effective strategies to prevent further HIV infections.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE 
 
6.0 BIOETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR HIV TESTING OF WOMEN 
IN AFRICA 
In the preceding chapters, a number of points have been made about the bioethics and 
human rights challenges related to the HIV testing of women in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Included in these arguments have been many examples of how these challenges play out 
for women and girls in various sub-Saharan African countries and settings. The related 
philosophical principles also have been discussed in previous chapters. Some further 
explication will support and show why these principles and practices are important to 
address to strengthen both individual and global health toward better outcomes for women 
and girls in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
As discussed several times earlier in this paper, HIV is a greater biological, 
socioeconomic, and human rights threat to women than it is to men. This threat initially 
can be manifested through insensitive and even ignorant approaches to and conditions 
within which women and girls are tested for HIV, some against their knowledge of the 
testing, some coerced into the testing to be able to receive whatever care they have come to 
a clinic for, some informed that the testing is mandatory as a means of coercion, and some 
tested without any attempt by health professionals to implement informed consent of the 
testing process or to communicate the potential testing outcomes and what they mean, as 
well as future prevention, treatment, and care options, if any. Yet informed consent for 
HIV testing as an aspect of access to health-related information and services is a core 
bioethical and human right as the following describe:  
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1. “Because every health intervention (be it examination or treatment) 
constitutes interference with the individual, it is subject to the 
requirement of free and informed consent…” (Tomasevski, 1995, 
p. 136). 
2. “Consent is defined as the agreement, expressed either verbally or  
in writing, to a proposed action or situation. For purposes of medical  
intervention or research, consent given by a subject for a procedure,  
course of treatment, or any other health intervention to be performed,  
must be informed. The subject should receive information about the  
intervention and must indicate that they understand the possible risks 
and/or benefits of participation; and, if consent is given, that it has  
been done so voluntarily without any feeling of coercion” (Fox,  
Ferguson, Ajose, et al., 2013, p. 3). 
3. “Informed consent has historically been a cornerstone to ensuring  
autonomy during HIV testing…As the new guidance on HIV testing  
is implemented in different settings, it is critical to monitor women’s  
testing experiences to ensure that a woman’s right to make an informed,  
voluntary choice is not violated. Furthermore, models of testing that  
allow us to meet broader public health goals while simultaneously 
respecting women’s autonomy are needed” (Groves, Maman, 
Msomi, et al., 2010, p. 1).  
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I would argue that the statement cited in 3, above, by women’s health and research 
professionals about South Africa’s new HIV testing protocol on routine testing in 2010 is 
no less important for women today in 2015 than it was then. Indeed, as recently as two 
years ago in 2013, South Africa’s HIV epidemic was described by two South African 
physicians as “a poorly controlled human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic with 
high HIV prevalence, late diagnosis and incomplete access to timely treatment,” implying 
that the public health interventions regarding HIV were not working (Richter & Dreyer, 
2013, p. 2920). This was despite the country’s routine testing policy having been put in 
place three years earlier. Informed consent remains a critical piece of the routine testing 
process, whether routine testing is suggested by health professionals in South Africa or in 
any other country.  
 
6.1 BIOETHICAL CHALLENGES OF HIV TESTING OF ADOLESCENTS 
Informed consent and indeed consent is a critical issue related to HIV testing particularly 
pertinent in the case of adolescents, as consent for HIV testing by adolescents varies from 
country to country related to the age of consent and whether a parent or guardian also 
needs to give consent for the testing of the adolescent; and, adolescents account for more 
than 41% of new HIV infections in the 15-49 age group worldwide (Fox, et al., 2013, pp. 
3-4). The issues surrounding HIV testing, informed consent, and consent itself are of 
special concern to adolescent girls and young women in sub-Saharan Africa, where they 
account for 71% of the 3.8 million HIV infections in their age group across the region, 
which is also 76% of the global total of HIV infections among adolescents and young 
people (ibid., p. 1). Thus HIV testing, access to it if desired, the freedom to test or not, 
coercion related to it, and the potential lack of being able to test without parental 
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permission are all important issues surrounding the testing of adolescents, especially girls, 
in sub-Saharan Africa. These issues are at the core of HIV testing for adolescent girls in 
the region because of their heightened biological vulnerability to HIV infection as well as 
the greater risk they face because of the commonality of GBV, including gang rape, for 
which they need access to PEP within 72 hours afterward to minimise their HIV infection 
risk (ibid., p. 2).   
 
It is critically important to protect the rights of women and girls related to HIV from the 
outset, that is, by providing access to information and HIV prevention methods and by 
helping to protect them from infection and maltreatment through HIV counselling and 
testing using a bioethical and human rights-based approach. According to the Report of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights in 2013, with an 
intentional focus on women as a vulnerable and marginalised group: 
“As part of their core obligations States must ensure the right of  
access to health facilities, goods, information and services— 
including in the area of sexual and reproductive health—on a  
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or  
marginalized groups” (Sepúlveda Carmona, 2013, p. 12).   
Eight years earlier in 2005 human rights lawyer Katarina Tomasevski addressed the 
“multiple human rights implications of HIV testing” as follows: 
“UNAIDS [has] advocated routine HIV testing in the context  
of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy and ‘where HIV  
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is prevalent and antiretroviral treatment is available. Whether  
individuals can opt out of such routine testing depends on their  
knowledge of this choice and their capacity to exercise it…The  
conditions that make it possible for people to choose or refuse  
testing, or to refuse risky behavior whereby they might become  
infected, require examination of broader legal rules, not only  
those related to testing…Denials of women’s rights impede the  
ability to self-protect” (2005, p. 4).  
In the passage above, Tomsaevski focused her concern about HIV testing on the 
importance of having the choice to test or not. Related to choice is whether individuals 
facing routine testing for HIV are really autonomous and see themselves in a position to be 
able to make their own choice about testing—if they are given the opportunity—and 
believe they will not suffer any deleterious consequences from healthcare providers if they 
choose not to test for HIV. That having access to health services is crucial for anyone 
anywhere, and especially individuals in Africa where health services can be far less 
available than they are in industrialised countries, or of poor quality where they are 
available, is a caveat related to any disease and access to potential treatment or related 
services, including HIV and AIDS, and indeed HIV testing.  
 
6.2 RECENT HIV RESEARCH RESULTS RELATED TO CHALLENGES 
WOMEN FACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
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A recent framework for the right of girls to education included in the ongoing Global 
Study on Women, Peace and Security by the United Nations focuses on the need for: 
availability; accessibility; acceptability; and, adaptability of education (Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, 2015, p. 8). I would argue that this same framework is an 
excellent one to apply to health services, including HIV testing. One size does not fit all 
related to education, health, or HIV testing. That many of the women participants in the 
recent Vaginal and Oral interventions to Control the Epidemic (VOICE) (MTN 003) HIV 
prevention trial conducted in South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2012 
who had agreed to take ART daily or use a vaginal microbicide to prevent sexual 
transmission of HIV neglected or decided not to take or use the prevention product, yet 
lied about not doing so for months so they could have access to monthly health services, 
shows how important such health service access really is, particularly to women in sub-
Saharan Africa (Mastro, Sista and Abdool-Karim, 2014, p. 4). Yet the disappointing study 
results also documented how large an issue the stigma and discrimination surrounding HIV 
is in their communities, where women feared repercussions if they were seen as having 
any relationship to the possibility of present or future HIV infection, a level of stigma that 
was documented also by men in the communities (Saag, 2014, p. 565). It does not seem 
hard to imagine in this context fraught with stigma and discrimination related to HIV that 
the routine testing of individuals, particularly women, could backfire regarding the 
“acceptability” of this type of health service as a gateway to care for any health problem. 
It’s a shame that apparently more than $90 million was spent and several years in the lives 
of the many women, health researchers, and physicians who were involved in this major 
study, whose disappointing results underscore the need to better understand the plight and 
behaviours of individual women and women as a group encountering the HIV epidemic in 
sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.). There remains an urgent need to systematically start to 
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politically, programmatically, and legally address the gender inequalities that foment the 
HIV epidemic, as well as the prevalent stigma and discrimination that continue to fuel the 
epidemic spread, particularly among women.  
 
The VOICE study also recorded extraordinarily high annual HIV incidence rates of 4 to 
9% in the women participating in the prevention trial in the three countries, rates that were 
significantly higher than expected by the study’s designers (Mastro, Sista and Abdool-
Karim, 2014, p. 1). Despite these depressing research study results, the need for more 
individuals to test for HIV to be able to get access to ART remains paramount. Because of 
this ongoing need, I propose that the prioritisation of routine testing as the HIV testing 
approach in South Africa and other sub-Saharan African countries should be reviewed as a 
truly ethically viable and acceptable and indeed successful ‘routine’ HIV testing strategy 
for everyone seeking health care for any condition in this region, including pregnant 
women, adolescent girls, all women, and members of any minority groups.     
 
The VOICE trial, I believe, also documents the ultimate goal of the study participants as 
self-preservation, which I discussed at length in Chapter 5 related to the historic 
philosophical underpinning of this right—the ultimate human right—by Descartes, 
Hobbes, Kant, Locke, Mill, and Rousseau, among others. The concern of many of the 
women participants in VOICE with the opportunity to have access to monthly health care, 
many not wanting to take or use an unproven HIV prevention product on a regular basis so 
as not to possibly jeopardise their own health, and the potential physical, emotional, and 
psychological impact of the stigma and discrimination they could suffer if they were 
known to be affiliated with HIV through their own behaviours, activities, or via rumors in 
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the community supports their overall priority of self-preservation, the preservation of their 
positions in their families, socially in their communities, and even their reproductive 
future.  I would argue that they should not be faulted for their need to protect and realise 
their own right to self-preservation. Rather, there needs to be more community 
mobilisation, planning, and acceptance, including methods to address gender disparities, 
implemented in advance of where such trials are funded to take place related to HIV in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to what I suggest was self-preservation as the real priority 
of these women, their need for individual choice also surfaced as a secondary priority. 
Having a choice is important. It generally is a priority for human beings.  
 
I also would posit that social justice and justice itself reared its head in the VOICE study 
results: it is not just to expect women to suffer potential serious stigma and discrimination 
on an individual basis for participating in a trial of any new product, even if the lives of 
many possibly could be extended if the study proves to be successful. Likewise, it is not 
just to expect women to immediately agree to routine testing for HIV supposedly to 
prevent HIV infections from occurring in other individuals when they may suffer serious 
stigma and discrimination from testing HIV-positive, or even for testing for HIV at all. 
Moreover, I don’t believe routine HIV testing can be seen as a beneficent act unless 
anyone who tests HIV-positive has immediate access or a referral for access to ART if 
indeed they decide to go ahead with the test. And, I believe that in order to be ethical, 
routine testing must include pre-test counselling, fully informed consent, time to deliberate 
on one’s individual testing decision, post-test counselling, and referrals to other available 
services. Where there is no more or less immediate ART access, or access to any other 
services, and where only single-dose nevirapine is available for PMTCT, I do not believe 
that routine testing is a beneficent or ethical HIV testing protocol. Further, as mentioned in 
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Chapter 5, routine testing for HIV, as practiced in some or perhaps even many health 
facilities in sub-Saharan Africa, is maleficent in that it can indeed harm an individual, 
especially someone who has not considered HIV testing previously, or someone who 
knows that merely testing for HIV may commence stigma and discrimination through a 
lack of confidentiality at health facilities that can spread across communities. These 
situations have been documented, and examples have been provided in previous chapters 
of this paper. For women who potentially face GBV because of testing for HIV, including 
testing HIV-positive, their health will suffer, psychologically even if not physically, and 
the impact may be long lasting or life threatening. What’s more, they may be thrown out of 
their homes and even ostracised by their communities, or shunned by their family 
members and neighbors if they are allowed to remain living in the same place. They may 
lose their jobs—if they are lucky enough to have one—and they suddenly may have to 
figure out how their child or children or other family members can possibly be supported 
in the future. These are real issues of survival. These issues revolve around HIV testing 
here and now in 2015. 
 
I believe all the issues surrounding HIV testing and indeed routine testing, or provider-
initiated HIV testing, of women in sub-Saharan Africa have not been comprehensively 
examined before such policies have been put into place and routine testing has started to be 
implemented routinely. This stance was the genesis of this paper. I hope that some of the 
issues discussed herein have further illuminated how serious and important the 
reconsideration of HIV testing related to the contextual situation of gender-power relations 
of women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa really is. There is no time to waste by 
continuing to use HIV prevention and/or care approaches that do not work or that do not 
work for women. According to Geary and Bukusi, 
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  “Reducing HIV transmission among women in sub-Saharan 
  Africa is key to ending the global AIDS epidemic, where over 
  70% of all new infections occur each year. Out of the over 16 
  million women living with HIV globally, over 12 million are 
  in sub-Saharan Africa” (2014, p. 1). 
To prevent further HIV infections among women, women have to be able to have access to 
HIV prevention methods and they have to be willing and want to use them. We are still 
lost amidst the framework of ‘availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability’ 
related to overall health services, as well as HIV-related services, including testing. The 
need for women to make their own HIV testing decisions, whether it is to access voluntary 
counselling and testing, community- or home-based HIV testing, agree to diagnostic HIV 
testing if they are ill and seek care, or even access ethically promoted and implemented 
routine testing, whether they are healthy, ill, or pregnant, is each and every woman and 
girl’s human right. No one has the right to take this human right away from any of them.  
 
6.3 CONCLUSION ON THE BIOETHICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
CHALLENGES OF THE HIV TESTING OF WOMEN IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
Where HIV testing is practiced in sub-Saharan African countries, and anywhere for that 
matter, without alignment with the bioethical principles of respect for autonomy, justice, 
beneficence, and non-maleficence, and without protecting the human rights of individuals 
testing for HIV, including the provision of pre- and post-test counselling, implementing 
the informed consent process, maintaining the confidentiality of test results, and making 
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referrals to other services available to all individuals who test negative or positive as well 
as making antiretroviral therapy (ART) available to anyone who tests HIV-positive, such 
testing is unethical. Thus I posit that the routine testing for HIV of all individuals 
presenting to a clinic for healthcare—and the routine testing of all pregnant women for 
HIV—amidst the highly stigmatised HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa is unethical. 
 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMMATIC AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO HIV TESTING 
The following are recommendations for either policy or programmatic considerations 
related to HIV testing: 
• Where routine or provider-initiated testing can be promoted and implemented in an 
ethical manner, including pre-test counselling, fully informed consent, enough time 
to deliberate whether to test or not, post-test counselling including individual risk-
reduction counselling for anyone testing HIV-positive so they do not get re-
infected and to minimise the risk of onward transmission, or negative so they can 
prevent infection in the future, and post-test referrals, I suggest making this testing 
method an ‘opt-in’ option, rather than continue to use an ‘opt-out’ testing approach. 
• Increase the availability and accessibility of HIV testing by expanding the range of 
HIV testing options offered in communities and at facilities, including door-to-door 
home-based testing by trained providers; community-based voluntary counselling 
and testing using trained lay counsellors; expanded hours for voluntary counselling 
and testing at health facilities, which also could be staffed by trained lay 
counsellors; and, sale of HIV testing kits with 24/7 phone lines available staffed by 
trained HIV/GBV counsellors to provide counselling support. 
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• Restrict routine testing to where ART is directly available to anyone testing HIV-
positive and include adherence counselling, as well as follow-up care or make 
referrals to local follow-up: including prevention, treatment, care, and support 
services. 
• Add HIV counselling and testing to all physician and nursing curricula in medical 
and nursing schools in sub-Saharan Africa and include bioethics and human rights 
training as part of this curriculum, as well as expand the training of community-
based counsellors to include human and sexual and reproductive rights. 
• Lower the age of HIV testing to 12 without the need for parental or guardian 
consent in the countries and/or locations where currently the age of consent is older 
than 12 or parental consent also is needed.    
• Make sexual and reproductive health education with a central focus on healthy 
behaviours and gender equality a mandatory curriculum for boys and girls in all 
schools starting at age 8 and implement teacher and principal training on this topic 
where needed. 
• Expand the availability of PEP for females and males—adults, adolescents, and 
children—in health facilities in sub-Saharan African countries with generalised 
HIV epidemics and include training for the police to ensure immediate care before 
a police report, where needed, is filed, and make PEP available for anyone who 
wants it based on potential HIV exposure, not just related to GBV or potential 
nosocomial exposure. 
• Enforce the laws on the prevention and occurrence of GBV for both girls and boys 
and women and men and advocate for and enact laws, where needed, on this 
widespread crime in sub-Saharan African countries, especially the high-prevalence 
countries in southern Africa; and, review and reform any discriminatory laws based 
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on HIV transmission criminalisation in sub-Saharan African countries with a 
special focus on women and minority groups.  
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